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Abstract 
I ask how audiences engage with impossible fiction, defined here as any fiction of any media 
which represents an absolute impossibility (excepting cases of empty reference). In 
particular, I am interested in how impossible fiction is absorbed, understood and enjoyed 
by its readers. I focus on the practices of readers, and in particular their beliefs and 
imaginings concerning the content of impossible fiction. I consider three significant issues 
in this area. 
First, the concept of normalisation, which I adapt from literary theory. Normalisation 
explains observations from Daniel Nolan and Derek Matravers about the tendency for 
readers to view impossible fictions as examples of unreliable narration. Second, the 
puzzlement readers experience when a work of impossible fiction proves to be beyond 
conventional understanding. Considering work by Umberto Eco, as well as philosophical 
treatments of the sublime, I suggest that this puzzlement may have unique effects on the 
reader’s aesthetic judgements of a fiction. Third, I consider when and why impossibilities 
are and are not part of what the reader imagines while engaged with an impossible fiction. 
This follows work by Tamar Gendler and Kathleen Stock on how readers imagine 
impossibilities in fiction. 
Each of these analyses is accompanied by examples from the wide range of 
impossible fictions, from postmodernist experiments like Alain Robbe-Grillet’s La Maison de 
Rendez-vous to contemporary horror such as Mark Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves. The 
range of examples from fiction is almost as diverse and disparate as existing academic work 
on reader engagement with impossible fiction, but I draw out common features in both 
bodies of literature. I combine work in imagination, fiction and narratology in order to provide 
a robust, principled description of how and why readers engage with impossible fiction. 
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Introduction 
 
There is a class of fiction which depicts impossibilities. These impossible fictions feature 
bizarre, contradictory events or objects. They include the temporal paradoxes of Back to 
the Future, the eldritch horrors of H.P. Lovecraft, and the absurd convolutions of Terry 
Pratchett. They include the postmodernist experiments of Alain Robbe-Grillet, Gilbert 
Sorrentino and Flann O’Brien, as well as the fourth wall-breaking antics of Deadpool and 
The Stanley Parable. These are all stories, which makes them natural, appropriate objects 
of aesthetic attention and appreciation. Yet the philosophical literature on impossible fiction 
offers little discussion of this aesthetic aspect. Instead, the vast majority of philosophical 
work on impossible fiction discusses their implications for logic or metaphysics.1 Topics 
include how theories of fictional truth are affected by impossible fictions, and what 
implications these fictions have for the rules of logic in fictional worlds. These issues are 
heavily discussed, and this thesis does not pursue them. Instead, I focus on impossible 
fictions as stories. I consider the experience of readers who are faced with these sorts of 
extreme fictions. My goal is to provide a compelling account of how fictional impossibilities 
systematically change the ways in which readers engage with, appreciate and understand 
fiction.  
My central question, then, is how the cognitive aspects of engagement with 
impossible fiction differ from engagement with standard, possible fiction. I answer this 
question with three key claims: 
1. Impossible fictions prompt the reader to normalise the fiction. This is a process by 
which the reader attempts to either explain or explain away the presence of 
impossible elements. 
2. The practice of normalisation is remarkably flexible. It can account for how readers 
engage with even the most challenging impossible fictions. 
3. Readers can engage imaginatively with impossible fictions, and frequently do so in 
the same way that they typically engage imaginatively with fiction.  
Each of these claims is the subject of a chapter in this thesis. A thesis overview is included 
at the end of this introduction which indicates where each claim is discussed. 
 
1 For example, Lewis (1983b), Badura & Berto (2018), Nolan (2007) and Priest (1997). 
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 In the process of discussing impossible fiction, I make a further significant claim. 
This is that there is a productive way of talking about the events of stories without discussing 
fictional truth-statements—that the question ‘What happens in the story?’ is one about 
reader psychology and aesthetic experience as well as one about ontology of fiction. I look 
at how readers answer the question without reference to theories of fictional truth. Readers 
have particular impressions of what occurs in the fictions they read, and these impressions 
are responsible for the nature of the experience readers have. They are more directly 
responsible for the experience readers have than formal accounts of fictional truth. This 
differentiation between fictional truth and reader impressions is important for my work 
because it allows me to discuss reader experiences at a general level. This thesis is 
intended to be theory-neutral in terms of what constitutes fictional truths, and the concept 
of impressions saves me from committing to a single account of fiction when discussing 
fictional impossibilities. A full account of reader impressions and their significance is given 
in Chapter 2. 
 The overall conclusion of this thesis is that fictional impossibilities can affect reader 
experience in significant ways, but not in unique ways. Not only is fiction itself much too 
broad a church for definitive statements like ‘Engagement with impossible fiction is distinct 
from engagement with other kinds of fiction’ to hold up, readers are extremely flexible when 
it comes to engaging with fictions of all kinds. In fact, I recommend that generalised claims 
about how readers interpret impossible fiction tend to be misleading. Attempts to pigeonhole 
the ways in which impossible fiction is read are doomed to failure at the hands of a single 
idiosyncratic reader. This is a feature of my claim rather than a flaw. My overall conclusion 
does not only give insight into how readers do respond to impossible fiction; it also promises 
to shed light on reader engagement with other cases of non-standard fiction. 
My methodology is theoretical rather than empirical. This is for two reasons. The 
first is that there is very little empirical data available about how readers respond to 
impossible fiction. The second is that, even if empirical studies were set up, there must be 
some conjecture about which effects on the reader are due to fictional impossibilities and 
which are due to other idiosyncrasies in the fictions used as test cases. There is no control 
group available; no pair of fictions which are identical save for the fact that one contains a 
logical impossibility. This makes an experimental approach to the issue less appealing, 
since it would be difficult if not impossible to show that results were actually the effects of 
fictional impossibilities. Instead, I limit this thesis to a theoretical investigation.  
This does not reduce my work to intuitions alone. Some limited work in analytic 
philosophy exists on the subject, notably from philosophers such as Tamar Gendler (2000), 
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Kathleen Stock (2003; 2017) and Derek Matravers (2014). These philosophers offer insight 
into impossible fiction which helps refine and calibrate my arguments. Another resource is 
the substantial volume of research in literary studies concerning reader responses to 
impossible and unnatural fiction. These also contribute to my argument, although they must 
be analysed carefully in order to align their claims with analytic aesthetics. My theorising 
can therefore be supported by existing work, even if finding conclusive empirical evidence 
is not practical. 
 Theorising is for nothing if it does not take into account the responses readers have 
to real works of fiction. To illustrate and test my arguments, I draw extensively on works of 
fiction. Practically speaking, the sample fictions I draw on are most frequently works of film 
and literature.2 These are not the only available media which support impossible fiction—in 
fact, I do not rule out any medium. Frequently the fictions I mention are impossible fictions, 
which I describe in order to demonstrate a particular point about impossible fiction in 
general. On other occasions, I describe standard, possible fictions. This is usually in order 
to make a comparison between impossible fictions and standard fictions. In some cases, it 
is because the possible fiction has been the subject of theory or criticism which is relevant 
to cases of impossible fiction. Where there is potential confusion, I clarify whether I consider 
the fiction to be impossible or possible.  
As mentioned above, I do not think that my main three claims are unique to 
impossible fictions. Other, so-called ‘unnatural’ fictions—a category of fictions which depict 
impossible or uncanny events of any kind—may have similar effects on the reader to those 
of impossible fiction. There are many parallels between my project, an investigation of the 
aesthetic effects of impossible fiction, and Jan Alber’s sustained focus on the poetics of 
unnatural narrative (2014; 2016; Alber and Heinze 2011). Impossible fictions, however, 
have several distinguishing features which set them apart from unnatural fiction. There are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for impossible fiction (discussed in Chapter 1), while the 
category of ‘unnatural fiction’ is vague. Furthermore, philosophers are sometimes 
prescriptive about how impossible fiction is interpreted on the basis of metaphysical 
commitments to possible worlds (Hanley 2004; Lewis 1983b; Nolan 2007). These concerns 
do not apply to unnatural fictions, which only sometimes violate metaphysical necessity. 
Due to these differences, it is worth discussing impossible fictions separately from unnatural 
fictions in general. More could be done to develop philosophical work on unnatural 
 
2 To avoid convolution, I refer to engagement with fictions as ‘reading’, and to the audience of any 
work of fiction as ‘readers’, no matter which verb and noun would normally be used.  
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narratives, and to bring the fruits of narratological work in this area to bear on philosophy of 
fiction. However, such work falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
 I conclude this introduction with a synopsis of each chapter. 
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for later arguments by discussing how the distinct 
areas of possibility and fiction intertwine. My goal in this first chapter is to establish a 
concrete definition of impossible fiction. In order to do so, I search for the strongest sense 
of impossibility available, which I call absolute impossibility. I do this by investigating how 
philosophers have defined various kinds of necessity, including logical, conceptual, analytic 
and metaphysical necessity. This work leads me to an initial, simple definition: a work of 
fiction is an impossible fiction if it represents an absolute impossibility. That is to say, 
impossible fictions represent things which could not occur in any possible world. This 
restrictive definition allows me to isolate fictions which are impossible in a non-trivial, 
philosophically interesting sense. 
This simple definition is not sufficient. In the second half of the chapter, I discuss a 
counterexample: standard, possible fictions which include empty references and therefore 
could not occur in any possible world. To better understand this problem, I consider the 
work of Saul Kripke. Kripke’s account of fictional names and predicates suggests they are 
all empty expressions (Kripke 2013). I revise my simple definition to accommodate these 
cases: a fiction is an impossible fiction if it represents absolute impossibilities besides those 
merely involving empty references. I defend this revised definition against potential 
criticisms. 
 Chapter 2 continues this groundwork. It considers what it means for a fiction to 
represent an absolute impossibility. I investigate three potential explanations of 
representation: fictional truth, direct content (the words, images and sounds which make up 
fiction), and Craig Bourne & Emily Caddick Bourne’s notion of truth to a story (Bourne and 
Caddick Bourne 2016). I argue that none of these are appropriate for modelling 
representation for my work. Instead, I argue that reader impressions—the reader’s beliefs 
and imaginings which relate to the fiction—best explain what it means for a fiction to 
represent absolute impossibilities. I define and defend the concept of reader impressions. I 
also discuss its relationship with Stock’s similar concept of F-imagining. By defining 
representation in terms of impressions, I keep my account applicable to a wide range of 
theories of fictional truth. A benefit of this is that a discussion of impossible fiction can be 
conducted in a way which does not exclude Lewisian philosophers of fiction—key players 
in existing discussions of impossible fiction. 
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 Chapter 3 marks the start of my analysis of the effects of impossible fiction on the 
reader. I address the theme shared across arguments from Daniel Nolan, Richard Hanley 
and Derek Matravers: that impossible fiction is best interpreted as unreliable narrative 
(Hanley 2004; Matravers 2014; Nolan 2007). In order to account for the fact that some 
impossible fictions resist this sort of interpretation, I introduce and explain the notion of 
normalisation. Normalisation, originally developed by structuralist theorists, is the process 
by which readers tend to interpret in ways which make them more able to access and enjoy 
a work of fiction. Work by Tamar Yacobi, combined with related work by Matravers, gives a 
list of principled methods of normalisation (Yacobi 1981; Matravers 2014). This list helps to 
show why some impossible fictions sponsor an interpretation of unreliable narration, while 
others do not. 
 Chapter 4 concerns the normalisation of more challenging works of fiction. I use the 
example of Alain Robbe-Grillet’s La Maison de Rendez-vous, a challenging and deliberately 
obscure work of impossible fiction. It is not clear how readers unfamiliar with Robbe-Grillet’s 
work can normalise this fiction. To show how normalisation can proceed, I discuss Umberto 
Eco’s work on impossible fiction (Eco 1994). In particular, I analyse Eco’s claim that there 
are first-level, naive readings and second-level, reflective readings available to the reader. 
I criticise Eco’s characterisation of the first-level reader, but I show how his picture of the 
second-level reader fits within my account of normalisation. I finish by suggesting reasons 
why reading the twisting narrative of impossible fictions like La Maison de Rendez-vous can 
be pleasurable in and of itself. 
 Chapter 5 concerns the relation between impossibility and imaginability. I engage 
with the debate on whether the reader is able to imagine what is depicted in an impossible 
fiction. This debate creates a tension between widely accepted theories about the 
imagination. If reading fiction successfully involves close imaginative engagement, but 
people are not able to imagine the absolutely impossible, it is not clear how readers can 
successfully engage with impossible fiction. I investigate several ways of dissolving this 
tension. I also suggest that the reader’s ability to imagine indeterminately—that is to say, to 
imagine that something is determinate without actually imagining a specific state of affairs—
allows her to phenomenally imagine (i.e., form imaginings which are phenomenally rich)  
many impossible fictions to precisely the same extent that she does possible fictions. 
I synthesise the lessons from these three argumentative chapters into the following: 
there are several philosophically interesting aspects to the experience of impossible fiction, 
but each of these aspects might also be found in the process of reading non-impossible 
fiction. There are no effects on the reader’s experience that are unique to impossible fiction. 
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This is partially due to the sheer malleability of fiction: different readers will find different 
things striking, and there is no guarantee that two readers will have the same experience 
given the same work of fiction. However, general principles can be found which show typical 
responses to this kind of fiction. These show the diversity of ways in which readers can 
engage with impossible fictions.  
Impossible fictions are more than just metaphysical curios. They are different 
enough from typical fictions that it is not clear whether standard models of the reader’s 
imaginative and narrative engagement can accommodate them. My thesis shows when and 
how they can, and it offers explanations of what happens when they cannot.  
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1. Impossibility and Fiction 
 
And as they drifted up, their minds sang with the ecstatic knowledge that either what they were 
doing was completely and utterly and totally impossible or that physics had a lot of catching 
up to do.  
- Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This chapter sets out the definition of impossible fiction which I use in this thesis. My goal 
is to isolate a class of fiction with philosophically interesting impossible content. In order to 
do so, I explain how notions of possibility, necessity and impossibility interact with fiction. In 
the first half of the chapter I argue that there is a type of necessity which is absolute. This 
necessity applies to all circumstances in a completely unrestricted fashion. In the second 
half of the chapter, I consider how absolute necessity is represented in fiction. Fictions which 
break this type of necessity, with one notable exception provided by Kripke, are what I call 
impossible fictions. 
I argue that this class of impossible fiction deserves special attention. Impossible 
fictions complicate standard ways in which readers engage with and enjoy works of fiction. 
This has knock-on effects on the reader’s understanding and aesthetic appreciation of these 
fictions. For this reason, part of my approach is to differentiate between uninteresting, 
standard ways in which fictions represent impossibilities, and significant, contra-standard 
representations of impossibility in fiction. My definition is restrictive in that it only addresses 
the strongest sense of impossibility. This is in order to isolate this latter kind of fiction. 
I begin by outlining how philosophers discuss possibility and necessity. I seek out 
the strongest sense of necessity, a project shared with several other philosophers such as 
Daniel Nolan and Francesco Berto. I contrast this absolute necessity with the merely 
relative, restricted types of necessity which are routinely broken in typical works of fiction. 
This gives a simple definition of impossible fiction: any work of fiction which depicts 
something absolutely impossible is a work of impossible fiction. 
The remainder of the chapter discusses how Saul Kripke’s work on fictional 
reference complicates this simple definition and demands its revision. I outline Kripke’s 
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objection: the existence of empty fictional references. This is problematic for my definition, 
as according to Kripke no fictional names refer to possible entities. This makes the simple 
definition of impossible fiction vacuous, as it includes all works of fiction which include 
fictional names. In order to accommodate this issue, I revise the definition to specifically 
exclude cases of empty references from impossible fiction. 
In an appendix to the chapter, I show how my revised definition articulates previous, 
less targeted or extensive attempts to define impossible fiction. I outline the definitions used 
by, among others, Kendall Walton, David Lewis, Tamar Gendler, Kathleen Stock and Nolan. 
The only philosopher whose work on impossible fiction goes against my revised definition 
is Derek Matravers. I offer some challenges to Matravers’s definition, as well as some 
reasons why Matravers may not have much at stake in his definition of impossible fiction.  
 
1.2  How are impossible fictions impossible? 
This section introduces the notion of impossibility. I show how philosophers distinguish 
between various different kinds of impossibility, and illustrate these kinds are represented 
in fiction. The purpose of the section is twofold. First, it lays out the vocabulary I use to 
discuss necessity and impossibility in fiction. Second, it introduces the notion of absolute 
necessity. This, I argue, is the kind of impossibility which characterises impossible fiction.  
Impossibility is one of three basic modal states along with necessity and possibility. 
If something is necessary, then it must be the case. If something is possible, then it may or 
may not be the case. If something is impossible, it must not be the case. When we call 
something impossible, we claim that it is neither necessary nor possible. However, there 
are many senses in which something can be necessary, possible or impossible. We might 
consider whether something is physically possible. For example, it is physically impossible 
for human beings to fly. We might consider whether it is legally or ethically possible to 
commit murder. An action may be possible in one respect but impossible in another. For a 
person, flying is legally possible but physically impossible. These different strains of 
possibility reflect different constraints on the set of objects and circumstances we consider 
when judging whether something is necessary, possible or impossible. Asking if it is 
physically possible for a human to fly is analogous to asking if a flying human could, must 
or cannot be included on the list of objects which are governed by the laws of physics. We 
place different restrictions on our use of the term ‘impossible’ by stating which kind of 
necessity we are discussing.  
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Given all of these restricted senses of impossibility, types of impossible fiction may 
seem to be equally varied. There are fictions which represent biological impossibilities: 
situations which defy the laws of biology. The enormous Godzilla, for example, is so large 
that it should collapse under its own weight. In the dozens of films, comics and television 
shows in which Godzilla features, however, the monster is fully mobile. Many fictions feature 
physical impossibilities. The laws of physics necessitate that nothing with mass can travel 
faster than light, but science fictions such as Star Trek regularly flout this fact. Poorly 
researched hospital dramas might depict medically impossible deaths and cures. Grey’s 
Anatomy is infamous in this regard. Courtroom media may depict scenarios which are 
legally impossible—the trial depicted in Duck Soup would never hold up in a real courtroom. 
Works such as Hackers and Swordfish depict computer hacking far outside the realms of 
technological possibility. In some sense, all of these fictions are impossible. They are 
impossible with regards to certain restrictions found in the actual world; the restrictions of 
physics, of biology, of medicine, law and technology. 
Although these are cases of fiction which represent something impossible, these are 
not examples of what I refer to as ‘impossible fiction’. This is because these works are not 
remarkable by the standards of fiction. Fiction frequently trades on situations which are, 
when considered relative to the actual world, impossible. Just as murder is physically but 
not legally possible, the above-mentioned cases are possible under a restricted sense of 
the term. They do not represent alethic impossibilities: statements which imply by their mere 
utterance that they are true (Kment 2017). It could have been the case that the square-cube 
law or the speed of light were different, so Godzilla and Star Trek represent restricted, 
contingent impossibilities. This makes them uninteresting for my purposes, as an 
investigation into these weakly impossible fictions is effectively an investigation into fiction 
as a whole. In order to isolate philosophically interesting cases of impossible fiction, I must 
find a maximally unrestricted, alethic kind of impossibility.  
Finding an unrestricted kind of impossibility is precisely Francesco Berto’s project in 
his work on impossible worlds. In the following, written with Mark Jago, Berto outlines the 
most likely candidate for the kind of impossibility which characterises impossible worlds: 
This... is about worlds which are not possible, with “possible” understood in an unrestricted 
sense. Start with the intuitive idea of the totality of possible worlds, which capture all and only 
the genuine possibilities. The worlds we are interested in are not there. These worlds are often 
called logically impossible worlds, as logical laws such as the Law of Non-Contradiction or the 
Law of Excluded Middle are assumed to be the most general and topic-neutral: they are 
supposed to hold at all possible worlds (Berto and Jago 2018). 
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Berto and Jago isolate necessities which are binding in all possible worlds. This gives a 
working notion of unrestricted necessity: if something could occur in a possible world, then 
that thing is not unrestrictedly impossible. 
The same principle can be applied to a definition of impossible fiction. If a fiction 
contains only events which could take place in a possible world (as Grey’s Anatomy and 
Swordfish do), then it should not count as an impossible fiction. Including these fictions 
would result in a weak definition which accommodates the majority of works of fiction. 
Instead, impossible fictions are those which represent things which could not be manifested 
in any possible world. Berto provides an example of this unrestricted type of impossibility: 
logical impossibility. A fiction which includes this type of impossibility would have the form: 
(1) In fiction F, p & in F, ¬p. 
By representing logical impossibilities, this fiction violates the law of non-contradiction. This 
is seen far more rarely in fiction than restricted impossibilities, but many logically impossible 
fictions exist. Jorge Luis Borges’s ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ contains just such a 
contradiction: the short story features a novel in which all outcomes of events are 
manifested at the same time (Borges 2018). This makes ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ an 
impossible fiction.  
Every object and event, no matter the manner of its existence, should obey the law 
of non-contradiction. This makes the law of non-contradiction absolutely necessary: it 
applies in all cases. This can be compared with the merely relatively necessary laws broken 
in Godzilla and Swordfish. Godzilla is impossible relative to certain laws of nature, such as 
the square-cube law. On a planet with weaker gravity, Godzilla would be possible. 
Swordfish is impossible relative to the limitations of early-2000s computer systems. A 
different computer system would make the events of Swordfish entirely possible. An 
inconsistent fiction (i.e., one which breaks the law of non-contradiction) is absolutely 
impossible, as the law of non-contradiction holds in all circumstances. An absolute 
impossibility is an unrestricted impossibility; one which applies to all possible worlds, and 
can never have any counterexample. This is the sort of impossibility which I focus on in this 
thesis. 
 
1.3  Example: ‘Sylvan’s Box’ 
What do absolutely impossible fictions look like? We have already seen ‘The Garden of 
Forking Paths’, where a character possesses an infinite novel. There are many others 
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besides this. This section introduces a standard case of impossible fiction: the short story 
‘Sylvan’s Box’, written by Graham Priest (1997). I outline the impossible elements of 
‘Sylvan’s Box’, and comment on its suitability as a sample case of impossible fiction. I also 
show how examples of literary fiction expand on the kind of absolute impossibility 
represented in ‘Sylvan’s Box’. This helps contextualise the work on absolute impossibility in 
the previous section and shows how real fictions can represent these sorts of impossibilities. 
 It is easy to write an impossible fiction. I myself can do so right now:  
Ladybird: Once upon a time, there was a ladybird named Sam. Sam was red all over, but also 
was not red at all. Sam had six legs, and no legs. Sam was very happy about this situation but 
wasn’t happy about it one bit. 
‘Ladybird’ is an impossible fiction (I count three absolute impossibilities, provided that all six 
legs are counted together), but it is a vestigial one. It is a world apart from ‘The Garden of 
Forking Paths’ in terms of literary style and quality. While it is easy to pen a logically 
impossible fiction like ‘Ladybird’, these perfunctory stories are vulnerable. They can be 
charged with failure to properly represent fiction in general. Nolan calls this a state of 
quarantine—fiction written in a tightly controlled environment where outside factors are 
removed (Nolan 2015: 59). Quarantined fictions are not easily subject to issues such as 
artistic licence, metaphor and interpretation, which means that the philosophical claim they 
are used to demonstrate is not so easily generalised to non-quarantined fictions. We would 
do better to draw on real examples when illustrating how absolute impossibilities are 
represented in fiction. The drawback to this approach is that these examples are frequently 
convoluted and difficult to explain without a great amount of detail. Fortunately, there is a 
middle ground available. There is an impossible fiction with the trappings of literary fiction, 
but the specific and easily understood impossibility of a thought experiment. This is Priest’s 
‘Sylvan’s Box’. 
‘Sylvan’s Box’ depicts the discovery of a logically impossible artefact in the 
belongings of a recently deceased man (a fictionalised version of Priest’s colleague, 
philosopher Richard Sylvan). The first-person narrator (a fictionalised version of Priest 
himself) has discovered a box labelled 'Impossible Object': 
Carefully, I broke the tape and removed the lid. The sunlight streamed through the window 
into the box, illuminating its contents, or lack of them. For some moments I could do nothing 
but gaze, mouth agape. At first, I thought that it must be a trick of the light, but more careful 
inspection certified that it was no illusion. The box was absolutely empty, but also had 
something in it (Priest 1997: 575). 
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This passage represents an inconsistent object. The box that narrator-Priest describes 
breaks the law of non-contradiction: something cannot be both p and not-p at the same 
time. The plot of ‘Sylvan’s Box’, brief as it is, revolves around this logically impossible box. 
This makes 'Sylvan's Box' an exemplar of impossible fiction. One must, Priest argues, 
interpret the story as impossible in order to engage with it properly. Indeed, Priest is so 
convinced that the story is essentially impossible that he claims, 'anyone who misapplied 
the principle of charity to interpret the story in a consistent way, would have entirely 
misunderstood it (Priest 1997: 580).' This is because the actions of the characters would 
make no sense if the box were actually a consistent object. According to Priest, a reading 
of 'Sylvan's Box' which claims the object is not impossible, merely presented in a deceptive 
and impossible-seeming way, would make less sense than one which claims the box is 
impossible.  
'Sylvan's Box' makes a good case sample of an impossible fiction for several more 
reasons: it is well-known as an ostensibly impossible fiction; it clearly represents an 
absolute impossibility; and it is not easily subject to Nolan’s notion of quarantining. 
The first of these reasons, that 'Sylvan's Box' is already relatively well-known as an 
impossible fiction, is beneficial because it licences using the story as a sample impossible 
fiction. There is no need to attempt to justify a reading of the story as impossible, as this is 
the default reading that Priest encourages us to take. It is the context in which the work is 
discussed in philosophy. When attempting a definition of impossible fiction from scratch, it 
is good to ensure that cases already widely recognised as impossible fiction are 
accommodated. ‘Sylvan’s Box’ serves well as such a fiction. 
The second reason is that the fiction clearly represents an absolute impossibility. 
This is due to the fact that the impossibility represented is a violation of the law of non-
contradiction. As I have already discussed via Berto, logical inconsistency is perhaps the 
most intuitively clear example of something which is unrestrictedly, absolutely impossible. 
Priest presents an alethic impossibility: by saying ‘the box was absolutely empty, but also 
had something in it’, we necessarily say something false. This impossibility is intuitively 
stronger and more binding than those broken in Star Trek and Grey’s Anatomy. An object 
should not, cannot have contradictory properties, even in cases of fiction. That ‘Sylvan’s 
Box’ depicts an intuitively alethic and absolute impossibility is why it makes a compelling 
exemplar of impossible fiction. 
Finally, ‘Sylvan’s Box’ benefits from that fact that, while specifically designed by a 
philosopher to pump intuitions about impossibilities in fiction, it is nevertheless recognisable 
as a story. This helps it avoid the charge of quarantining from Nolan, explained above. A 
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quarantined fiction is one which bears little resemblance to real works of literary fiction. 
‘Sylvan’s Box’ is short, and unlikely to win awards for its literary merit, but it has a plot and 
defined characters. It can function as an aesthetic object, not merely as an argument or 
philosophical example. ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is not quarantined, but still contains a logical 
impossibility which is difficult to interpret away—this is a virtue for an exemplar impossible 
fiction.3  
Other examples of logically impossible fiction can be found in works from various 
media. Unlike the case of ‘Sylvan’s Box’, however, the contradictions present in other works 
of impossible fiction are not always made explicit. A contradiction may be suggested without 
being described in detail, and the logically impossible elements of a fiction may be subject 
to interpretation. Certain character crossover fictions, such as the work of Flann O’Brien 
and Kathy Acker, feature such contradictions. The coexistence of two fictional characters 
from different works is not an obvious contradiction, yet it might nevertheless be considered 
contradictory upon reflection. Fictions are frequently taken to be isolated and independent 
of one another, which would make several crossover casts of characters logically 
inconsistent (McHale 1987: 57). For example, Captain Ahab is killed by the titular whale in 
Moby-Dick, but he is killed prematurely by Deadpool in Deadpool Killustrated. If we take 
seriously the notion that a character can cross over to another work of fiction, then Ahab is 
both killed by the whale and not killed by the whale: a logical impossibility. Another example 
of logically inconsistent fiction is provided by Nolan, who argues that certain fictive 
personifications of abstract entities are contradictory (Nolan 2015). The concept of Death 
does not have arms, and so cannot carry a scythe. Despite this, Death is frequently depicted 
as robed and scythe-bearing, which Nolan argues constitutes a violation of the law of non-
contradiction.4 Both the crossover and personification cases can be formalised into logical 
contradictions, though the formalisation is less obvious and more prone to challenge than 
that of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ and similar fictions. This is why, despite the multitude of log ically 
impossible fictions, ‘Sylvan’s Box’ makes a compelling example of this kind of fiction. 
 
1.4  The simple definition of impossible fiction 
This section establishes my simple definition of impossible fiction: any fiction which 
represents at least one thing which is absolutely impossible (i.e., that could not occur in any 
 
3 Several philosophers have claimed that the impossible box can be explained away. Chapter 3 of 
this thesis investigates arguments to this effect. 
4 See Bourne and Caddick Bourne (2018) for an argument against this claim. 
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possible world) is an impossible fiction. In order to inform that definition, however, I must 
consider whether there are other kinds of absolute necessity besides logical necessity. I 
address three potential candidates for absolute necessity: metaphysical, analytic and 
conceptual necessity. I argue in all cases that the status of these as absolute necessities 
does not alter my simple definition. I assume for the sake of argument that these are 
absolute necessities, but I also argue that the definition does not stand and fall on their 
inclusion. The simple definition, however, does not stand up to criticism, and it must 
eventually be replaced. However, the details of this criticism as well as a replacement 
definition are only illuminating if the simple definition is motivated and established first. 
I am interested in all kinds of absolute, unrestricted necessity. Logical necessity is 
one of these. Berto and Jago, amongst others, take logical necessity to be the widest form 
of necessity available. To Berto and Jago, if something is logically impossible then it is 
impossible in all other senses (Berto and Jago 2018). However, other philosophers claim 
that metaphysical necessity is equally strong as, or even stronger than logical necessity. In 
fact, metaphysical necessity is a popular choice for the strongest, least restricted kind of 
possibility available (Kment 2017; Kripke 1980: 36; Nolan 2011). There is substantial 
disagreement amongst philosophers over the limits of metaphysical necessity. Some see 
logical necessity as synonymous with or a subtype of metaphysical necessity (synonymous: 
Bricker 2008: 8; subtype: Fine 2002). Others, notably Nolan, claim that not all metaphysical 
impossibilities are logically impossible. Truths about the existence of God, the nature of time 
and space, and perhaps causation may be metaphysically necessary even if their negation 
does not constitute a logical contradiction (Nolan 2011: 325–326). Metaphysical necessity 
must be accounted for when searching for unrestricted kinds of possibility.  
 It is not my goal here to definitively identify metaphysical necessity. It is also not my 
goal to distinguish between logical and metaphysical necessities, or to take sides in the 
debate over whether they are distinct or coextensive. Metaphysical necessity is only 
relevant to impossible fiction if metaphysical impossibilities are absolute impossibilities. If 
impossible fictions are those which are impossible in the strongest, least restricted sense, 
then these metaphysical necessities should be included in the definition of impossible 
fiction. If metaphysical necessity is absolute (in the sense that it holds in all possible 
circumstances), then metaphysically impossible fictions are impossible fictions. I proceed 
under the assumption that this is the case, though this assumption is not load-bearing with 
regards to my definition of impossible fiction. The inclusion of metaphysical impossibilities 
in impossible fiction is conditional on their unrestrictedness. 
23 
 
The same goes for two other potentially absolute necessities: analytic and 
conceptual necessity (Nolan 2011: 325). Neither of these types of necessity have 
universally accepted definitions. However, ‘analytic necessity’ suggests that which is 
implied by definition. It is analytically necessary that a bachelor is unmarried, or that a circle 
is round. Analytically necessary truths are those which are necessary without any reference 
to the world. Again, it is possible that this category coincides entirely with logical necessity. 
Whether or not it does is not important to my definition; I mention it here only to indicate that 
it is a candidate for absolute necessity. All that matters for my work is that analytically 
impossible fictions are included in my definition if and only if analytic necessity is absolute. 
For the sake of argument, I take this to be the case. 
Conceptual necessity follows the same pattern established by metaphysical and 
analytic necessities with regards to impossible fiction. Conceptual necessity is a notion 
introduced by Leibniz, who takes it to refer to the dependency of concept y on concept z, in 
virtue of the containment of y in z (Newlands 2018). For example, the concept of checkmate 
depends on the concept of chess. It is conceptually impossible, therefore, to achieve 
checkmate in a game of darts, as the conceptual dependency on chess has been broken. 
Conceptual necessity is covered in greater detail in the appendix to this chapter, with 
particular reference to the work of Tamar Gendler and Kathleen Stock. For now, I only raise 
it as another kind of absolute necessity which may not be encompassed by logical and 
metaphysical necessity combined. Just like analytically impossible fictions, conceptually 
impossible fictions are included in my definition if conceptual necessity is absolute, which I 
grant for the sake of argument. 
 This discussion of modality suggests that a good definition of impossible fiction 
should reflect the different ways in which philosophers use the term ‘impossible’. Ideally, it 
should use the term in the absolute sense. Godzilla is not an impossible fiction, but ‘Sylvan’s 
Box’ is. Both depict something impossible, but they depict things which are impossible in 
distinct ways. Godzilla could not take place in our own world, but it could have taken place 
under different circumstances. If Earth’s gravity had been weaker, for example, Godzilla’s 
enormous mass would not pose any problem. ‘Sylvan’s Box’, on the other hand, depicts 
events which could not have taken place no matter what. There is no way the world could 
have been such that there could be an empty box with something in it. There is no possible 
world in which ‘Sylvan’s Box’ could have taken place. In an absolute sense, only one of 
these two fictions is impossible.  
The distinction between absolutely and relatively impossible fiction, as illustrated by 
the comparison between ‘Sylvan’s Box’ and Godzilla, gives me my working definition of 
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impossible fiction: a fiction is an impossible fiction iff it represents at least one circumstance 
which could not occur in any possible world. Conversely, any and all fictions which could 
take place in a possible world are not impossible fictions. I take this to be synonymous with 
the following: a work of fiction is an impossible fiction if it depicts an absolute impossibility. 
Call this the simple definition of impossible fiction. 
 The virtue of this simple definition is its flexibility and applicability. It is sensitive to 
future developments in philosophy concerning necessity. It captures the notion of 
impossible fiction without the need for an exhaustive list of types of absolute necessity. It 
leaves us able to differentiate between a fiction which is chronically impossible and one 
which is impossible merely at one moment, while still recognising that both are impossible 
fictions. As the appendix to this chapter shows, it accommodates most of the ways in which 
philosophers have previously talked about impossible fiction where they did not offer a full 
definition of their own. 
I do not, however, take the simple definition to be the most successful definition of 
impossible fiction. This is because there is a class of fictions which is captured by the simple 
definition but is not impossible in a philosophically interesting way: fictions with empty 
references. The next section explains why empty references are absolutely impossible, and 
hence why fictions with empty references fall under the simple definition. It also shows why 
these fictions should nevertheless not be considered impossible fictions. My task then is to 
preserve the virtues of the simple definition while revising it so as to remove this problematic 
class of fictions.  
 
1.5  The problem of empty references 
This section introduces a problem case for the simple definition of impossible fiction. The 
definition, it transpires, applies to more works of fiction than it ought. This includes works of 
fiction which should not fall under the definition of impossible fiction. These are works which 
include empty references. Empty references cannot be actualised in any possible world, 
because there is no referent to satisfy the reference. According to the simple definition, this 
makes any fiction with an empty reference an impossible fiction. I show why this is a problem 
using the example of Tom Wolfe’s A Man in Full. I then discuss Kripke’s work on fictional 
names (Kripke 2013). Kripke goes further than cases like A Man in Full. He argues that all 
fictional names and fictional predicates are empty references. I analyse Kripke’s argument 
and show that his objection is strong enough to motivate revising the simple definition of 
impossible fiction. 
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The problem posed by empty references can be demonstrated by ‘that thing with 
the cup’—the scandalous sexual act undertaken by Serena and Charlie Croker in Tom 
Wolfe’s A Man in Full. As Gendler establishes in ‘The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’, 
Wolfe’s description lacks any referent (Gendler 2000: 72). To the disappointment of curious 
readers, Wolfe made up the name without any notion as to what Charlie and Serena might 
be doing. This fact threatens to leave A Man in Full within the bounds of simple definition of 
impossible fiction. The argument for this can be formalised.  
(1) There is no act which satisfies the description ‘that thing with the cup’.  
(2) If there is no act which satisfies ‘that thing with the cup’, then there is no possible 
world where ‘that thing with the cup’ is performed (from the definition of possible 
worlds).  
(3) There is no possible world where ‘that thing with the cup’ is performed (from 1 and 
2). 
(4) If there is no possible world where ‘that thing with the cup’ is performed, then it is 
absolutely impossible to do ‘that thing with the cup’ (from the definition of absolute 
impossibility).  
(5) It is absolutely impossible to do ‘that thing with the cup’ (from 3 and 4). 
(6) Any fiction which represents the performance of ‘that thing with the cup’ represents 
an absolute impossibility (from 5). 
(7) In A Man in Full, Serena and Charlie perform ‘that thing with the cup’. 
(8) A Man in Full depicts an absolute impossibility (from 6 and 7).  
(9) If A Man in Full depicts an absolute impossibility, then it is an impossible fiction (from 
8 and the simple definition of impossible fiction).  
 
Therefore, A Man in Full is an impossible fiction (from 8 and 9). 
The problem is that, intuitively, A Man in Full should not be counted as an impossible fiction. 
It does not have the obviously impossible events of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ or Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland. It is painstakingly researched and highly realistic throughout. If A Man in Full 
is an impossible fiction, then the definition of impossible fiction used seems too strong. A 
similar case can be made for nonsense literature. There is no action which counts as gyring 
or gimbling, but it is the case in Lewis Carroll’s ‘Jabberwocky’ that the slithy toves gyre and 
gimble (Carroll 2001). It is not so intuitively objectionable that ‘Jabberwocky’ might be an 
impossible fiction than it is that A Man in Full might, but it is odd that something nonsensical 
could have modal properties at all. The simple definition has labelled A Man in Full and 
‘Jabberwocky’ impossible fictions. I see this as a fault in the simple definition. 
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 This problem is developed much further by Kripke in his Reference and Existence. 
Kripke questions what kind of existence we should take fictional characters, objects and 
entities to have. His central hypothesis, explained in greater detail below, is that fictional 
names cannot refer to any possible entity. Effectively, all fictional names are empty 
references in the same way as the rigid designator ‘that thing with the cup’. The same 
applies to fictional predicates: they are empty expressions. This means that there is no 
possible world where Serena Croker exists, let alone a world where she enacts ‘that thing 
with the cup’. There is also no possible world where the predicate ‘is a dragon’ can apply. 
If Kripke is correct, the simple definition of impossible fiction is useless. Defining impossible 
fiction as any fiction which depicts absolute impossibilities means any fiction which includes 
fictional names or predicates is impossible. The remainder of this section investigates 
Kripke’s claim to determine whether this threat demands the revision of the simple definition. 
In Kripke’s John Locke lectures, Reference and Existence, he combines the notion 
of fictional reference with his earlier work on modal aspects of names and identities in 
Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1980). Most notably, Kripke develops the idea that the 
meaning of a name cannot be the same as a description. For example, ‘Moses’ cannot 
mean ‘the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt’, since this would leave us unable to 
parse a sentence like ‘It is possible that somebody other than Moses could have led the 
Israelites out of Egypt’ (Kripke 2013: 32–36). Kripke uses the example of Sherlock Holmes 
to compare such a case to fiction. According to Kripke, the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ cannot 
apply to just anybody (2013: 41). It is intended to pick out an individual. We cannot interpret 
the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as, say, ‘the person who solved the mystery of the Speckled 
Band,’ else we could not understand a sentence like ‘if Sherlock Holmes had not solved the 
mystery of the Speckled Band, Mycroft could have done so.’  
It seems reasonable to separate the identity of Sherlock Holmes from the deeds 
performed in the Sherlock Holmes stories. However, Kripke shows that doing so means that 
Sherlock Holmes does not exist in any possible world. Take a real or possible person who 
did solve the mystery of the Speckled Band. This person does not have the identity of 
Sherlock Holmes in virtue of having done the things described of Holmes in these fictional 
works. Kripke writes in Naming and Necessity: 
I hold the metaphysical view that, granted that there is no Sherlock Holmes, one cannot say 
of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed. Several 
distinct possible people, and even actual ones such as Darwin or Jack the Ripper, might have 
performed the exploits of Holmes, but there is none of whom we can say that he would have 
been Holmes had he performed these exploits. For if so, which one (Kripke 1980: 158)? 
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Somebody may have been in the right place, at the right time, doing the appropriate things, 
but this does not give us any reason to suppose that this possible person is Sherlock 
Holmes. This leads Kripke to conclude that Sherlock Holmes is not the name of any possible 
person. Kripke develops this further in Reference and Existence. Since ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
does not refer to any possible object, a sentence which refers to Sherlock Holmes does not 
express a real proposition. Instead, a sentence using a fictional name is pretence: it creates 
the illusion of reference to a possible entity (Kripke 2013: 29). Sentences which include the 
name of a fictional character appear to refer to a unique person, but do not actually do so. 
When the sentence is read, the reader pretends that she is reading a sentence with 
propositional content, when in fact she is not.  
Kripke does not deny the possibility that we may have been mistaken about Sherlock 
Holmes. It might turn out that Conan Doyle wrote his stories as a factual report of a friend, 
but these reports through coincidence and error came to be thought of as fictional. However, 
in this event, we still cannot sensibly claim it is possible for the fictional character Sherlock 
Holmes to really exist. Instead, we have simply applied the label ‘fictional’ mistakenly—
Holmes never was a fictional character, but rather a real person erroneously called fictional.  
Kripke applies the same principles to fictional predicates. He describes ‘empty 
predicates... “[is a] unicorn”... “dragon,” “chimera” and so on—various mythical types of 
species (2013: 43).’ Just as was the case with fictional names, we do not have enough 
information to isolate a possible species which is identical to the fictional species. He 
explains that having a good description of the creature's appearance is not enough: 
[C]an one say that under specific circumstances there might have been unicorns? Well, of 
course there might have been animals that looked like white horses and had one horn. But 
that isn’t sufficient… A situation in which there are animals looking like tigers in the Antarctic 
is not necessarily a situation in which there would have been tigers in the Antarctic. There has 
got to be another condition that these hypothetical animals must satisfy to be tigers, that is, 
that they are of the same species, have the same internal structure… Unfortunately, the story 
just doesn’t tell us what the external structure of a unicorn is supposed to be, and therefore it 
hasn’t told us which hypothetical animal to look out for in another possible world (Kripke 2013: 
47). 
If we were to find horned horses, Kripke argues, we could not declare that these horses are 
unicorns. We have insufficient information about the properties of unicorns to determine 
that these animals are unicorns. Compare the unicorn to the bandersnatch. We do not, on 
reflection think that bandersnatches are possible creatures. This is because we recognise 
intuitively that we do not have enough information about bandersnatches to identify them 
28 
 
(Kripke 2013: 51). The same principle applies to unicorns. It is only because we think we 
could identify a unicorn if we saw one that we are tempted to say that they are possible. 
Kripke therefore claims that references using fictional predicates, such as ‘is a unicorn’, are 
not real propositions.  
None of this is to say that Kripke thinks that fiction is senseless. Nor does Kripke 
think that fictional characters are impossible (García-Carpintero and Genoveva 2014: 292). 
Rather, his claim is that the conventions which govern fiction are radically different to those 
which govern genuine references. Fiction is more than just writing on a page or images on 
a screen. It involves a complex practice of telling and reading stories in a way superficially 
similar to reporting facts. The storyteller pretends to be relating real events, but typically 
without any intent to deceive the reader. The reader, meanwhile, typically pretends that the 
events of the story are true, despite the fact that she does not believe they are. It is due to 
this practice of pretence that Kripke thinks fictions make sense despite never referring to 
existing objects.  
 If Kripke is correct, though, my simple definition of impossible fiction fails. The simple 
definition targets fictions which are not manifested in any possible world, but according to 
Kripke this applies to all fictions. All works of what I have been referring to as ‘standard, 
possible fiction’ are in fact works of impossible fiction. Unintuitively, this suggests that we 
should not call fictions ‘impossible’ just because they are not possible. A definition of 
impossible fiction needs to capture the distinction between impossible fiction and standard, 
possible fiction. It should show why it is that certain kinds of fiction are different, with respect 
to the kind of events and objects they depict, from others. It should help articulate the 
difference in possibility between Jane Eyre and H.P. Lovecraft’s eldritch ‘The Call of 
Cthulhu’. Prior to investigating Kripke, it was tempting to use absolute impossibility to show 
this difference: Jane Eyre, it seems, could have taken place if the world had been slightly 
different, whereas The Call of Cthulhu could never have taken place no matter how different 
the world was. Kripke shows that this approach to defining impossible fiction does not work, 
since even Jane Eyre could never have taken place. The proper nouns used throughout, 
from ‘Jane’ to ‘Pilot’, do not refer to possible entities. The predicate ‘owner of Thornfield 
Hall’ is empty—there is no person to whom it could be appropriately applied, even if a real 
estate was actually named Thornfield Hall. According to my simple definition, both Jane 
Eyre and The Call of Cthulhu are absolutely impossible, and this indicates that the simple 
definition is insufficient for distinguishing between interestingly and trivially impossible 
fictions. 
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 Perhaps there is still some hope for the simple definition. Perhaps Kripke’s account 
is mistaken. Two major philosophers of fiction who disagree with Kripke’s account of 
fictional names are Lewis and Gregory Currie. If the account of either philosopher is correct, 
then the simple definition of impossible fiction will be salvaged.  
To Lewis, a fictional name refers to the bearer of that name in any possible world 
where the story is told as known fact (Lewis 1983c). Fictional names are far from empty 
under this understanding; they refer to an entire class of possible objects. Currie, on the 
other hand, claims that fictional names are bound variables. The reader, Currie claims, 
make-believes that these existentially quantified variables refer to specific individuals 
(Currie 1990: 151-152). Both of these approaches sidestep Kripke’s concern by recasting 
the practice of using fictional names as more than pretence, and both could with a little 
extension do the same for fictional predicates. Anybody who agrees with Lewis or Currie, 
or for some independent reason claims that fictional names are not empty references, will 
be able to use the simple definition (provided that they do not hold all fictions to be 
absolutely impossible for some other reason).  
Despite Lewis’s and Currie’s promises that the simple definition of impossible fiction 
can be saved, I end this section by committing to its revision. Lewisians and Currians will 
not need further convincing that we can differentiate between absolutely and relatively 
impossible works of fiction. It is the Kripkean who must be accommodated in a meaningful 
definition of impossible fiction. Convincingly rejecting Kripke’s model of fictional names 
would require an extensive and off-topic argument about the nature of fiction. Instead of 
committing to this, I argue that a slight modification of the simple definition can 
accommodate Kripke. Furthermore, Lewisians and Currians would be able to use this 
revised definition just as effectively as the simple definition. The following section refines 
the simple definition into one which a Kripkean could use to distinguish impossible fictions 
like ‘Sylvan’s Box’ from regular fictions like Jane Eyre. 
 
1.6  The revised definition of impossible fiction 
This section revises the simple definition of impossible fiction in light of Kripke’s claims. I 
introduce a revised definition which I take to successfully distinguish between trivially and 
interestingly impossible fictions. I stipulate that impossible fictions are those which are 
absolutely impossible in some sense other than the inclusion of empty references. This 
definition may seem ad hoc, but it successfully captures fictions like A Man in Full in addition 
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to addressing Kripke’s potential issue with the simple definition. I explicate and defend the 
revised definition, and I indicate the benefits of adopting it. 
If all fictions are absolutely impossible in virtue of the empty references they contain, 
then the absolute impossibility of certain fictions ceases to be philosophically interesting. 
There is nothing distinctive about the absolute impossibility of the referent of an empty 
reference. My definition must accommodate this typical feature of fiction, and instead 
identify only interestingly impossible fictions. The simple definition is not able to achieve 
this, so I move to a revised definition which can: a fiction is an impossible fiction iff it 
represents at least one absolute impossibility, and this absolute impossibility consists in 
something other than empty reference.  
This revised definition responds to Kripke by necessitating that impossible fiction 
contain some kind of distinctive content which standard, possible fictions lack. Merely being 
absolutely impossible is not sufficient—Kripke shows that it is a standard feature of fiction 
to be absolutely impossible. Instead, the revised definition considers the kind of absolutely 
impossible content which impossible fictions contain. ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is absolutely impossible 
because it contains empty references, but it is an impossible fiction because it contains a 
logical contradiction. Even if the references were meaningful, the fiction would still be 
absolutely impossible. This distinguishes it from other works of fiction which do not have 
this additional kind of absolute impossibility.  
My revised definition could be attacked as ad hoc. I am willing to bite this bullet. The 
simple definition was only unfit for purpose due to the existence of fictions with empty 
references. Eliminating the simple definition altogether would eliminate with it the merits I 
listed above: its simplicity, its lack of reliance on a concrete list of absolute impossibilities, 
and its sensitivity to future developments in our understanding of absolute necessity. I argue 
that an alternative definition of impossible fiction would, at best, be coextensive with the 
revised definition. Such a definition would likely require lengthy explanation and defence 
Admitting to an ad hoc definition is, ultimately, a much simpler way to express my definition. 
A consequence of adopting the revised definition is that standard, non-Kripkean 
cases of empty reference, such as Carroll’s bandersnatch, are not counted among 
impossible fictions. I view this as an additional benefit to the definition. The fact that Charlie 
and Serena perform that thing with the cup should not render A Man in Full an impossible 
fiction. There is nothing obviously impossible about it even when one discovers that there 
is no such activity. Empty references of this kind are unremarkable in fiction. Heffalumps, 
grumpkins, snarks and fearsome critters all show that fictions commonly draw on similar 
empty references. They can easily be accommodated by our standard practice of 
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engagement with fiction. There is no special difficulty in pretending or make-believing that 
snarks and bandersnatches exist, or that two people can perform that thing with the cup. 
There is no difference between pretending that ‘heffalump’ is a meaningful reference and 
pretending that ‘Jane Eyre’ is a meaningful reference (besides the content of the pretence). 
If Jane Eyre shouldn’t be classed as an impossible fiction, nor should Winnie-the-Pooh. 
I consider the revised definition a marked improvement on the simple definition. The 
following section shows how it can be used on both paradigm and edge cases of impossible 
fiction. The appendix to this chapter shows how the revised definition captures the spirit of 
previous definitions of impossible fiction. Due to these features, it is the definition of 
impossible fiction I use for the remainder of this thesis. 
 
1.7  Applying the revised definition 
With the revised definition established and defended, I can show it in action. This section 
tests out the revised definition on Neil Gaiman’s The Ocean at the End of the Lane to show 
how it identifies this work as an impossible fiction. With this trial successful, I show how the 
definition applies to more ambiguously impossible fictions. These include works where 
impossible elements are well-hidden and likely to be missed by the casual reader. It also 
includes cases of metafiction, of fictions which are inadvertently absolutely impossible due 
to an authorial error, and cases of imaginative resistance. 
In Neil Gaiman’s The Ocean at the End of the Lane, a magical parasite is drawn 
from the foot of the protagonist. The creature is impossible—its appearance is described as 
a hole with no edge (Gaiman 2013: 136). This is absolutely impossible, because having an 
edge is a necessary condition of something being a hole.5 This makes The Ocean at the 
End of the Lane absolutely impossible, independent of the absolute impossibility of its empty 
references. It is therefore an impossible fiction. Since the revised definition distinguishes 
between these sorts of significant impossibilities and trivial impossibilities, a Kripkean is 
able to distinguish between standard and impossible fiction just as a non-Kripkean can. This 
test case is successful, but more complex cases remain. 
One less obvious case of impossible fiction is where absolutely impossible content 
is difficult to notice. These fictions are liable to be characterised as possible fictions. While 
 
5 ‘For every hole there is a hole-lining; for every hole lining there is a hole’ claims Argle in ‘Holes’ 
(Lewis and Lewis 1983: 5).  
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it would be difficult to read ‘Sylvan’s Box’ and fail to realise that it depicts a logical 
contradiction, in other cases the absolutely impossible element is noticeable but presented 
more subtly. Terry Pratchett’s Going Postal features a letter-sorting machine with circular 
gears inside. These gears have 3 as the ratio of their circumference to their diameter, rather 
than pi (Pratchett 2005: 194–199). Recognising this as absolutely impossible requires more 
specialist knowledge than the previous examples. It is feasible that a reader may fail to 
recognise the fact that Going Postal contains absolutely impossible content of this kind. 
Some other fictions depict impossibilities in a way which is even easier to miss. Kubrick’s 
film adaptation of The Shining features a hotel with impossible geometry. With no floor plan 
shown in the film, recognising this requires close attention to detail. It should be expected 
that most viewers do not recognise its absolute impossibility. I argue that the revised 
definition captures the impossible nature of these fictions. Readers who miss these subtle 
absolute impossibilities and label Going Postal and The Shining standard, possible fictions 
are mistaken. The revised definition enables philosophers to resist this mislabelling and 
insist that these are cases of impossible fiction. 
Other cases are even less cut-and-dried. Fiction rarely deals in absolutes; the fact 
that two different readers may notice or not notice a contradiction is, I think, inevitable but 
not problematic. Whether or not a fiction is recognised to be impossible is a product of 
several things: how much attention the story draws to the impossible element, how familiar 
the reader is with the area of impossibility in question, how much attention the reader is 
paying, etc.  Some impossible fictions may even be the subject of dispute—perhaps we 
should not, on balance, consider them to be impossible fictions after all. This sort of 
discussion is supported by the revised definition. It allows for substantive, meaningful 
interpretation and criticism of fiction with regards to its impossible content. I demonstrate 
this by paying attention to several cases where judging the impossibility of a fiction is 
difficult: metafiction, author mistakes and imaginative resistance. 
  First, metafiction. Broadly speaking, a metafiction is a narrative which draws 
attention to its own fictionality. In the process of doing so, some metafictions highlight the 
fact that their characters are fictional entities. This is not problematic on its own, as many 
works of fiction contain other, embedded works of fiction (such as The Murder of Gonzago 
within Hamlet). However, certain metafictions go further than this. In Pirandello’s Six 
Characters in Search of an Author, the Mother is represented as a fictional character who 
meets and talks to real people (Pirandello 2004). This makes her an absolute impossibility, 
since fictional characters cannot meet real people—they have a different kind of existence 
to real people. Other works of metafiction display similar impossibilities. In The Purple Rose 
of Cairo, a character from a film flees out of the screen to fall in love with a member of the 
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audience, and the other characters go on strike to demand his return. In At Swim-Two-
Birds, an aspiring author is held hostage by his own fictional characters. These metafictions 
represent certain characters are real and other characters as fictional, but then show both 
the fictionally real and fictionally fictional characters interacting. This makes them works of 
impossible fiction. The revised definition tracks this, and labels all of these examples as 
impossible fiction.  
Not every metafiction is impossible, and not every impossible metafiction is 
impossible due to its metafictionality. Joan Didion’s novel Democracy is metafictional, as 
the narrator is explicitly identified as the author herself. However, the story itself is consistent 
and possible, meaning that Democracy is not a work of impossible fiction. Mark Z. 
Danielewski’s House of Leaves, on the other hand, is a metafiction and an impossible 
fiction. However, it is impossible due to its content (a house which is larger on the inside 
than on the outside) rather than due to its metafictionality (which manifests in the novel’s 
structure—it is partially an academic critique of a short film). Metafiction and impossible 
fiction are closely connected subjects, but they are not coextensive. Cases of metafiction 
are particularly susceptible to interpretation. It is frequently difficult to pinpoint exactly when 
reality and fictionality clash in a way which is absolutely impossible, and different readers 
may interpret this in different ways. The revised definition allows us to debate the 
impossibility of metafiction in a principled way. It allows us to distinguish between absolutely 
impossible metafictions like Six Characters in Search of an Author, and metafictions which 
only hint at their own fictionality such as Northanger Abbey. 
 Next is the issue of author mistakes in works of fiction. Infamously, John Watson’s 
war wound changes location between Sherlock Holmes tales. Described on different 
occasions as being in his leg (The Sign of the Four) and being in his shoulder (A Study in 
Scarlet), it is clear that Arthur Conan Doyle forgot that he had placed Watson’s wound 
somewhere different. Looked at uncharitably, this is a contradiction—Watson only has one 
wound, but it is in two different places. However, this is not an interesting contradiction. It is 
comparable to continuity errors in film—an error which would likely have been altered if 
noticed before release. It is not part of the fiction that there is a mic boom shadow visible in 
Plan 9 from Outer Space. Nor is it part of the Sherlock Holmes series that Watson has a 
contradictory war wound. Ideally, absolute impossibilities like Watson’s war wound should 
not qualify Sherlock Holmes as an impossible fiction. 
Fortunately, readers are not committed to viewing every single word of a book as 
part of the fiction contained within. Errors and quirks in writing and representation can be 
interpreted away during the standard process of engaging with fiction. A viewer does not 
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take it that Cathy Gale of The Avengers is black-and-white, but instead attributes this quirk 
to the physical transmission of the fiction. Similarly, a viewer can interpret the mic boom 
shadow in Plan 9 from Outer Space as a feature of transmission rather than a part of the 
fiction. So too can a reader interpret the contradictory reports of Watson’s war wound as a 
mistake by Conan Doyle which should not play a significant role in the story. The revised 
definition demands that the fiction represent an absolute impossibility, but on this 
interpretation of Sherlock Holmes no absolute impossibility has been represented. A 
contradiction was featured in the words which make up the fiction, but it was not represented 
in the fiction itself. This means that Conan Doyle’s mistake has not rendered Sherlock 
Holmes an impossible fiction. This also means that, in the event that the presumed mistake 
is eventually decided to be significant (perhaps if a contradictory war wound somehow 
turned out to be a major clue in Holmes’s investigation), then it may turn out that the fiction 
should be classified as an impossible fiction after all. The revised definition is able to 
accommodate this change of heart as well. 
 Another topic in the philosophy of fiction is relevant to impossible fiction: imaginative 
resistance. This area of study deals with a distinctive asymmetry between certain 
propositions in fiction. In almost all cases, the reader is willing and able to imagine the 
propositions which make up a fiction. Ridiculous and fantastical propositions are imagined 
in much the same way as mundane, realistic propositions. In some other cases, however, 
the reader resists imagining propositions contained in the fiction. Most notably, deviant 
moral propositions seem to consistently evoke resistance from readers. Kendall Walton 
suggests such a fiction: 
Giselda: In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl (1994: 37. Walton's 
italics). 
The reader is assumed to have no difficulty imagining the act of infanticide, even if she finds 
doing so distasteful. What she finds difficult to imagine is that Giselda’s actions are morally 
commendable as the fiction states. This difficulty may be due to an unwillingness to imagine 
the proposition in question (Gendler 2000). It may be because she is unable to imagine the 
proposition at all (Walton and Tanner 1994). Whatever the nature of the block, the reader 
undergoes imaginative resistance to the fiction. My question is whether these resistance-
causing fictions are impossible fictions. 
 It could be claimed that resistance-causing fictions depict normative impossibility. 
This is the case if it is impossible that Giselda behaved morally according to the normative 
standards which govern our attitudes towards moral obligations. To claim that her behaviour 
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was appropriate is therefore normatively impossible. If normative impossibility is absolute, 
then the revised definition asserts that resistance-causing fictions are impossible fictions.  
Certain theoretical commitments inform whether or not normative necessity is 
absolute. Take the proposition ‘slavery is just’. To consider this absolutely impossible is to 
consider slavery to be, by definition, unjust. This would in turn imply commitment to some 
form of objective moral realism. This also requires an essentialist account of moral truths: 
they must be true in all possible circumstances. Neither of these two commitments, 
objective moral realism or absolute necessity of moral truths, is required in order to consider 
the proposition ‘slavery is just’ to be false. Furthermore, a fiction which ostensibly depicts 
moral, upstanding behaviour in an event where a character is keeping slaves does not 
necessarily violate normative necessity. The fiction does not necessarily imply that the 
slave-keeper’s behaviour is moral in virtue of the character’s slave-keeping practices 
(Walton and Tanner 1994: 47). Resistance-causing fictions can be considered to be 
impossible fictions, but believing this requires strict commitments to particular metaethical 
and metaphysical accounts. It also requires interpreting the fiction in such a way that 
fictionally moral behaviour is fictionally moral in virtue of immoral fictional actions. 
 Resistance-causing fictions are not unequivocally impossible in the manner of, say, 
‘Sylvan’s Box’, but could be considered absolutely impossible with the right set of 
background commitments. The notion of impossible fiction has little impact on the work 
already done on imaginative resistance, which is mostly concerned with issues about 
imagination (why it is that readers resist imagining the contents of these fictions) and 
fictionality (whether or not resistance-causing propositions can be fictionally true). Its status 
as impossible fiction ultimately rests on whether normative possibility is absolute. Those 
who argue that it is may use the revised definition to claim that resistance-causing fictions 
are impossible fictions, and vice versa. The revised definition is sensitive to this ongoing 
ethical and metaphysical debate. 
 I consider the revised definition to hold up well against these difficult cases of fiction. 
At no point does it label intuitively standard fiction as impossible or intuitively impossible 
fiction as standard. It also allows for meaningful debate over a fiction’s status as impossible. 
Appropriate evidence in this debate would include reasons to agree with a particular 
interpretation of the fiction, and reasons to consider particular kinds of necessity as 
absolute. Given that these are relevant criteria for judging a fiction to be impossible, and 
given that there are no cases where the revised definition results in an unintuitive 
judgement, I consider it a successful definition of impossible fiction. 
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1.8  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a definition of impossible fiction: an impossible fiction depicts 
circumstances, characters or events which are absolutely impossible, but are absolutely 
impossible for some other reason than merely being empty references. This definition 
avoids several potential ambiguities and problems. It avoids classifying fictions with only 
relative impossibilities as impossible fictions, as fictions frequently depict physical, 
biological, legal and other related types of impossibilities. It also covers Kripke-style cases 
where fictional references have no referent, removing this common phenomenon in order 
to strengthen the definition of impossible fiction. 
The definition is sensitive to interpretation of fiction and to arguments about 
necessity. Exactly what cannot occur in any possible world is not universally agreed upon—
commitments to doctrines like property essentialism, necessitarianism about the laws of 
nature, and moral realism all play a role in establishing which propositions are impossible 
under all circumstances. However, this is simply to say that there are some cases of 
impossible fiction which might be disputed, not that the definition itself is not viable. 
The next chapter investigates how fictions represent absolute impossibilities. The 
wide range of accounts of fiction means a diverse spread of additional factors which affect 
whether a work of fiction can be said to represent an absolute impossibility. Since my 
investigation is not concerned with the metaphysical nature of fiction, I do not commit to a 
single account of fictional truth. Instead, I show that there is neutral ground between 
different theories of fiction on which my investigation can be conducted. I have ensured that 
the definition of impossible fiction is theory-neutral with regards to the nature of fiction. The 
next chapter builds on this theory neutrality to centre discussion on the reader’s experience 
rather than the fiction itself. 
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2. Impressions of Fiction 
 
The unread story is not a story; it is little black marks on wood pulp. The reader, reading it, 
makes it live: a live thing, a story. 
- Ursula K. Le Guin, Dancing at the Edge of the World 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter defines impossible fiction in terms of representing a particular kind of 
impossible content. The task of this chapter is to discuss what exactly is involved in this 
representation, and to show how representation relates to the reader’s engagement with 
and experience of impossible fiction. I claim that, for my purposes, representation is best 
thought of as the reader possessing a particular appropriate impression of the fiction. 
What is an appropriate impression of a fiction? It is a judgement the average reader 
makes about what occurs in a story she is reading. These judgements are not typically 
informed by theories of fictional truth. Rather, they are impressions; impressions of a story’s 
plot, characters and content. They are not knowledge about the nature of a fictional world. 
They are intuitive understandings of what is happening in a story. They are instinctive, 
sometimes involuntary responses—parsing and comprehending information which is 
gained from paying attention to a fiction. If these judgements would be made by a suitably 
engaged and informed reader, then they are appropriate impressions of a fiction. 
Impressions are further characterised, and contrasted with fictional truth, later in this 
chapter. 
Along with impressions, this chapter frequently discusses the nature of 
representation. The kind of representation I am interested in is the representation of a 
story’s content. This is representation in a descriptive sense, rather than representation 
through allegory and symbolism. The Chronicles of Narnia descriptively represents a lion, 
Aslan, by including certain propositions about his appearance and temperament. In turn, 
Aslan represents Jesus, but does so in an allegorical or symbolic sense. I am interested in 
the former, descriptive sense of representation rather than the latter, allegorical sense of 
representation. Discussions of representation throughout the rest of the chapter are all 
intended in this descriptive sense. 
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I begin the chapter by interrogating this notion of descriptive representation. I ask 
what feature of a work of fiction enables it to represent its content to the reader in this way. 
The notion of fictional truth is one possible explanation, but I show why fictional truths do 
not always match up with what is represented by the fiction. Another candidate is direct 
content—my term for the naive, immediate content of a work of fiction such as words and 
pictures. However, direct content can also be differentiated from what is represented by a 
fiction. Truth to a story, a concept borrowed from Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne, 
is sufficient for explaining representation (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016). However, 
truth to a story is itself based on the reader having certain impressions of the fiction she 
reads. While fictional truth, direct content and truth to a story are important concepts in their 
own right, I look to these impressions for an account of descriptive representation. 
I show that reader impressions are successful in describing how fiction represents 
things to its readers. I explain the nature of reader impressions, describing their content, 
character and appropriateness conditions in detail. I explain the relation between reader 
impressions and fictional truths, arguing that, for most accounts of fiction, they are closely 
linked. I show that reader impressions are a property of the reader’s engagement with a 
fiction rather than of the fiction itself. This, I claim, makes them theory-neutral, and a better 
tool than fictional truth for discussing reader engagement with impossible fiction. A theory-
neutral account of representation broadens the application of my account. It also helps the 
thesis focus on typical methods of reader interpretation and engagement with fiction, rather 
than ontology of fiction. I am interested in the character and quality of the reader’s 
experience—how we typically enjoy, appreciate and, most importantly, understand fiction. 
This means that I am not interested (strictly in this thesis) in analysing or providing an 
account of the nature of fictional truth. I do not make any claims about metaphysics or 
ontology of fiction. I am instead concerned with judgements that everyday readers make 
concerning the fictions they read. This chapter develops and explains the term ‘impression’ 
as a description of this sort of engagement with fiction rather than as a description of fictional 
truth. 
 In order to further specify the nature of reader impressions, I contrast them with a 
similar notion: Stock’s concept of F-imaginings (Stock 2017). F-imagining is the minimal 
level of imaginative engagement with fiction made by readers. It is a strictly propositional, 
non-imagistic form of imagining. I argue that impressions are a slightly richer, wider form of 
reader engagement with fictions than F-imaginings. I also claim that F-imaginings form part 
of the content of reader impressions, supplemented by richer, phenomenal imaginings. I 
then contrast impressions with fictional truth, and finally describe how reader impressions 
of a fiction can be more or less appropriate. In an appendix the chapter (Appendix B) I offer 
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some suggestions as to why several accounts of fiction are not only compatible with, but 
actively benefit from the introduction of reader impression. This justifies my focus on the 
nature of reader impressions rather than fictional truths for the remainder of the thesis. 
 
2.2  Representation and fictional truth 
The previous chapter established my definition of impossible fiction: those fictions which 
represent an absolute impossibility, besides the inclusion of empty references. It might well 
be asked of this definition what it means for a fiction to descriptively represent something in 
the first place. To answer that, I must find an effective model of descriptive representation. 
This model of representation should satisfyingly complete the following: ‘a fiction 
descriptively represents x if and only if…’ Not only can many different things be descriptively 
represented (people, places, events, emotions, experiences), these things can be 
descriptively represented in different ways (verbally, visually, through implication, through 
implicature). This section discusses whether fictional truth is a convincing candidate for this 
model. I argue that using fictional truth to model representation unnecessarily limits the 
scope of this thesis. If an alternative model can be found, it should be used instead. 
One seemingly reasonable way to talk about the representation of absolute 
impossibilities is by talking about fictional truths. Using fictional truths, our model of 
representation is finished like so: ‘a fiction descriptively represents x if and only if x is true 
in that fiction.’ It seems intuitive to claim that anything fictionally true in a given fiction is 
represented by that fiction. On this model, a fiction would be an impossible fiction if and only 
if it contained a fictional truth which was absolutely impossible (besides empty references). 
While this model is an effective way to talk about representation, it is not the model I use in 
this thesis. 
I do not use fictional truths for my model of representation, but this should not be 
taken as a rejection or belittlement of the concept of fictional truth. Accounts of fictional truth 
offer us lots of useful things. They give us semantics of fiction, descriptions of fictional 
worlds and truth conditions for statements about a fiction. Some accounts of fictional truth 
offer ways to generate secondary fictional truths, articulating intuitions about features of a 
fiction otherwise left indeterminate. There are many reasons to be interested in fictional 
truths. Despite these reasons, using fictional truths to explain representation harms my 
project more than it helps. 
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I do not consider fictional truth to be the optimal model of representation because 
committing to a single account of fictional truth harms the generality of my arguments. My 
overall goal in this thesis is a general description of the effects of impossible fiction on a 
reader. Committing to a single account of fictional truth does not further this goal. I do not 
reject the notion that there is a correct account of fictional truth, but I do claim that discussing 
fictional truths as part of my project would make my description less general. There is a live 
debate on fictional truth with no clear consensus. Among the well-supported accounts in 
contention for the definition of fictional truth are: intentionalist theories of several kinds, 
including moderate or modest (Carroll 2001; Stecker 2006), extreme (Stock 2017) and 
hypothetical (Levinson 1996); inference to the beliefs of a fictional author (Currie 1990); 
prescriptions to make-believe (Walton 1990); and the events which occur in relevant 
possible worlds (Lewis 1983c). If I were to explicitly commit to any one of these accounts, 
the applicability of my account of impossible fictions would suffer. It would be susceptible to 
the same weaknesses as whichever account of fictional truth I chose. Committing to any 
one of these accounts would limit my discussion substantially, and automatically make my 
arguments less useful and relevant to a philosopher subscribed to a different account. 
This might be considered a superficial issue. If the points I make about the effects 
of impossible fiction on the reader are generalisable, there should be little stopping me from 
committing to a specific account of fiction. Alternatively, I could hedge my bets by using 
fictional truth for my model of representation without identifying a single account of fictional 
truth to use. Neither of these are effective options, and for the same reason: at least one 
account of fictional truth—the possible worlds account—outright prohibits absolutely 
impossible fictional truth. If fictions represent possible worlds, then fictions cannot represent 
events which could not occur in any possible worlds. Merely talking about impossible 
fictional truths excludes possible worlds accounts like those of Lewis. By extension, this 
excludes the wealth of philosophy influenced by his work on fiction, such as that of Bourne 
and Caddick Bourne and Richard Hanley (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016; Hanley 2004). 
These writers are directly involved in debates on impossible fiction, and simply ignoring their 
work would limit the scope of my argument immensely. 
This is not, by itself, a good reason to reject fictional truth as a model of 
representation. If fictional truth is the best way of modelling representation, then it is the 
model which should be used. However, my commitment to generality is motivation to test 
other models before committing to using fictional truth. If there is a sensible way to talk 
about representation of absolute impossibilities besides in terms of fictional truth, then the 
above issues can be avoided altogether. This would not necessitate rejecting the entire 
concept of fictional truth, but rather putting it to one side as irrelevant to this specific issue. 
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Ideally, a successful model of representation will be compatible with all accounts of fictional 
truth. Given that this would make my work far more generally relevant than if it were limited 
to a single account of fictional truth, I see this as a goal worth pursuing. The remainder of 
this section therefore moves on from fictional truth to explore two other ways in which 
representation can be modelled. These are through direct content, which is the individual 
words, sounds and images which make up a work of fiction, and truth to a story, the narrative 
which a work of fiction presents to a reader. 
 
2.3  Representation and direct content 
This section describes another potential candidate for modelling descriptive representation. 
This is the direct content of a fiction. This concept requires some exposition, which I provide. 
I also require the tools to make a systematic judgement about the suitability of direct content 
for modelling representation. I introduce two criteria which I use to test direct content: that 
it should correlate with what the reader imagines of the fiction, and that it should support 
the representation of absolute impossibilities. Using these two criteria shows that direct 
content is not suitable for modelling representation.  
To begin, I expand on the two criteria I use to judge a suitable model of 
representation. The first criterion is that representation directly correlates with what the 
reader (appropriately) imagines of the fiction. This criterion ensures that an account of 
representation describes how typical readers access and understand what is represented 
by a fiction. It does so by ensuring that readers imagine what is represented by a fiction, 
therefore tying representation to the reader’s experience of what is represented. I also use 
a second criterion: an effective account of representation must support the representation 
of absolute impossibilities. This criterion is more self-interested on my part. It ensures that 
the model of representation is useful for my project. Given that I start from the assumption 
that fictions do represent impossibilities, it would be a poor model of representation which 
could not extend to the representation of absolute impossibilities. These two criteria help 
me judge whether direct content is a suitable way of modelling representation. 
By direct content, I intend the literal meaning of the words and/or images which 
constitute the work of fiction. This is the work’s content prior to implicature and interpretation 
on behalf of the reader. It is the information the work contains at its most basic level. Take 
the following extract from Chronicle of a Death Foretold: 
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A: Santiago Nasar put on a shirt and pants of white linen, both items unstarched, just like the 
ones he’d put on the day before for the wedding. It was his attire for special occasions (García 
Márquez 1996: 3).  
The direct content of this extract is just the literal meaning of the two sentences. It includes 
the fact that Santiago Nasar puts on two items of clothing. It includes the fact that neither 
are starched, and that they are the sorts of clothes he wears for special occasions. It does 
not contain such information as: 
B: Santiago Nasar considers today to be a special occasion.  
or 
C: Santiago Nasar is wearing underwear. 
These pieces of information are gained through implicature. They are therefore generated 
by the reader (along with conventions of communication) rather than by the text itself.6 They 
are not part of the direct content, but rather belong to the imaginative responses which are 
prompted in the reader by the extract. It is not a problem to think that, given A, B or C is 
true. Nor is it a problem to think that B or C is what Garcia Marquez intends to be 
communicated by A. However, this information is not actually contained in A, merely 
implicated by it. The direct content of A is no more than the meaning of the words which 
make up A. 
It is tempting to think that this literal meaning of a text is no more than its 
propositional content, but visual fiction can have similar literal meaning. Take, for example, 
Vermeer’s The Music Lesson (illus. 1). Just as with extract A, this image has direct content: 
‘A young woman is standing at a virginal,’ ‘a pitcher is set on a table,’ ‘it is daytime’, and so 
on. Also as with extract A, the reader naturally tends to elaborate on this direct content. The 
Royal Collection’s description of the painting illustrates how this might proceed. The non-
direct, implicated content is italicised:  
A striking feature of the composition in this part is the mirror on the wall where the slightly 
blurred reflections include the young woman’s face, part of the table and the legs of an artist’s 
easel. The implication of this glimpsed easel is that Vermeer shares the same space as the 
figures he is depicting (‘Lady at the Virginals with a Gentleman' n.d., my italics). 
The catalogue description of The Music Lesson describes the direct content of the painting 
(the mirror and the reflections within), but also information derived from or implicated by the 
 
6 The most popular account of implicature and conventions of communication is that of Grice (1989). 
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direct content (that the artist is present but unseen). The direct content in The Music Lesson 
can be distinguished from content in The Music Lesson discovered or derived through 
interpretation. Assuming that pictures do not have propositional content, it follows that direct 
content is the list of propositions depicted by and/or contained in the fiction.7 In this way, 
visual fiction has direct content in the same sense as written fiction. 
 
 
Illus. 1: The Music Lesson (Vermeer 1662–1665) 
 
 
7 See Grzankowski (2015) for a challenge to the view that pictorial content is non-propositional. If 
Grzankowski is upheld, direct content is simply the propositional content of a fiction. 
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Direct content as I have defined it seems a viable candidate for explaining how 
fictions represent things. This can be modelled as follows: ‘a fiction descriptively represents 
x if and only if x is part of that fiction’s direct content.’ To judge how well this model performs 
in practice, I consider now how direct content fares with the criteria I list above.  
Direct content passes one criterion easily, as it can clearly express absolute 
impossibilities. Take an extract from House of Leaves: 
[He] proceeds to measure the distance from the far end of the master bedroom to the far end 
of the children’s bedroom. The total comes to 32’ 9 ¾” which the house plans corroborate—
plus or minus an inch. The puzzling part comes when Navidson measures the internal space. 
He carefully notes the length of the new area, the length of both bedrooms and then factors in 
the width of the walls. The result is anything but comforting. In fact it is impossible. 
32’ 10” exactly. 
The width of the house inside would appear to exceed the width of the house as measured 
from the outside by ¼”... He double checks his work, makes sure the line is straight, level and 
taut and then marks it. The measurement is still the same. 
32’ 10” exactly (Danielewski 2001: 30). 
With no sense of implicature or elaboration on the direct content, an absolute impossibility—
that the house is larger inside than outside—has been expressed. No further information is 
needed in order to render this piece of direct content absolutely impossible. This means 
that direct content satisfies the second criterion: that fiction should be able to represent 
absolute impossibilities. 
While it passes this criterion, direct content fails the other: that it must correlate with 
what the reader imagines of the fiction. In this regard, direct content and representation 
come apart from one another in several ways. What a reader imagines of a fiction frequently 
differs from its direct content. This difference can go in either direction. Readers may find 
that some direct content is not represented by the fiction, while in other cases more than 
simply the direct content is represented.  
For an example of direct content which is not represented by a fiction, consider the 
errant boom seen in Plan 9 from Outer Space, mentioned in the previous chapter. The mic 
is part of the direct content of Plan 9, since it is included in the set of moving images which 
make up the fiction. However, no competent reader would include the boom in what she 
imagines of the fiction. She may notice the boom, but she will recognise that its inclusion in 
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the shot should not be considered part of the fiction itself.8 This means that fictions represent 
more than just their direct content. This is regularly demonstrated in the theatre. A rumbling 
metal sheet represents thunder, while a painted backdrop might represent a haunted forest. 
The direct content of the play is simply that there is a given sound, or a given image behind 
the players. The reader imagines that there is a faraway castle rather than a static image, 
or a rumble of thunder rather than a clanging sheet of metal.  
Fictions can also represent certain things which outright contradict their direct 
content. It is part of the direct content of William Luce’s The Belle of Amherst that Emily 
Dickinson speaks a certain amount (in fact, quite a lot). However, the play represents 
Dickinson as shy and reserved. This representation proceeds despite the direct content 
rather than because of it, but it is nevertheless the case that in The Belle of Amherst Emily 
Dickinson is represented as shy. In the case of The Belle of Amherst and in the case of the 
painted backdrop, the fact that the play represents certain things relies on a certain 
convention recognised by the audience, rather than merely the existence of direct content.  
Works of fiction often contain discrepancies between direct content and what the 
reader imagines. This means that there is a discrepancy between direct content and 
represented content. It is therefore not guaranteed that a fiction with impossible direct 
content represents an absolute impossibility to a competent reader. Direct content is not a 
suitable model for descriptive representation. 
 
2.4  Representation and truth to a story 
Perhaps the better model of representation is truth to a story, introduced by Bourne and 
Caddick Bourne in their Time in Fiction (2016). This section introduces and explains truth 
to a story. It then uses the same criteria from the last section (correlation with what the 
reader imagines and ability to represent absolute impossibilities) to test truth to a story’s 
suitability as a model for representation. However, in the process of applying these criteria, 
truth to a story yields an even more primitive notion of how readers engage with fictions: 
impressions. I show that, while truth to a story passes both criteria, it is based on the notion 
 
8 This issue is similar to the problem of ‘silly questions’ which Walton discusses in Mimesis as Make-
Believe, and the upcoming example of The Belle of Amherst is borrowed from here (1990: 174–183). 
Since Walton’s concern is fictional truth, the comparison is not worth going into in detail. It is worth 
mentioning, though, that Walton agrees with the notion that certain parts of a fiction should not be 
imagined by the reader.  
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of reader impressions. I claim that it is therefore worth investigating this more fundamental 
notion, reader impressions, as a model of representation instead. 
Bourne and Caddick Bourne approach the issue of truth to a story in the context of 
an account of fiction heavily influenced by Lewis. Bourne and Caddick Bourne see fictions 
as descriptions of specific possible worlds. Fictional truth, in this model, is truth at a relevant 
individual possible world. A proposition p is fictionally true iff it is true at the possible world 
which the fiction describes.9 Bourne and Caddick Bourne recognise that this account is 
susceptible to an existing problem with Lewisian-style theories of fiction: the presence of 
absolute impossibilities in some fictions. As no possible worlds contain absolute 
impossibilities, it follows that impossible things cannot be fictionally true. The apparent 
existence of impossible fiction is at odds with the account. Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s 
response to this problem is to draw a distinction between the possible world which the story 
represents, and the impression of a coherent narrative that is given to us by the story: 
In many cases, we have argued that what we are dealing with is really a combination of 
fictions—which we have called the story—which gives the misleading impression of being a 
description of a single world when in fact it is a complex of descriptions of many worlds. In this 
way, we have distinguished two levels—the level of individual fictions and the level of the story 
as a whole (2016: 195). 
Bourne and Caddick Bourne claim that, through the juxtaposition of fictional worlds, an 
impression is given of a single narrative. The impression is misleading insofar as it makes 
it appear to the reader that something absolutely impossible has happened in the fiction. 
Nothing impossible has happened in any fictional world, but the shift in perspective between 
worlds has made it appear that something absolutely impossible has occurred. Due to this 
ability to mislead the reader, no possible world need be contradictory—the contradiction is 
simply an impression given by the multitude of possible worlds which are represented.  
Bourne and Caddick Bourne suggest that there are two levels at which we can talk 
about what is occurring in the fiction. One is the truth in fiction mentioned earlier—that p is 
true at the world which the fiction represents. The other is truth to a story. A story may be 
composed of multiple fictions, which in Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s parlance means that 
a story can be a description of more than one possible world. Only one possible world is 
 
9 This differs from Lewis’s approach, which claims that the incompleteness of certain fictions arises 
because some fictions are such that we are unable to say definitively which possible world they 
represent (1983c: 270). Bourne and Caddick Bourne claim that a possible world can be incomplete, 
and therefore the fictional world is the world which fits exactly the conditions set by the fiction (2016: 
219–223). 
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described at a time, but the story may switch between these worlds with no outward 
indication that it has done so. A single story may express an absolute impossibility, since it 
is composed of several fictions which are all individually possible. In this event, the absolute 
impossibility is true to the story, but not fictionally true.  
Bourne and Caddick Bourne leverage the distinction between fictional truth and truth 
to a story in order to explain how various unusual fictional phenomena are compatible with 
a possible worlds account of fiction. They deny the existence of impossible fictions but 
accept the existence of impossible stories. Considering that Bourne and Caddick Bourne 
are happy to use the term ‘impossible fiction’ despite their account prohibiting the existence 
of impossible fictional truths, it seems they use ‘impossible fiction’ to indicate a work of 
fiction rather than a fictional world (on their account works of fiction and fictions may have 
a one-many relation, which makes the difference between a work of fiction and a fiction 
more significant). This move from impossible fictions to works of impossible fiction does not 
interfere with my revised definition of impossible fiction, which applies as well to works of 
fiction as it does to fictions. 
The wider relevance of truth to a story is unclear. Any philosopher who does not 
follow a possible worlds account of fiction would likely find truth to a story redundant. Since 
most other accounts of fiction have no problem with absolutely impossible fictional truths, 
there is no motivation to distinguish between the fictional truth and truth to a story. Instead, 
other theorists are likely to claim that truth to a story just is fictional truth. This means that, 
to most philosophers of fiction, impossible truths to a story are the same thing as impossible 
fictional truths. To any possible worlds theorist of fiction, however, truth to a story is a 
powerful tool to distinguish between possible worlds and narratives.  
Truth to a story passes both of my two criteria for modelling representation. It 
correlates with what the reader imagines, prioritising the reader’s experience over the 
fictional truth at stake. it accommodates representations of absolute impossibilities—
indeed, this is what it is introduced to explain. Truth to a story can model representation as 
follows: ‘A fiction descriptively represents x if and only if it is true to the story that x.’ In the 
event that a story is constituted of multiple fictions, then these fictions collectively represent 
x. But is truth to a story the best candidate for modelling representation? The answer 
depends on what exactly makes a proposition true to a story. Both fictional truths and direct 
content have standards of correctness. Fictional truth is set according to the theory of 
fictional truth being used, while direct content is set according to the words, images and 
sounds which constitute the fiction. To be certain that truth to a story can account for 
descriptive representation, I must determine how it comes to be set.  
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Bourne and Caddick Bourne have an account of how truth to a story is set. They 
argue that 'being true to a story is a matter of according with the impressions created, by 
the way in which that story is packaged, concerning what fictionally happens—even when 
those impressions are misleading (2016: 196).' In other words, for a proposition to be true 
to a story, it must match the impression that the story gives. For it to be true to the story that 
p, it must be the case that the story (i.e., the fiction or fictions which comprise a single 
narrative) gives the impression of p. This has only delayed a full explanation, as it remains 
to be seen what exactly it means for a reader to have a particular impression created by a 
story.  
It transpires that impressions are a more fundamental way to explain representation 
than truth to a story. Modelling representation using truth to a story collapses into modelling 
representation using impressions. I expand on both of these points, and explain reader 
impressions, in the following section. 
 
2.5  Impressions of fictions 
As discussed in the previous section, Bourne and Caddick Bourne claim that reader 
impressions create conditions under which we can determine what is true to a story. 
Something is true to a story if it accords with the impressions which that story creates (2016: 
196). What Bourne and Caddick Bourne do not offer is a full explanation of what they take 
these impressions to be. My goal in this section is to further characterise reader 
impressions. This section defines reader impressions, showing how they determine truth to 
a story. This enables me to discuss their aptitude for modelling representation in the next 
section. First, however, I demonstrate exactly what reader impressions are.  
When reading and paying attention to a story, a reader has a basic understanding 
of that story. If pressed, she could probably give a quick explanation of this understanding. 
Somebody watching Citizen Kane, for example, should reply that the story is about a 
reporter investigating the life of a recently deceased rich man. A person reading The Wind 
in the Willows might tell us that the story is about anthropomorphic animals and motorcars. 
This ability to comprehend a story should come as no surprise—it is how we engage with 
fiction in an everyday context. We read, or watch, or listen to the story, and in the process 
of doing so develop ideas about what it is that takes place in the story and how. This 
understanding is composed of particular beliefs about what occurs in a story. Some of these 
beliefs are propositions like those above. They state what, within the story, occurs. Some 
beliefs relate to how characters and other fictional entities might be sensorily imagined. Our 
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reader could tell us her ideas about what Mole from The Wind in the Willows looks like—
that he is short, has dark fur and glasses, etc. These beliefs include sensory information 
about the characters and locations which the story features. Readers develop ideas about 
many other aspects of the stories they read. We form beliefs about character psychology: 
readers recognise that a character feels a certain emotion. We also understand relations—
that Elizabeth Bennet is older than Kitty Bennet, or that murdering somebody caused 
Raskolnikov’s guilt. In comprehending a narrative, a reader builds an account of its 
contents—her ideas about what occurs and how—which can be anywhere on a spectrum 
from perfunctory to extremely rich. These ideas, no matter how sparse, are what I call the 
reader’s impressions.10 
Reader impressions, then, are a set of beliefs and imaginings about what the reader 
takes to occur and exist in a story. The term ‘about’ is deliberately ambiguous, as 
impressions can include both propositional (i.e., about the occurrences themselves) and 
non-propositional (i.e., about the phenomenal qualities and characteristics of these 
occurrences) beliefs and imaginings. The former set might include propositions such as 
‘Harry Potter is casting a spell’, or ‘Dallas has been killed by the alien.’ These are the 
propositions of the story itself, beliefs about what occurs in the story which we acquire in 
the process of reading the work of fiction. However, impressions are composed of more 
than descriptions of the plot. The latter set includes affective responses, objectual 
imaginings (e.g., mental images) and other non-propositional thoughts which relate towards 
the characters, events, objects and settings of the fiction: Don Quixote is tall while Sancho 
Panza is short; Desdemona pitiable while Iago is detestable; Tatooine covered in desert 
and Hoth covered in ice. All of these are beliefs and imaginings about what the content of 
the story is like, and so are also about what the reader takes to exist and occur in the story. 
Our impressions can be complex and sophisticated, not merely propositional 
imaginings, and not only copies of whatever we are reading. However, depending on our 
level of engagement with the fiction itself, they might also be very basic. A reader skimming 
a copy of Crime and Punishment might form simple impressions about the plot. A leading 
expert on Russian literature, on the other hand, will form a far richer set of impressions, 
including more complex details such as the relative social standing of each character. An 
axe-murderer would probably have a similarly complex, yet significantly different set of 
impressions, perhaps including judgements about the feeling Raskolnikov has as he swings 
 
10 There is an echo here of how Hume uses the term ‘impression’ in A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1969: 49). I do not use the term of art as Hume does, but it is a happy coincidence if it captures the 
same sense of immediacy of experience.  
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his axe. The reader’s circumstances, including her level of engagement with the text, will 
heavily influence the quality of her impressions. It will also inform the kind of impressions 
she forms: speed-reading The Passion of New Eve is likely to result in mostly propositional 
impressions, but the vivid imagery contained in the novel means that careful reading is likely 
to create richer sensory impressions.  
Having established what reader impressions are, it may be helpful to consider what 
they are not. Reader impressions are not the totality of mental activity which occurs while 
engaged with a work of fiction. The reader may well have concurrent, unrelated thoughts. 
Impressions also do not include thoughts about the real world which are influenced or 
inspired by the story. Watching Moonlight may well result in certain thoughts about 
conditions for gay black men in the US, but these thoughts are not directed at the story of 
Moonlight. Judgements about the work of fiction itself (that a book is heavy, that the sound 
in a cinema is too quiet) are not impressions, though these judgements may influence the 
impressions which a reader forms about the story that work of fiction contains.11 The only 
thoughts and imaginings I count as impressions are those which are specifically to do with 
what occurs and exists in a given story. This means that certain thoughts about the real 
world can still count as impressions of a fiction. For example, imagining that Vronsky looks 
like Lee Van Cleef is an impression of Anna Karenina, since it expresses a belief about 
what part of that story is like. Calling on one’s real knowledge of Amsterdam while reading 
The Goldfinch is a way of forming a richer impression of the novel. These thoughts are still 
directed towards the story itself, even though their content draws on the real world. 
This description of impressions develops Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s notion of 
truth to a story. Bourne and Caddick Bourne claim that truth to a story is determined by 
reader impressions, and impressions as I have described them can fulfil this role. This is 
the case both for propositional impressions and non-propositional impressions. It is true to 
the story that the Xenomorph kills Dallas in virtue of the fact that the typical reader has an 
impression of this while watching Alien.12 It is also true to the story that the Xenomorph is 
scary, in virtue of the fact that the typical reader has an impression of its scariness (whether 
through affective imagining, or through recognition of its in-story effect on characters) when 
it appears. My account of impressions explains why it is true-to-the-story that Anansi is 
 
11 In a very simple case, a noisy cinema may result in several missed lines of dialogue. This could 
significantly alter the reader’s impressions. 
12 I offer a more rigorous set of standards for ‘typical’ impressions later in this chapter. 
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clever, or that Charles Foster Kane is regretful, without either of these being expressed in 
propositional form by the stories which contain those characters. 
 
2.6  Representation and reader impressions 
This section shows how impressions are an effective way to model descriptive 
representation. I first outline the motivation for adopting reader impressions as a model of 
representation. I then use my two criteria from earlier in this chapter to test if reader 
impressions are able to explain representation. Since they pass both criteria, I conclude 
that reader impressions are the optimal way for me to discuss the representation of absolute 
impossibilities in fiction. 
There is a major reason to adopt reader impressions as a model of representation: 
if representation can be modelled in terms of reader impressions, then I am able to 
circumvent discussing fictional truth while investigating reader engagement with impossible 
fictions. This avoids controversy over whether or not fictional truth can be absolutely 
impossible (Lewis, Hanley and Bourne and Caddick Bourne would all deny that it can). 
However, no account of fictional truth turns on denying that readers form particular beliefs 
and ideas about the content of a fiction. Impressions are the way that readers understand 
fiction—an issue separate to the nature of fiction itself. This separates my discussion from 
issues surrounding the metaphysics of fiction, and instead situates it around the issue of 
reader experiences. By discussing impossible fictions in terms of impressions, I am able to 
keep my argument applicable across multiple philosophical theories of fiction.  
In order to show that impressions are a reasonable model of representation, I refer 
back to the two criteria mentioned earlier. Those criteria are, first, that representations 
should correlate with what the reader imagines of the fiction and, second, that the model 
should accommodate representations of absolute impossibilities. Reader impressions 
appear to satisfy the first criterion for modelling representation. They are correlated with 
what the reader imagines to be happening in the fiction: in fact, they are what the reader 
takes to be happening in the fiction. I take this as sufficient evidence that reader impressions 
pass the first criterion. 
It remains to be demonstrated that reader impressions pass the second criterion. If 
impressions are to be an effective model of representation, it must be the case that a reader 
can have an impression of something absolutely impossible. I argue that a reader can have 
an impression of absolute impossibilities, and that therefore readers can have impressions 
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of impossible fiction. This satisfies my second criterion for a model of representation. To 
provide evidence for this claim, I draw from Stock’s work on how readers imagine impossible 
fictions on a basic, propositional level. 
 
2.7  Impressions and F-imaginings 
To support my claim that reader impressions are an effective way of accounting for 
representation, I draw on Stock’s work from her 2017 Only Imagine. I point out the close 
resemblance between my notion of reader impressions and Stock’s notion of F-imaginings. 
Based on this comparison, I claim that F-imaginings are an aspect of reader impressions. I 
use this as evidence that readers can have impressions of absolutely impossible fiction. 
Stock characterises F-imagination as a particular kind of imagining that readers 
extend to the contents of fiction (2017: 20–29). It is the minimum appropriate imaginative 
reaction to works of fiction: imagining no more and no less than the propositional content 
contained in and implied by the fiction (Stock 2017: 20–22). This means it is a strictly 
propositional kind of imagination, as opposed to a sensory or phenomenal kind of 
imagination (Stock 2017: 23–24). To F-imagine p, one thinks of p as being the case, where 
‘thinks of’ is not synonymous with ‘believes’ (Stock 2017: 22). Readers F-imagine the 
propositions which make up a fiction, and they are disposed to conjoin the propositions 
which they view as members of the same fiction. This, Stock suggests, is the baseline level 
of imagination which readers use when engaged with fiction. The reader may have 
concurrent mental images with phenomenal properties, but these are separate to the F-
imaginings themselves. 
To Stock, F-imagining is an important aspect of fictional truth. The extreme 
intentionalist account Stock lays out in Only Imagine argues, broadly speaking, that 
something is fictionally true if and only if the author intends her reader to F-imagine that 
thing as a result of reading the work of fiction. This particular application of F-imagining is 
not relevant to my work here. However, certain characteristics of F-imagination have a 
range of implications for reader impressions. In particular, I am interested in extending 
Stock’s argument that readers can F-imagine absolute impossibilities to my account of 
reader impressions. In order to do so, I must first specify exactly how F-imagining and 
impressions are related to and different from one another. 
Given that both impressions and F-imaginings are related to the immediate 
experience of the reader, it is worth making absolutely clear that impressions are different 
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from F-imaginings. Impressions can be (though are not necessarily) non-propositional and 
phenomenally rich; F-imaginings are strictly propositional. F-imaginings relate strictly to 
fictional truth; impressions may correlate with fictional truths, but there are circumstances 
where they may come apart.13 Both F-imagining and impressions are concerned with the 
issue of what readers do when they read fictions. However, the notion of impressions aims 
at a wide concept of how readers respond to fictions while F-imagining describes a specific 
imaginative aspect of this response. This shows how impressions and F-imaginings are 
different. Next, I show how they are related. 
Given this difference in scope despite a shared interest, I claim that F-imagining and 
impressions are related as follows: F-imagining that p is sufficient but not necessary for 
having the impression that p. Impressions are a collection of beliefs and imaginings (of 
various kinds) about a narrative. F-imaginings are the component of an impression which 
relates to propositionally imagining that narrative. This fits with Stock’s claims about the 
nature of F-imagining. She is clear that F-imagining is not the only appropriate response 
when reading works of fiction; simply that it is the only necessary appropriate response 
(Stock 2017: 25). Readers may also form objectual, phenomenally rich imaginings based 
on the fiction they are reading. Stock stipulates that these imaginings are not relevant for 
defining fictional truth. I have no objection to this, since as I have specified, the question of 
fictional truth is separate to the discussion of impressions. However, I agree that readers 
do frequently have these richer imaginings. F-imaginings, objectual imaginings, feelings and 
phenomenal experiences together form this richer impression of a fiction, but not all 
impressions must be so rich. Sometimes elements of this combination are missing, such as 
when the reader is not deeply immersed in the fiction or when the work itself is not of high 
quality. In these cases, the impression is less sophisticated and developed than it would be 
otherwise. At other times, all of these features may be present, and the reader’s impression 
of the fiction is correspondingly richer. In other cases, such as visual media, a reader may 
have phenomenal, objectual impressions which do not have a propositional component. 
While Stock would argue that these readers do not attain minimal appropriate engagement 
with the fiction in question, these readers still form an impression. Impression-forming does 
not directly correspond with minimal engagement with fiction, so it can be differentiated from 
F-imagining in this regard. A reader who F-imagines the content of a fiction has an 
impression of that fiction. Not every reader who forms an impression of a fiction F-imagines 
 
13 In addition to the case of impossible fictional truths which Bourne and Caddick Bourne suggest, 
fictional truth and impressions come apart any time the reader has a mistaken impression. 
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that fiction. In other words, F-imagining is sufficient but not necessary for having an 
impression. 
Another important difference to note between F-imaginings and full impressions is 
how readers embellish and draw inferences from fiction. Readers use assorted principles 
when forming impressions of fiction. Philosophers have already isolated, described and 
named some of these principles. For example, we may draw upon Walton’s Reality Principle 
in order to flesh out a visual imagining of a fictional character, perhaps by assuming that a 
human character has typical human anatomy unless told otherwise (Walton 1990).14 We 
may draw on closure under logical implication in order to form an impression of the events 
of a plot which are suggested rather than stated. Sometimes we may imaginatively 
elaborate on information given by the fiction in order to arrive at a more detailed, pleasing 
impression.15 Recent phenomena like ‘headcanon’ (a fan-generated idea about what occurs 
in a story) and fanfiction-writing show how readers regularly engage in surprisingly complex 
elaborations of fictional material (see, e.g., Mullis 2018 and Thomas 2011). Full impressions 
frequently go beyond the remit of fictional truth and into personal responses to the work of 
fiction in question.  
F-imaginings do not draw on these inferences and elaborations. They are far more 
sparse than impressions are capable of being. Stock argues that: 
The generation of implied fictional content, and so the imaginative path of the reader, do not 
necessarily proceed like [it would if formulating a counterfactual]. That is, they do not inevitably 
proceed via the sorts of inferences we would make with respect to belief with the same 
content… making inferences from fictional content as to what to imagine is not inevitably or 
even often like counterfactual thinking (Stock 2017: 177–179). 
Stock argues that F-imaginings do not operate under the principles described above. This 
is because propositional imagining is not belief-like with respect to making inferences. 
Readers do not F-imagine based on inference or embellishment, but only on what is 
included in the fiction itself and, according to Stock, what they recognise the author to intend 
them to F-imagine (2017: 21–22). I do not have space to rehearse Stock’s full argument, 
but fortunately there is no need for me to. Nothing about this quality of F-imagination 
 
14 See also Ryan’s minimal departure (1980), Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s actuality principle (2016: 
19–20), and Friend’s reality assumption (2017). Again, I am interested in what these sources suggest 
about what readers imagine, not how this imagining relates to fictional truth. 
15 See Nichols & Stich’s Script Elaborator for a suggestion as to how this sort of elaboration may 
proceed (2000). 
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changes the nature of impressions, as F-imaginings form only part of a reader's impression. 
Impressions themselves do not always proceed in the manner that Stock describes of F-
imagining. Since this issue is separate from fictional truth, Stock’s main interest, this picture 
of impression-forming does not threaten Stock’s inference-free characterisation of F-
imaginings or vice versa. For now, I have shown that F-imagining and impressions are 
closely related but not identical.  
 
2.8  F-imagining and impossible fiction 
I argue that Stock’s work on F-imagining absolute impossibilities is prima facie evidence 
that reader impressions satisfy my final criterion for representation: a reader can have 
impressions of absolutely impossible things. Stock argues that readers can F-imagine 
absolute impossibilities, as I explain in this section. F-imagining is part of how impressions 
are formed. This, I claim, means that readers are able to form impressions of absolute 
impossibilities. 
The relation between F-imagining and impressions is important for showing that 
reader impressions can pass my second criterion for modelling representation. Earlier in 
this chapter, I made it a condition for accepting any account of descriptive representation 
that it shows how absolute impossibilities are represented to readers. F-imagining helps 
show that impressions are capable of doing so. Stock claims that, since F-imagining is 
strictly propositional, one can F-imagine an absolute impossibility. There is no need to 
objectually imagine this impossibility, and in fact Stock suggests that the pressure to 
objectually imagine impossibilities helps explain why imagining the impossible is typically 
considered beyond human capacity (2017: 143). All that is required to F-imagine the 
absolutely impossible, Stock argues, is that one also imagines there is a suitable 
explanation for the absolute impossibility (2017: 141). Imagining this explanation helps by 
countering the reader’s conviction that the impossibility could not obtain. Just as how a 
person may come to believe a fact she previously thought untrue based on the promise of 
an explanation, a reader may F-imagine the absolute impossibility despite her recognition 
of its impossibility by also imagining there is some explanation for it. This explanation does 
not need to be imagined in any detail; the reader need only F-imagine that some fact 
explains the contradiction rather than imagine how the fact explains the contradiction. In 
this way, readers F-imagine impossible fictions. This, I claim, is evidence that readers can 
have impressions of impossible fictions. 
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Given that F-imagining p is sufficient for having an impression of p, a reader can 
have an impression of an impossible fiction. This impression is (at least partly) composed 
of the F-imagining that, in the fiction, something absolutely impossible is true.16 That 
impression may not have any mental images associated with it, and if it does, then those 
images may not themselves be impossible (I imagine a box when reading ‘Sylvan’s Box’, 
but this box is not both empty and full). However, if part of the impression is that the reader 
believes something absolutely impossible occurs in the story, then that suggests the 
impression is of an absolute impossibility. The reader is therefore having an impression of 
an impossible fiction. This satisfies my final criterion of a model of representation: that a 
work of fiction should be able to represent the absolutely impossible.  
Now that I have established how F-imaginings support the idea that reader 
impressions are a suitable model of descriptive representation, I make some observations 
about the quality of impressions of impossible fiction. As Stock points out, part of the general 
resistance to the idea that readers imagine impossibilities might be that the relevant kind of 
imagining is (incorrectly) assumed to be rich, detailed and perhaps objectual (2017: 143). It 
is not clear that readers are able to imagine impossible fiction with this kind of phenomenal 
clarity.17 In contrast, F-imagining is low-level and sparse. This means that it serves the 
purpose of showing that readers have impressions of absolute impossibilities, since 
impressions are not necessarily vivid or objectual imaginings. An impression of an 
impossible fiction may still be rich and vivid, but the actual impossible proposition is 
entertained at the level of F-imagination; richer imaginings of non-impossible content may 
accompany this propositional imagining.18 When I read ‘Sylvan’s Box’, I propositionally 
imagine an impossible box, but complement this with objectual imaginings of a (possible) 
box and the narrator’s shocked reaction. Together, these form an impression of ‘Sylvan’s 
Box’ which serves to make it true that: 1) the story represents an impossible box, and 2) it 
is true to the story that the box is empty and has something in it, while also making it the 
case that I have a rich and detailed set of imaginings about the story. Given this, a reader 
 
16 Perhaps it also includes the belief that, in the fiction, some other proposition explains this set of 
circumstances. Stock argues that a similar statement is the case for F-imagining impossible fictions. 
I am not so certain that it applies in the case of reader impressions, but its inclusion would not be 
problematic. 
17 This idea is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
18 It can and has been argued that people can imagine absolute impossibilities in a stronger, even 
objectual sense. There is not space to do justice to this idea, but it is discussed extensively by Peter 
Kung (2010; 2016). 
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can have an appropriate impression of an absolute impossibility whether or not the 
impossibility is fictionally true. 
I have argued that reader impressions are a convincing way to discuss the 
representation of impossibilities in fiction, showing that reader impressions are correlated 
with what readers imagine of a story. This section has shown, through appeal to F-
imagining, how readers can have impressions of absolute impossibilities. This means that 
reader impressions have cleared both of my criteria for modelling descriptive 
representation. The proposed model is as follows: a fiction descriptively represents x if and 
only if the reader has an impression of x while reading that fiction. 
The following section isolates the final problem with this model of representation. 
What remains to be shown is that impressions are not subjective or arbitrary, but rather that 
they are subject to standards of appropriateness. Impression-forming is a varied and 
individualistic practice, but this does not mean it is a free-for-all. I discuss in the following 
section how standards of appropriateness can be drawn for impressions. This will allow me 
to redraw my proposed model to the following: a fiction descriptively represents x if and only 
if the reader has an appropriate impression of x while reading that fiction. 
 
2.9  Standards of impressions 
It cannot be the case that for a fiction to represent x is for it to merely give the impression 
that x, otherwise fictions would genuinely represent any x which is part of a reader’s 
impression by mistake or accident. This section offers standards of appropriateness for 
reader impressions of fictions. Many, perhaps even the majority of truth-apt impressions of 
fiction will correspond with the fictional truths contained in that fiction.19 However, reader 
impressions come apart from fictional truths in several important ways. Since fictional truth 
cannot give a standard for appropriate impressions, this section gives an alternative 
condition: the impressions of competent, engaged readers. This shows that reader 
impressions are non-arbitrary and can be held to a meaningful standard of correctness. 
Armed with this set of standards, I can conclude that impressions successfully account for 
descriptive representation. 
 
19 This is true even for Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s definition of fictional truth, assuming that 
impressions of impossible fictions are in the overall minority. 
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Fictional truths are generally considered to be set features of a given text. In 
defiance of the Le Guin quote which heads this chapter, it does not matter whether a reader 
finishes, concentrates on or even actually reads Middlemarch; it is fictionally true that 
Dorothea and Casaubon honeymoon in Rome. Reader impressions, however, can vary 
wildly. A reader might easily misinterpret, skip over or outright ignore key information in a 
text. Returning to Middlemarch, a reader may through inattention miss key information. 
Such a reader may have no impression of where Dorothea and Casaubon honeymoon, or 
she may even have a mistaken impression (e.g., that they are in Milan, or in Rome, Ohio). 
This reader has inappropriate impressions.  
 
Precisely what standard makes this reader’s impressions inappropriate is not 
immediately clear. Given that impressions do not necessarily map onto fictional truths, 
fictional truth cannot serve as a measure of the appropriateness of impressions. If fictional 
truth is the underlying 'fact' of the matter, our impressions are the viewpoint we have upon 
these facts. This viewpoint might be distorted or even erroneous, but such a viewpoint can 
still be the appropriate viewpoint to take. Optical illusions such as the Ames Room (illus. 2) 
are founded on such principles. The Ames Room illusion only functions if the viewer adopts 
a specific and misleading angle on the room. Similarly, an appropriate first time viewing of 
The Sixth Sense is one where the reader spends much of the film erroneously believing 
Illus. 2: Ames Room (Stannard 2010) 
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that Malcolm is alive and not a ghost. Erroneous impressions are not necessarily 
inappropriate. 
Also making this task difficult is the fact that impressions are likely to vary at the 
individual level. Two different readers bring two different perspectives to the same work of 
fiction and will have two different impressions as a result. The content of these impressions 
depends on a myriad of factors: the direct content of the fiction, the reader’s knowledge of 
the fiction in general, her familiarity with the circumstances which the fiction describes, her 
level of engagement, etc. Attempting to fix the appropriateness of impressions through 
appeal to these influencing factors would require listing them in full—a difficult task, even 
ignoring the fact that the list could be challenged as non-exhaustive. There is no doubt that 
different reader impressions of the same fiction can be wildly varied.  
Despite this variance, the impressions of competent, engaged readers have broad 
similarities. Competent, engaged readers all have the impression that Dorothea and 
Casaubon travel to Rome. They all have the impression that Macbeth kills Duncan with a 
dagger. It is this feature which I claim sets the standard of appropriateness for impressions. 
The less likely it is that an impression would be had by a competent, engaged reader, the 
less appropriate the impression. This is a necessarily vague standard, since there is no 
absolute level of competency or engagedness to which a reader can be compared. 
However, I claim that there is an intuitive idea of competency and engagedness which can 
be used to give a standard of appropriateness to reader impressions. This approach offers 
some merits which compensate for the lack of absolute standard. Some examples illustrate 
how the standard of a competent, engaged reader can positively identify the 
appropriateness of various impressions: 
(1) Obviously false impressions can be discounted. In Philip K. Dick’s Ubik, Glen 
Runciter sits in a ‘massive, old-fashioned, walnut-and-leather swivel chair (Dick 
2012: 36)’. No competent, engaged reader would, reading this line, have the 
impression of a tiny, plastic folding chair. Having such an impression is not 
appropriate.  
(2) Superficially ambiguous fictions can support a particular impression over another. 
In Tess of the d’Urbervilles, it is strongly implied that heroine Tess is raped by Alec 
d’Urberville. A competent, engaged reader is likely to spot this implication, but it is 
feasible that she misses the suggestion amongst Hardy’s prose. It is therefore not 
an appropriate impression that Alec does not rape Tess, though this is less 
inappropriate than the impression that Glen Runciter sits in a small plastic chair. 
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(3) Genuinely indeterminate and ambiguous fictions support impressions of any viable 
interpretation. In John Fowles’s The Magus, it is left ambiguous as to whether the 
novel’s protagonist is witnessing supernatural events or merely being tricked. A 
competent, engaged reader might have either impression, justified by any number 
of principled approaches to interpretation. Either impression is appropriate. This 
means that impressions show how specific and contrasting interpretations of a 
fiction can be justified, even if the fictional truth is indeterminate. 
(4) Standards of competency among readers can vary across time. This is 
accommodated by the account. Lady Macbeth scolds her husband, asking if he is 
‘letting “I dare not” wait upon “I would”/Like the poor cat i’ th’ adage? (Shakespeare 
2015: 168)’ A contemporary reader would recognise the allusion to an old saying: 
‘the cat wanted to eat fish but dared not get her feet wet’ (Shakespeare 2015: 168). 
This saying is likely to feature in the impression of the competent contemporary 
reader, as she follows through on the allusion made by Lady Macbeth. The modern 
reader, though competent and engaged, is unlikely to be familiar with the adage, 
and so it is unlikely to feature in her impression of this scene. Both contemporary 
and modern readers are competent and engaged, and neither has privileged 
impressions. Both are appropriate impressions of this scene, even though they are 
different. Modern readers can still have appropriate impressions despite failing to 
grasp a fiction’s original meaning.  
(5) The same principle applies to cases where impressions of fiction are more radically 
revised. Modern readers may form the impression that Prince Hamlet has an 
Oedipus complex—an impression which contemporary playgoers would not have 
shared since the concept was not yet coined. Either impression is appropriate, since 
both have been formed by competent, engaged readers.  
(6) Impressions can be misleading in terms of accurately capturing fictional truth, but 
still be appropriate impressions.20 Bourne and Caddick Bourne agree that a reader 
should form an impression of an impossible object while reading ‘Sylvan’s Box’, 
even though they claim that it is not fictionally true that there is an impossible box. 
(7) In John Ford’s 1956 The Searchers, Debbie is introduced as the niece of Ethan. 
Gregory Currie claims that The Searchers can be interpreted in such a way that 
Debbie is the daughter of Ethan, and the suggestion that she is his niece is a lie 
perpetuated by Debbie’s mother and Ethan (Currie 2004: 148). Currie offers a 
detailed argument in favour of this reading, pointing out details in the film which 
 
20 This point is developed in Appendix B using the example of 2001: A Space Odyssey. 
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support the claim. A competent, engaged reader may fail to spot these clues, and 
instead form the impression that Debbie is Ethan’s niece. Currie’s reading 
represents that of a competent and engaged reader, who is also hyperattentive to 
particular details in the film. A reader who, like Currie, has the impression that 
Debbie is Ethan’s daughter has an appropriate impression, but the fact that a non-
hyperattentive reader fails to notice these clues does not render her impression 
inappropriate. Currie’s hyperattentive reading does not set the standard of 
appropriateness, but rather goes above and beyond it. 
These examples show that an account of appropriateness can be constructed for reader 
impressions. It does not offer a definitive verdict on every feasible impression, but it does 
allow for a measure of impartial judgement on blatantly inappropriate impressions. Armed 
with this set of standards for appropriate impressions, I conclude that reader impressions 
capture the meaning of the term ‘represent’ in my revised definition of impossible fiction. 
The full definition, then, is written out: a fiction is an impossible fiction if it gives its reader 
an appropriate impression of at least one absolute impossibility, besides absolute 
impossibilities which merely consist in empty references. 
 
2.10  The importance of impressions 
Impressions are theory-neutral. There is no account of fiction which rejects the idea that a 
reader forms an impression of a story. Yet impressions can have impossible content. When 
reading an impossible fiction, we will often form impressions of impossible things. This is 
acknowledged even by theorists with commitments against the existence of impossible 
fiction. This includes Lewis, who speaks of an inconsistent fiction’s ‘distinctive peculiarity’, 
even though he denies that fictional worlds are themselves inconsistent (Lewis 1983b: 277). 
It is acknowledged specifically by Bourne and Caddick Bourne, who use the term 
‘impression’ to describe how the fiction can represent the impossible without actually 
containing impossible fictional truths (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016: 103). To have an 
impression is, in part, to understand a detail in the narrative of the story. It does not make 
any kind of commitment to the nature of fictional truth. This means that even theorists 
committed to opposing impossible fictional truths can accept that we can have impressions 
of absolute impossibilities. 
The significance of this is that it allows me to write about the implications of 
impossible fiction for readers without alienating theorists who do not countenance the 
existence of impossible fictional truths. It prevents me from being forced to commit to a 
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specific account of fictional truth which justifies the features of impossible fiction that I 
discuss. After all, whether or not a fiction is impossible depends purely on ontological 
commitments about what constitutes absolute impossibility. As Nolan writes, whether or not 
we interpret a fiction as impossible or possible ‘will depend on our other theoretical 
commitments (Nolan 2007: 670).’ Not only does our ontology contribute to classifying what 
kinds of fictional truth count as impossible, it also legitimises specific interpretations of 
fictions. For example, a committed presentist might resist the idea that Back to the Future 
should be interpreted as about a boy who goes back in time. Not only should the presentist 
hold that any fictional world which included time travel would be impossible, they may prefer 
interpretations of fiction which avoid time travel as a result. 
If Nolan is right, then writing about the aesthetic and experiential impact of 
impossible fiction would be difficult. Precisely what constitutes an impossible fiction is too 
variable, and any reader might reject the interpretation which leads to a result which they 
consider to be impossible.21 It is the concept of impressions which salvages the ability to 
write about the effects of impossible fiction on the reader. When fictional truth itself is not at 
stake, ontological commitments become less pressing. Even a presentist can have the 
impression that a character travels in time, despite the fact that they might on reflection 
decide that interpreting this as the fictional truth of the matter is not tenable. Bourne and 
Caddick Bourne take this point to be so obvious that their concern is to demonstrate how 
we might still reject impossible fictional truths despite the fact that our impressions are of 
impossibility. By focussing on impressions of impossibility, I avoid Nolan’s concern about 
the contentiousness of impossible fictional truths. 
 
2.11  Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that impressions are a distinct element of engagement with fiction, 
separate from both direct content and fictional truth. This has allowed me to clarify my 
revised definition of impossible fiction: to represent an absolute impossibility is to give a 
reader an appropriate impression of that absolute impossibility occurring in the story. I have 
argued that by focussing on impressions, I am able to discuss reader responses to 
impossible fictions without presupposing a specific account of fiction or making particular 
ontological commitments. I can now discuss reader engagement with impossible fiction in 
 
21 This can be done by suggesting that the narrative is unreliable—a move made independently by 
both Nolan (2007) and Yacobi (1981). How Nolan, Yacobi and others make this move is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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a way compatible with all accounts of fictional truth. This completes my exegesis of 
impossible fiction. The next step, then, is to discuss precisely how impossibilities affect 
reader engagement with and experience of fiction. The remainder of this thesis discusses 
the effect that impossibilities have on reader impressions, judgements and sentiments.  
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3. Normalisation 
 
“Truth must of necessity be stranger than fiction,” said Basil, placidly. “For fiction is the creation 
of the human mind, and therefore is congenial to it.” 
- G.K. Chesterton, The Club of Queer Trades 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter investigates the way readers form impressions of impossible fictions. In 
particular, I look at the idea that the optimal impression to form of an impossible fiction is 
that it is a work of unreliable narration. While several philosophers have argued that it is 
reasonable to interpret impossible fictions as works of unreliable narration, I show that there 
are cases of impossible fiction where this interpretation is problematic. I argue that the 
process of normalisation, first discussed in structuralist theory but since adopted by literary 
theory and scientific modelling, explains how readers are equipped to form impressions of 
impossible fictions.22 Normalisation is a kind of interpretive practice which justifies or 
eliminates deviant and incongruous elements in a text. Absolute impossibilities can be one 
such element, and I show how readers normalise impossible fictions. This discussion shows 
why it is that certain impossible fictions resist an interpretation of unreliability. 
 The chapter is split into three major portions. The first portion introduces 
philosophical arguments in favour of interpreting impossible fictions as works of unreliable 
narration. The second portion shows how these arguments reflect concerns which are 
expressed in work on normalisation. The third portion considers these arguments in light of 
lessons learned from normalisation. I show why impossible fictions do not need to be 
interpreted as works of unreliable narration. Since the chapter is broken into thirds, there is 
no convenient place to pause halfway; as a result, this chapter is longer than the other four. 
There follows a short breakdown of each of these major portions in order that the overall 
goal of the chapter remains clear despite this extra length. 
 
22 For an overview of the structuralist origins of normalisation, see Culler (1975: 131–160). For its 
place in more modern narratological theory, see Alber (2016: 46–55). For an overview of scientific 
(re)normalisation, see Butterfield & Bouatta (2014). 
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 In the first portion of the chapter, I respond to the work of several philosophers who 
link impossible fiction with the literary technique of unreliable narration. Daniel Nolan and 
Derek Matravers both suggest that readers might be disposed to interpret impossible 
fictions as unreliable, but neither go into much detail on how and why this interpretation 
proceeds. Richard Hanley, on the other hand, sees unreliability as the only sensible 
interpretation of some works of impossible fiction. I claim that, by investigating the wealth 
of literary theory which has been written on unreliable narration, a clearer image of the 
principles which underpin unreliability is available. I draw on Angsar Nünning’s account of 
unreliable narration in order to show that Hanley’s threat is a genuine contender. 
Sometimes, absolute impossibilities alone seem to justify interpreting a work of fiction as 
unreliably narrated. However, I indicate that in practice Hanley’s account fails: the film 
Looper, an impossible fiction, resists being interpreted as unreliably narrated. This prompts 
the question: why do some impossible fictions lend themselves to interpretations of 
unreliable narration while others do not? 
In order to answer this question, the second portion of the chapter investigates the 
practice of normalisation. Work on this subject shows how and when reader impressions of 
impossible fiction differ. Drawing on research into normalisation requires investigating work 
in narratology and literary theory. I see many areas of potential synthesis between this work 
and the analytic approach of Hanley, Nolan and Matravers. In order to understand 
normalisation, I outline its structuralist roots in the form of work by Jonathan Culler. In order 
to put normalisation into practice, I investigate the work of Tamar Yacobi, who offers the 
most extensive account available of how normalisation helps readers access deviant works 
of fiction. The reader, unable to understand the fiction at face value, must draw upon 
supplementary principles in order to engage with the text. I focus in particular on what 
Yacobi calls the ‘perspectival principle’; the assumption that a text has an unreliable 
narrative due to the incongruity or inconsistency of its content.23 Doing so gives me the tools 
needed to answer the question from the first portion. 
 
23 In doing so, I am attempting a description of what readers actually do, but I do not attempt to 
provide decisive empirical evidence. My focus is theoretical: the notion of normalisation has 
repeatedly appeared in narratology, and bears investigation. Some empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis may be found in Liao, Strohminger & Sekhar Sripada’s ‘Empirically Investigating 
Imaginative Resistance’, which concludes that certain genre expectations can reduce the effects of 
imaginative resistance (2014). If considering genre can allow readers stronger imaginative access to 
fictions, it seems that justifying the deviant aspects has helped the reader interpret the fiction. This 
is the claim made by Yacobi’s generic principle, covered later in the chapter This is not conclusive 
evidence, however, so while its existence is interesting it is not evidence I draw from extensively.   
 
66 
 
The third portion ties together the first two. Normalisation aims to increase certain 
qualities in fiction (namely coherence, consistency and rationality), and it is only in particular 
cases that using the perspectival principle achieves this. This means that absolute 
impossibilities alone are not sufficient motivation to posit unreliable narration. This is 
illustrated with several examples of impossible fiction which I consider. 
 
3.2.1  Unreliability and impossible fiction: Graham Priest and 
Daniel Nolan 
A man, Graham, visits the home of a recently deceased friend in order to help sort his 
unfinished papers. While doing so, he finds a box tucked away in the friend’s study. The 
box, he discovers, is both empty and has something in it. Shocked, he shares this box with 
a companion, Nick. Graham and Nick agree that the box is extraordinary, but they disagree 
on how to proceed. Eventually, Graham drives away with the box, while Nick buries the 
same box outside. There really is an impossible object, which really is both buried at the 
house and taken away from the house. 
So runs ‘Sylvan’s Box’, Priest’s case study in impossible fiction. As the previous 
chapter shows, readers are able to form impressions of absolute impossibilities in fictions 
like ‘Sylvan’s Box’. Priest claims that such an impression is the only sensible interpretation 
of the story. I agree that the above paragraph is an appropriate impression for a reader to 
form of ‘Sylvan’s Box’. But is it the only appropriate impression available? Here is an 
alternative suggestion.  
Graham (a man who is committed to the existence of real logical contradictions) 
visits the home of a recently deceased friend in order to help sort his unfinished papers. 
While doing so, he finds a box tucked away in the friend’s study. The box, Graham is 
convinced, is both empty and has something in it, but he is mistaken. He sees it as 
impossible, but this is only an optical illusion. Really, the box is empty. Shocked, he shares 
this box with a companion, Nick. Graham and Nick agree that the box is extraordinary, 
because Nick experiences the same illusion as Graham, but they disagree on how to 
proceed. Eventually, Graham drives away with the box, while Nick buries a different box 
(which both think is the original) outside. There was no impossible object or impossible 
action, but both men were mistakenly convinced that there was. The story has been recast 
as an unreliable narrative. 
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This recasting of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is suggested by Nolan (2007). Nolan responds to 
Priest’s claim that the only reasonable interpretation of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is as an impossible 
fiction. He argues that another reasonable interpretation is that the narrator is unreliable. 
Under this interpretation, there is no impossible object in the story. Instead, there is only a 
false claim from the narrator that there is an impossible object. While Priest may have 
written ‘Sylvan’s Box’ as an unequivocally impossible fiction, Nolan’s interpretation gives a 
reasonable and consistent reading of the fiction. Such a reading is ontologically 
parsimonious, explaining the behaviour of the characters without relying on the existence 
of an impossible object. Under Nolan’s interpretation, ‘Sylvan’s Box’ ceases to be an 
impossible fiction.  
On the subject of whether this is the better interpretation, Nolan is noncommittal 
(2007: 670). He claims that the reader’s theoretical commitments are the deciding factor in 
whether this reading is more or less preferable. If she opposes the idea that fictions can 
contain impossible truths, she will prefer the reading of unreliability. As his own 
commitments do not prohibit impossible fiction, Nolan is content to interpret ‘Sylvan’s Box’ 
as a genuinely impossible fiction. He does however warn that, while unreliability remains a 
viable option for providing consistent readings of impossible fiction, theorists who claim that 
fictions cannot contain impossible content will never be convinced otherwise.  
 
3.2.2  Unreliability and impossible fiction: Richard Hanley 
This section introduces Hanley, who is just the kind of theorist that Nolan describes. Hanley 
is a committed Lewisian about fiction.24 I run through Hanley’s arguments about impossible 
fiction. This includes the ‘chunking’ method of dealing with impossible fiction, and his claim 
that certain impossible fictions must necessarily be interpreted as unreliable. I specify my 
disagreement with Hanley, showing how his argument is against the spirit of my project. 
Hanley’s general project in his 2004 ‘As good as it gets’ is to defend a Lewisian 
account of fiction. Due to this, he is more insistent than Nolan that the consistent, unreliable 
reading of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is the correct reading. For the most part, Hanley’s paper dedicates 
itself to defending the ‘chunking’ method of understanding impossible fiction (the ‘method 
of union’, to Hanley). Under this account, impossible fictions represent multiple juxtaposed 
possible worlds which may or may not be consistent with one another. This means, 
 
24 I.e., fictional truth is determined by a set of relevant concrete possible worlds, and so cannot be 
impossible. 
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according to Lewis and Hanley, that contradictory propositions can be included in fictions 
without the fiction containing an inconsistent conjunction. The fiction does not represent a 
single world where both p and ¬p hold. Instead, the fiction represents world 1, where only 
p holds, and world 2, where only ¬p holds. It may appear that these two are a single world, 
but this is narrative sleight of hand. In this way, both p and ¬p are fictionally true, but the 
conjunction p & ¬p is not. This method, Hanley claims, is the sensible way for a Lewisian to 
account for impossible fiction (Hanley 2004: 123). It is closely related to the metaphysical 
account to which Bourne and Caddick Bourne subscribe, described in the previous chapter. 
Bourne and Caddick Bourne also argue that fictions are individual possible worlds, and that 
fictional impossibilities represent this chunking together of multiple worlds rather than a 
single, inconsistent world.25  
Just as with Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s ontological account of fiction, the use of 
chunking to explain the metaphysics of impossible fiction has no implications for my project. 
I have already clarified that I am interested in impossibility at the level of reader impressions 
rather than fictional truth. I have no issues with which metaphysical standpoint the Lewisian 
elects to take. It is this issue of metaphysics which motivates Hanley, who attacks Priest’s 
claim that ‘Sylvan’s Box’ demonstrates a genuine counterexample to Lewis’s model of 
fictional truth. He does so by claiming, just as Nolan does in his later paper, that the more 
reasonable interpretation of the story is one where the narrator is unreliable. To Hanley, in 
fact, ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is unreliable insofar as it is contradictory (2004: 125). There are no 
inconsistent pairs of propositions to be chunked, only the single consistent proposition that 
the narrator believes that the box is empty and has something in it. Chunking targets fictional 
truth rather than impressions or truth to a story. The suggestion that ‘Sylvan’s Box’ should 
be interpreted as unreliably narrated, on the other hand, has ramifications for what is true 
to the story of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ and which impressions are appropriate for its reader to form. 
I object to any account which claims that the reader does have the scope to interpret 
a fiction like ‘Sylvan’s Box’ as impossible at the level of truth to the story. Hanley does not 
make it clear why chunking is not perfectly able to accommodate ‘Sylvan’s Box’. By claiming 
that one possible world contains an empty box and another possible world contains an 
occupied box, the Lewisian should be able to accommodate the story in her ontology. Priest 
protests that applying chunking to ‘Sylvan’s Box’ makes the actions of the characters 
irrational, but this should not trouble the Lewisian (Priest 1997: 580). It is in the nature of 
Lewis’s modal realism that there exists a world with an empty box and a world with a full 
 
25 See p. 46. 
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box (in fact, many of each of these worlds) where relevant counterparts of Graham and Nick 
behave in the way described in ‘Sylvan’s Box’. It is, after all, possible for two people to 
behave in such a way towards an ordinary box. All that the Lewisian requires for her 
chunking account of fiction is this set of worlds. This would make ‘Sylvan’s Box’ palatable 
to the Lewisian, and still validate the reader’s impression of absolute impossibility.  
Instead of taking this route, Hanley opts to interpret ‘Sylvan’s Box’ as an unreliable 
fiction. This implies that the reader should not have an impression of an impossible object. 
Instead, the reader should have an impression of a fallible or untrustworthy narrator who 
gives a misleading description of a possible object. Nolan and Hanley’s claims about 
unreliable narration imply that a reader can and perhaps should have the impression that 
works of impossible fiction are unreliably narrated. This claim impacts on my work as, 
effectively, Hanley argues that readers have their hands tied when they form impressions 
of impossible fiction. Instead of being able to form whatever impression most appeals to 
them, they must interpret impossible fictions as unreliably narrated. Given that my project 
explores the wide range of effects that impossible fiction can have on a reader, it comes as 
no surprise that I object to how Hanley limits the reader’s options for engaging with 
impossible fiction. 
 Due to his switch in focus from fictional truth to the kind of impressions readers have 
of impossible fiction, Hanley becomes an issue for my project. His claim, that impossible 
fictions like ‘Sylvan’s Box’ must necessarily be interpreted as unreliable, is one to which I 
strenuously object. However, Hanley is not the last philosopher to suggest that unreliability 
and impossible fiction are tightly connected. The following section explains how Matravers 
links these two ideas.  
 
3.2.3  Unreliability and impossible fiction: Derek Matravers 
This brief section introduces Matravers’s work on impossible fiction. I show that, while he 
does not go as far as Hanley, Matravers too suggests that a viable interpretive move is to 
read impossible fiction as unreliably narrated. I then summarise Nolan, Hanley and 
Matravers, and indicate how I will proceed with analysing their arguments. 
While Hanley and Nolan suggest unreliability as a reasonable answer for Lewisians 
to the notion that certain fictions are absolutely impossible, Matravers’s approach to 
unreliability assumes that impossible fiction is a real phenomenon. His interest is similar to 
mine—describing what the reader can and does do while reading impossible fiction. Among 
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the reading strategies he lists (which are described in more detail later in this chapter) is the 
‘rejection’ strategy. Matravers sees it as a viable option for a reader to assume that the 
impossible elements of the story are some kind of misreport, and to reject the idea that the 
story should be taken at face value. Instead, the reader assumes that the narrator is 
unreliable (Matravers 2014: 131-132). While Matravers does not claim that unreliability is a 
more or less appropriate way to interpret impossible fiction, he thinks it is an interpretation 
available to the reader. This links the two notions, impossibility and unreliability, in a way 
reminiscent of Nolan and Hanley. Clearly there is some motivation for the idea that 
impossible fiction is interpreted as unreliable beyond commitments to a Lewisian account 
of fictional truth. 
Matravers, Hanley and Nolan all agree that one potential response which the reader 
can have to impossible fiction is to interpret it as unreliably narrated. Nolan goes further 
than Matravers, indicating that there is some motivation for general readers to interpret 
impossible fictions in such a way that impossible elements are written off as the products of 
an unreliable narrator. Hanley goes even further than Nolan, claiming that the unreliable 
reading is the preferred option for the general reader, and that ‘Sylvan’s Box’ and other 
impossible fictions earn an incredulous stare from ‘otherwise platitudinous folk (Hanley 
2004: 125)’. The remainder of this chapter investigates all of these suggestions. I ask the 
following: is unreliability, in fact, an appealing and rational way to interpret impossible 
fictions? In which cases is unreliability more or less viable an interpretation?  
In order to answer these questions, I analyse the principles which underpin 
judgements of unreliable narration. If readers opt to interpret impossible fictions as 
unreliable, whether consciously or unconsciously, there must be some factor motivating this 
interpretation. The first step in this investigation is a closer look at what motivates and 
justifies judgements of unreliable narration in the first place. While philosophers have 
discussed unreliable narration, the most established work in the area is in literary theory. 
Consequently, I draw on this resource to determine whether unreliable narration itself 
supports the use to which it is put by Matravers, Nolan and Hanley. 
 
3.2.4  Unreliability and impossible fiction: unreliable narration in 
literary theory 
This section draws on literary work on unreliable narration. I do this in order to inform my 
judgement on whether unreliability is a mandatory or even appropriate interpretation of 
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impossible fiction. While the concept of unreliable narration was first articulated by Wayne 
C. Booth, it has been further refined and developed by more recent literary theorists (Booth 
1961). I investigate Angsar Nünning’s 2008 account, as it summarises and reflects on a 
range of theories of unreliability in order to codify unreliable narration. In particular it  
synthesises Nünning’s own earlier reader-focussed work with the more holistic, author- and 
text-inclusive approaches to unreliability offered by theorists such as James Phelan and 
Greta Olson (Olson 2003; Phelan and Martin 1999). This gives some independent indication 
of the sorts of qualities works of fiction should have if somebody is to reasonably claim that 
a work is unreliably narrated. 
In general, Nünning follows the received wisdom on unreliability—that the unreliable 
narrator is one whose word the reader has some motivation to suspect—but finesses on 
this with his cognitive model of unreliable narration (Nünning 2005: 100; Rimmon-Kenan 
1983). This model responds in part to Booth, who originally classed unreliable narration as 
an objective, text-immanent phenomenon. Nünning’s cognitive reconceptualisation argues 
that unreliable narration is an interpretive method constructed by a reader, but that 
nevertheless textual phenomena and authorial intention can be seen to inspire, encourage 
and guide this sort of interpretation. Booth’s model holds that only textual phenomena are 
required for a judgement of unreliability (Olson 2003: 95). Nünning agrees that textual 
phenomena contribute to judgements of unreliability, but also claims that the reader’s own 
standards of normalcy provide the base point from which judgements of unreliability are 
made (Nünning 2005: 95). In other words, the actual content of a text can indicate to a 
reader that she should consider the narration unreliable, but this indication is relative to the 
reader. Take a paradigmatic unreliable narrator, such as Francis of Robert Weine’s The 
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920).  After telling his story, Francis is revealed in a closing twist 
to be a patient in a mental asylum. The fact that the narrator is a patient in an asylum is 
what triggers the judgement that he is an unreliable narrator. However, this judgement only 
makes sense against the background assumption that patients at mental asylums are 
unlikely to provide reliable testimony. If this background assumption could not be taken for 
granted, then the mere fact that Francis is in a mental asylum would not be sufficient 
indication that his testimony is unreliable. 
 To Nünning, unreliable narration is an interpretive strategy the reader uses. Coming 
to adopt this strategy successfully and appropriately requires three elements: 1) the author’s 
own agency, 2) textual phenomena and 3) reader judgements (Nünning 2005: 90–91).26 
 
26 Nünning is neutral towards whether this triumvirate refers to the implied author (i.e., the persona 
of the author which can be discovered from the text alone) or the actual author (i.e., the flesh-and-
72 
 
These three features are all demonstrated by The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. Author agency is 
present: the writers of the film introduce the twist in order to cast doubt on all of Francis’s 
prior testimony. The fact that Francis is shown in a mental asylum is the relevant textual 
phenomenon. The reader then judges, based on her ability to correctly recognise that the 
textual phenomenon is an invitation from the author to infer unreliability, that Francis is not 
a reliable narrator. All three of these aspects combined result in an appropriate judgement 
(and corresponding impression) of unreliable narration.  
Nünning emphasises the reader’s own role in identifying the elements of the text 
which hint at its unreliability. The reader judgement is crucial, since it is only in virtue of this 
judgement that authorial agency and textual phenomena are recognised. No matter how an 
author invites her reader to infer that a narrator is unreliable, the inference itself is made by 
the reader. This reader may be positioned in such a way that the invitation is not apparent—
the narrative may not strike a reader as unreliable. To use Nünning’s example, a male 
pederast may fail to notice that Humbert Humbert of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita is an 
unreliable narrator, since to this reader there are no suspicious or untoward features in the 
text (1999). It is the reader’s judgement which allows her to determine whether an element 
of the text indicates the author is inviting her to posit unreliability. Without this judgement, 
there cannot be a diagnosis of unreliable narration. 
To summarise: Nünning argues that unreliable narration is a way in which readers 
interpret texts rather than something found in a text. However, he also claims that in order 
to interpret a text as unreliably narrated, a reader must identify invitations from the author 
for her to infer unreliability. His account offers a way of independently verifying the claims 
that Nolan, Hanley and Matravers make about unreliable narration. While Nünning’s model 
of unreliable narration is not the only account which literary theory offers, Nünning is a 
prolific and respected voice in debates on unreliable narration (Shen 2013). His work is 
therefore a suitable yardstick for philosophical work on unreliable narration. I consider 
whether the arguments posed by Nolan, Hanley and Matravers about impossible fiction are 
compatible with Nünning’s model. If they are not, then there is reason to suspect that they 
(and particularly Hanley) respond to ideological commitments about impossibility rather than 
consideration of the literary technique of unreliable narration. If, however, their arguments 
 
blood person or people who authored the text). Phelan recasts the implied author as a partial 
representation of the actual author, drawing a closer relation between the actual and implied author 
than previous theorists (Phelan 2005, cited in Nünning 2005: 99). Nünning seems content to proceed 
under Phelan’s definition of the implied author, although he notes that the nature of the author in the 
triumvirate remains open to debate (2005: 99–101). 
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are compatible with Nünning, it will be clear that they represent a serious concern about 
impossible fiction. 
 
3.2.5  Unreliability and impossible fiction: are impossible fictions 
unreliable? 
Armed with a clearer image of how readings of unreliability can be licenced, this section 
reviews the judgements of unreliable narration made by Nolan, Hanley and Matravers. I 
argue that, on a fairly charitable interpretation of Nünning, there is good reason to take the 
claims these philosophers make seriously. Some impossible fictions do lend themselves to 
a reading of unreliable narration. I review ‘Sylvan’s Box’, as well as Italo Calvino’s Invisible 
Cities to show how this is the case. However, I ultimately argue that absolute impossibilities 
alone are insufficient licence for a reading of unreliable narration. To show this, I use Looper, 
an impossible fiction which does not seem to sponsor a reading of unreliable narration. This 
leaves us with a problem: why do some impossible fictions lend themselves to readings of 
unreliability, while others do not? 
Nolan, Hanley and Matravers all claim that the absolute impossibilities found in an 
impossible fiction are sufficient cause for the reader to judge the text as unreliable. However, 
Nünning’s model requires more than this. In the case of an impossible fiction like ‘Sylvan’s 
Box’, two of Nünning’s three features of unreliability are demonstrably present. Certainly, 
reader judgements of unreliability are fulfilled: Nolan, Matravers and Hanley each make 
these judgements. Arguably, there are also textual phenomena present: the absolute 
impossibilities themselves motivate these reader judgements. What remains to be 
demonstrated is authorial agency. To Nünning, this agency is expressed in the form of 
invitations for the reader to infer unreliability. His example is the self-important, emotionally 
stunted manner of the narrator in Ian McEwan’s ‘Dead as They Come’ (Nünning 2005: 102). 
This manner is a clue; by leaving it, the author indicates that the text is not reliable.27 The 
narrator’s clear inability to pass reasonable judgement on his own qualities invites the 
reader to consider whether his judgements of reality are also flawed. The equivalent in the 
case of impossible fiction would be to interpret the mere fact that absolute impossibilities 
are mentioned as sufficient indication that the author is inviting the reader to infer 
unreliability.  
 
27 Nünning leaves it indeterminate whether he refers to the actual author or the implied author in this 
context (see the previous footnote for further detail). 
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Nolan ends his argument on this point, sceptical about but undecided on the idea 
that impossible elements alone justify a reading of unreliable narration. Matravers, similarly 
to Nolan, suggests that unreliability is a potential route of interpretation for readers of 
impossible fiction, but does not claim it is a mandatory or even appropriate way of 
interpreting every impossible fiction. Matravers may even think that reading an impossible 
fiction as unreliable requires some further evidence beyond the impossible element alone. 
I suspect this is the case, since he claims that the so-called rejection strategy is an option 
‘if the reader has independent reason to believe that the narrative obeys the reality principle 
(Matravers 2014: 132)’. If positing unreliable narration is licenced by the suspicion that the 
fiction obeys roughly the same laws as the real world, then impossible fictions which clearly 
do not obey the reality principle may not licence the use of unreliable narration. Hanley, 
however, is compelled to say that impossible elements are sufficient evidence of an 
inference invitation from the author. He claims to be ‘forced’ to doubt the reliability of Priest’s 
narrator with regards to the narrator’s description of the impossible box, indicating that the 
box itself is what triggers his interpretation of unreliability (Hanley 2004: 125). There is 
disagreement, then, on whether or not absolute impossibilities can validate judgements of 
unreliable narration. Perhaps Nünning can help decide the matter. 
To Hanley’s credit, impossible elements of a story do, to some extent, fit Nünning’s 
description of textual clues to unreliability. Absolute impossibilities are violations of 
presupposed norms, e.g., that a box must be either empty or occupied. This violation is one 
of a range of signs and signals which Nünning claims qualify as relevant textual phenomena 
indicating unreliable narration (Nünning 2005: 102). However, Nünning portrays the 
judgement of unreliability as one which combines various features of a text—one feature 
alone does not typically constitute an inference invitation (Nünning 2005: 102). A judgement 
of unreliable narration should only be upheld if it is supported by multiple features in the 
fiction. Perhaps, however, absolute impossibilities are so extreme that they justify a reading 
of unreliability by themselves. Some examples of inappropriate and appropriate readings of 
unreliable narration help show why, though this may seem plausible to theorists like Hanley, 
I do not agree that this is the case. 
First, a closer look at the unreliable reading of ‘Sylvan’s Box’. Priest’s short story 
does have several features which support a reading of unreliable narration. Its narrator 
describes himself as emotional from the process of looking through his friend’s unfinished 
papers. He suffers from the heat of the day. He has no equipment with which to test the 
box, and we rely on the word of the narrator and his similarly tired colleague. Perhaps these 
factors all contribute to some misjudgement on the narrator’s part, making him what Olson 
calls a ‘fallible’ narrator (Olson 2003: 101–102). On a slightly different reading, the narrator 
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is more underhanded. He admits his support for the idea that contradictions can be 
instantiated in the real world. He muses on the possibility of proving this and the celebrity 
status this would bring him. Perhaps the narrator exaggerates the evidence and misleads 
the reader, making him an ‘untrustworthy’ narrator (Olson 2003: 102–103). These are 
relatively flimsy grounds on which to base a reading of unreliable narration (certainly 
compared to a fiction like The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari), but there are insufficient grounds to 
dismiss this reading outright. 
Supporting Hanley’s argument, there are impossible fictions which can be similarly 
read as unreliable due to their absolute impossibilities. Calvino’s Invisible Cities stars a 
fictionalised version of Marco Polo, who narrates descriptions of fantastical cities to a 
fictionalised Kublai Khan. The descriptions of some of these cities are inconsistent with one 
another. The cities of Cecilia, Penthesilea and Trude are all described in ways which cannot 
coexist, since each covers the extent of the earth: Cecilia has engulfed everything that 
surrounds it, Penthesilea is composed of endless suburbs with no centre, and Trude covers 
the entire world (Calvino 1997). Each of these cities is individually possible, but they are not 
compossible. This makes Polo’s description of the Khan’s empire impossible. This in turn 
suggests that Polo is exaggerating to the elderly Khan. A reasonable interpretation of the 
story is that the absolutely impossible elements are down to the misleading descriptions 
which one character gives—the narrator Polo is unreliable (McHale 1987: 43–44). The fact 
that Polo’s descriptions of cities are fantastical and impossible is, in this instance, direct 
evidence for the reading of unreliability. However, once again further supporting evidence 
can be found for the reading of unreliability. The Khan is openly sceptical of Polo’s claims. 
He reports discerning a subtle pattern beneath Polo’s wild accounts (Calvino 1997: 5). The 
impossible descriptions of cities or the Khan’s suspicion may not have sufficed to justify a 
reading of unreliability alone, but together these features do licence such a reading. 
A counterexample to Hanley would be an impossible fiction where unreliability is not 
an appropriate reading. Rian Johnson’s 2012 Looper is one such fiction. In Looper, time 
travel technology exists and is frequently exploited for criminal purposes. A character in 
trouble with the mob, Seth, is killed when the mob kidnap his younger self and mutilate him. 
As Seth desperately tries to find his younger self, the mobsters begin to remove the younger 
Seth’s limbs. As they do so, the older Seth’s limbs disappear, replaced with healed scars 
and aged damage. This presents a logical impossibility: Seth loses his hands while young, 
loses his hands while old, and has not lost his hands between these two points. Claiming 
unreliability, however, seems unpalatable in this case. Time travel and the accompanying 
paradoxes are core features of the narrative. Doubting the reliability of the depiction of time 
travel is tantamount to doubting the reliability of the premise of the film. At no point is the 
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process of time travel portrayed in a way which suggests its depiction is misleading. The 
unreliable reading of Looper is far less compelling than that of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ or Invisible 
Cities. 
We are presented with a puzzle. In some instances, absolute impossibilities seem 
to provide evidence and support for a reading of unreliability. In other instances, they do 
not. The impossibilities in Invisible Cities support a reading of unreliability, while those of 
Looper do not. Nünning has suggested the prerequisites for a reading of unreliability, but 
now I must investigate what motivates this interpretation over others. This completes the 
first major portion of this chapter, which has set up a problem with the way philosophers 
claim impossible fiction can be read. 
The second portion of this chapter searches for a solution to this problem. I find that 
solution in narratological work on normalisation. Normalisation is the process by which 
readers interpret what they read in accordance with their expectations of and underlying 
assumptions about a fiction. I claim that normalisation explains why readers form 
impressions of unreliable narration, and that a close look at the subject accounts for the 
disparity between interpretations of impossible fictions like Looper and impossible fictions 
like Invisible Cities. 
 
3.3.1  Normalisation: interpreting fiction 
This section lays the groundwork for future discussion of normalisation. To do so, I 
characterise the process of forming impressions of fiction as interpretive. I claim that this 
interpretive process tends to aim towards maximising three qualities in fiction: consistency, 
coherency and rationality. I explain each of these concepts and show how they guide our 
interpretation of fiction. 
When the reader forms her impressions of a fiction, she performs a kind of 
interpretation. She interprets the direct content of the fiction (its constitutive words, images 
and sounds—see pp. 41–43), using it to inform the impressions she draws. This interpretive 
activity is often low-level or even unconscious. It is far more primitive than other types of 
interpretation, such as the interpretation of themes or symbolism. It is a matter of parsing 
the fiction and understanding that it is representing a particular set of circumstances. Take 
the following extract from Hiromi Goto’s Chorus of Mushrooms, where the narrator, Naoe, 
overhears her daughter and son-in-law speculate about her oncoming senility: 
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“She started to stick her hands inside her pants, but I caught her in the act and she stopped 
and started laughing,” Keiko continues... 
     “Maybe her crotch is itchy,” Shinji suggests. 
There is a gurgle in my chest, up my throat, and at the back of my mouth. I bite my blankets 
to muffle the sound but snort through my nose instead (Goto 1997: 40–41). 
Forming an impression of this scene involves interpreting several pieces of information 
which are obvious, but not explicit. For example, the reader must interpret the fiction in order 
to arrive at the fact that Naoe is laughing. Similarly, at no point in the scene (including 
outside the given extract) is it made explicit that Naoe is in bed, or that she tries to hide the 
sound of her laughter from Keiko and Shinji. These are all extremely basic pieces of 
information which any competent reader can glean from the extract alone, let alone from 
the wider context of the novel. However, the information must still be extracted via 
interpretation, as it is not explicitly stated in the direct content of the fiction. The reader 
interprets the gurgling as Naoe laughing, and the blankets as indicating that she is in bed. 
 Some philosophers, such as Peter Lamarque, might challenge the idea that I have 
described an act of interpretation. Lamarque argues that an object can only be interpreted 
in the event that its meaning is unclear (Lamarque 2000: 98). There is no real ambiguity in 
the extract from Chorus of Mushrooms; a reader who does not think that Naoe is laughing, 
or that she is in bed, is simply wrong. Nothing turns on the use of the term ‘interpretation’ in 
this chapter, so this potential objection is not damaging. If, as Lamarque claims, 
interpretation is at its broadest definition the practice of making sense of things, then it 
should be clear that the practice I have described is similar to interpretation (Lamarque 
2000: 98). Lamarque, and others like him, might therefore think of the process described 
above as interpretation-like rather than an act of actual interpretation.28 Where such a 
reader objects to the use of ‘interpretation’ in this chapter, the word could be replaced with 
‘interpretation-like’ with no impact on my arguments.  
The low-level interpretation described above is how the reader makes sense of the 
fiction and forms her impressions. To interpret a fiction in a way which makes no sense 
would be pointless and arbitrary. Assuming that readers do not interpret purposelessly or 
arbitrarily, this means that a reader will make her best effort to interpret fiction in a way 
which makes sense to her. The reader does not imagine that Naoe is suspended from the 
 
28 To Beardsley, for example, the activity I describe is a combination of explication (interpreting the 
contextual meaning of words) and elucidation (interpreting the features of the world of the text which 
are suggested but not stated by those words) (Lamarque 2010: 291). 
78 
 
ceiling—part of her impression is that Naoe is in bed, because that is where people are 
usually wrapped in blankets. When Mrs Sommers is hungry in Kate Chopin’s ‘A Pair of Silk 
Stockings’, the reader’s impression is that Mrs Sommers hasn’t eaten recently (Chopin 
1897). If a character lets go of an object, then, unless given a reason to think otherwise, the 
competent reader’s impression is that the object falls. The reader recognises a causal 
relation between Inigo Montoya’s desire to kill the Six-Fingered Man, and the fact that the 
Six-Fingered Man killed Inigo’s father—she does not think the two are merely coincidental. 
Fiction is constantly interpreted and decoded by the reader in order to turn the words on the 
page into an impression of a unified narrative. 
When the reader forms impressions of a fiction in this way, I claim that she is 
generally guided by three qualities of fiction: (1) coherence, (2) consistency and (3) 
rationality.  
(1)  Coherent fiction is broadly unified in tone, style and subject. The reader’s 
impression is not that Mrs Sommers is hungry because she is secretly a bear 
disguised as a human. This would not be coherent with the rest of Chopin’s short 
story. The existence of aliens is a coherent aspect of The X-Files but would be 
incoherent in Fraiser. This should not be confused with logical coherency—a 
logically impossible fiction may still be coherent, and a logically possible fiction can 
be incoherent.29 
(2) A consistent fiction contains events and characters which, however unlikely, could 
have really occurred. That is to say, it could feasibly be discovered that a consistent 
fiction was mistakenly classified and is actually a work of nonfiction. Consistent 
fictions are logically possible, containing no internal contradictions. The characters 
and events of Jane Eyre are all compossible, making it a consistent fiction. Flann 
O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds, where various fictional characters drug their own 
author, is an inconsistent fiction. 
(3) A rational fiction contains events which relate to one another in sensible ways, rather 
than in arbitrary ways. The reader’s impression is that Naoe is laughing because of 
what Shinji says, rather than coincidentally. This is because that interpretation 
maximises the rationality in Chorus of Mushrooms. An irrational fiction, such as Jim 
Henson’s Tale of Sand, features non-sequiturs and suspension of typical rules of 
cause-and-effect (the same desert contains an American Football team out training, 
 
29 Matravers deals with a similar concept in Fiction and Narrative (2014: 80). His notion of ‘global 
coherence’ combines elements from my notions of coherence and rationality. 
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a used car dealer, a Civil War-era Confederate army, a gramophone with records 
which conjure the object which they have recorded, and a beach—complete with 
killer shark).  
These three qualities are not present in every fiction, nor are they always present in equal 
amounts. Some fictions, authors, genres or movements challenge one or more of these 
qualities. Surrealism challenges the quality of rationality; M.C. Escher challenges the quality 
of consistency; Steve McCaffery’s non-narrative fiction Panopticon challenges all three. 
Sometimes an interpretation will privilege one quality over another: frequently, a reader may 
favour coherency over rationality in cases of magic realist fiction, or consistency over 
coherency in cases of historical drama. Generally, however, all three are the rubrics which 
guide how the reader forms her impression of a fiction. An interpretation which maximises 
these three qualities is generally preferred to one which diminishes them. Usually, they are 
deployed without conscious effort—an interpretation which satisfies all three principles 
seems more right than interpretations which do not—but this is not the only way that they 
guide our interpretive activity. 
 Sometimes readers must actively interpret fictions which are harder to resolve than 
the ones suggested above. These are cases where there are genuine competing 
explanations to choose between. This active interpretation is not low-level or unconscious, 
unlike the type of interpretation I have discussed until now. It is interpretation in the sense 
which Lamarque discusses, and it requires conscious thought to conduct. However, it too 
aims towards maximising coherency, consistency and rationality, as an example shows. 
While watching the ending of Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, the reader must interpret 
the sequence in which Bowman passes through a vortex of colour near Jupiter, awaking in 
a stylish bedroom. In order for the reader to understand this scene, she must actively 
interpret what is taking place in the film. The direct content alone is not enough to provide 
a coherent, consistent and rational impression of the scene. If the reader does not exercise 
conscious, active interpretation, then the scene will not make sense. When performing this 
interpretation, the reader still aims to maximise the three qualities. For this reason, a 
common interpretation is that Bowman has made contact with an alien race. This 
interpretation is coherent (Bowman learns earlier in the film that his mission is to investigate 
an alien artefact on one of Jupiter’s moons). It is consistent (there is nothing logically 
impossible about the existence of aliens). It is also rational (the kaleidoscopic vortex is 
explained as alien technology, and Bowman wakes up in a bedroom because the aliens 
have constructed it for him), eliminating the non-sequitur appearance of the bedroom. In 
this example, coherence, consistency and rationality can be seen to guide our interpretive 
behaviour at both unconscious and explicit, conscious levels. 
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 This section has established that readers form their impressions by interpretation of 
fiction (or, if we are cautious about labelling this interpretation, by an interpretation-like 
activity). When interpreting fiction in this way, readers are guided by three principles: 
coherence, consistency and rationality. The following section defines normalisation and 
shows that it is an extension of this activity.   
 
3.3.2  Normalisation: defining normalisation 
The desire to develop a coherent, consistent and rational impression of a fiction leads the 
reader to normalisation. Normalisation is the process by which a reader interprets a text in 
a way whereby the text makes sense to her. It is the way in which she ensures that the 
fiction seems unified and sensical, without any arbitrary, deviant or outlying elements. To 
normalise a text means to relate that text to a particular viewpoint, convention or principle. 
Often, this viewpoint is the same we use in the real world—many fictions can be interpreted 
by applying the standards of the real world. However, some fictions cannot be properly 
interpreted when using these standards. In these cases, the reader draws on 
supplementary principles. These include genre conventions and historical context, but there 
are many other, more complex principles of normalisation which readers can use.   
This section characterises normalisation further by explaining Culler’s concept of 
naturalization. This requires careful and sensitive reading, since Culler’s account is 
embedded in the language of structuralism (which I am not committed to). In order to ensure 
that Culler’s work is relevant to analytic philosophy, I express the process of normalisation 
in direct comparison to Donald Davidson’s principle of charity. Many fictions can be 
interpreted using the principle of charity: the assumption that we are being told something 
rational (i.e., something which we consider to be true). However, fictions are not expected 
to conform to the truth in the same way as real rational speakers. When fictions deviate 
from the standards of the real world, readers must use a different principle to successfully 
conduct their interpretation. Explaining Davidson helps articulate the idea of normalisation 
in non-structuralist terms. Following this section, I go into greater detail on the principles 
and conventions which readers adopt when they normalise challenging works of fiction.  
Normalisation helps readers maximise the coherence, consistency and rationality of 
the fiction they read. It is part of the interpretive practice by which readers form impressions 
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of fiction.30 This means that normalisation is psychological, but it has a normative element 
as well. It is psychological in that there are no standards for what makes a fiction seem 
more coherent, consistent and rational to an individual reader. However, it is normative 
insofar as it contributes to reader impressions. The impressions formed as the result of 
normalisation are subject to standards of appropriateness as discussed in the previous 
chapter (pp. 58–61). Normalisation is therefore conducted poorly if it results in an 
inappropriate reader impression, even though the reader herself may feel that she can make 
better sense of the fiction. This is not usually an issue, as normalisation of standard, 
possible fiction tends to require minimal effort. It is not a challenge to interpret most fictions 
in a way which maximises coherency, consistency and rationality. This is why ‘A Pair of Silk 
Stockings’ and the extract from Chorus of Mushrooms pose little issue to a competent 
reader. Her normalisation of these works is straightforward: it can be done without 
conscious effort.31 
Normalisation is less straightforward in cases of impossible fiction, because 
absolute impossibilities reduce the fiction’s consistency and rationality. A reader may 
therefore be inclined to interpret an impossible fiction in a way which minimises or outright 
ignores absolute impossibilities. However, the coherence of impossible fictions frequently 
rests on the fact that the absolute impossibilities take place. Back to the Future would be 
far less coherent if the temporal paradoxes were not part of the reader’s interpretation: they 
drive its plot and inform the behaviour of the characters. In cases of impossible fiction, the 
quality of coherency therefore regularly conflicts with consistency and rationality. This 
introduces the risk that a reader will normalise in such a way that she forms an inappropriate 
impression of the fiction, such as one where Back to the Future involved no time travel. 
There are several strategies for normalising impossible fictions, which I explain in detail in 
the remainder of this chapter. A study of normalisation helps identify the characteristic 
elements of reading impossible fiction, as reading impossible fiction often involves 
normalising to a greater extent than is needed for standard fiction.  
Normalisation is not a novel concept. The term as I use it has its origins in 
structuralist theory, though it has been developed in later literary theory as well. Similar 
 
30 Alongside language comprehension, empathy, and other faculties required to interpret from words, 
sounds and images to a full narrative. 
31 For clarity, I wish to distinguish between successful normalisation and actual appreciation of fiction. 
While successfully normalising a fiction may better position a reader to admire and enjoy that fiction, 
it may also lay bare the fiction’s aesthetic flaws. In much of what follows I discuss how readers, 
unable to engage with and enjoy an impossible fiction, normalise a fiction and reap aesthetic rewards 
for having done so. While this is a possible outcome, it is by no means the only possible outcome. 
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notions have been alluded to the sciences, particularly in quantum field theory (Butterfield 
and Bouatta 2014). Concerns uncannily similar to those expressed in work on normalisation 
have also reared their head in philosophical aesthetics, notably in Matravers’s work on 
interpretation (2014: 85–86). For this thesis, though, I focus on the well-established and 
heavily discussed theories of normalisation in literary and narratological theory. This body 
of work gives a strong foundation on which to build an analytic account of normalisation. It 
does, however, require careful analysis. Concepts do not always translate directly from 
literary theory to analytic philosophy. This is particularly true of the structuralist origins of 
normalisation, which is directly challenged by Twentieth Century analytic philosophy of 
language (Herman 2005: 574). Despite this historical disagreement, I argue that the practice 
of normalisation can be described in terms agreeable to analytic philosophers. 
For an overview of the structuralist account of normalisation, I look to Culler’s 
Structuralist Poetics (1975). Culler refers to the practice as ‘naturalization’, but in order to 
avoid confusion with naturalism I continue to use the term ‘normalisation’. To Culler, 
normalisation is the process of interpreting fiction as if it were a communication.32 Just as 
communications can be interpreted in multiple ways according to different contexts, so too 
can fictions. Ambiguous phrases (e.g., ‘I saw a man with a telescope’) require that the 
recipient of communication decide on an interpretation. This interpretation is usually based 
on factors such as the context of the utterance, the intonation and stresses of the speaker, 
and personal knowledge of the intent behind the utterance (if the speaker is holding a 
telescope, the meaning is clear). Culler’s claim is that in cases of fiction these 
contextualising factors are absent. Direct communication has a level of nuance which allows 
the speaker to indicate the optimal interpretation of their utterance, but in the indirect 
communication provided by fiction the task of finding an optimal interpretation is left to the 
reader. To do this, the reader must find a context in which the text makes sense. In order 
to do so, readers relate fictions to particular contexts and conventions. By interpreting the 
fiction in this way, the reader is able to better understand it (Culler 1975: 134). The process 
of determining a context which makes the fiction coherent and understandable is 
normalisation. 
For the most part, the context which fictions are related to is everyday life. Culler 
claims that most narrative literature is intelligible precisely because readers relate its 
content to typical human concerns and behaviour (1975: 144). However, fiction often 
 
32 To some philosophers, fiction literally is a communication (e.g., Currie 1990). To Culler, it is not 
actually a communication, but is read as if it were. In terms of actually reading fiction, the difference 
is unimportant. 
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deviates from the acceptable standards of real life. While impossible fiction is the most 
relevant example of deviant fiction, it is not the only kind. Genre fiction frequently flouts rules 
which apply to the real world, as do fairy tales, unnatural narratives and metafictions. These 
deviant fictions require different contexts in order to be normalised. They must be 
understood in terms of something besides the everyday. In order to understand how 
different contexts can be usefully applied, I turn to work in philosophy of language. 
By specifying that texts are treated as communications, Culler leaves open the 
possibility of drawing on the rich selection of work in analytic philosophy which deal with 
communication. The notion that sets of conventions or frames of reference are relevant for 
understanding communications is well-discussed in philosophy of language. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, for example, states that shared frames of reference are essential for 
understanding a speaker in his Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 2009: 225). Lewis 
claims that utterances bear meaning only in relation to a language or population (Lewis 
1983a: 173). In particular, however, Davidson’s concept of radical interpretation helps 
understand how Culler’s ideas can be applied. Radical interpretation deals with the 
interpretation of communications where the receiver has no knowledge at all of the 
communicator’s language or meaning. Instead of understanding the speaker directly, she 
must interpret what the speaker says. Davidson claims that ‘all understanding of the speech 
of another involves radical interpretation’, since a shared language is no more than a 
convention which simplifies interpreting the meaning of another speaker (Davidson 1984b: 
126). In Davidson’s terms, normalisation is radical interpretation: attempting to understand 
the meaning of an utterance when the speaker cannot explain herself.  
Under typical modes of communication, radical interpretation proceeds upon a 
simple assumption: that the speaker is saying something that we consider to be rational 
and true (Davidson 1984a: 196). We approach the process of radical interpretation with a 
charitable attitude towards the speaker’s rationality. This is Davidson’s principle of charity. 
It is a key element of radical interpretation, as it allows Davidson to escape a recursive trap: 
we cannot know the beliefs of a stranger if we do not understand her language, and we 
cannot understand the language of a stranger if we do not know her beliefs (Avramides 
2003: 90; Davidson 1984b: 127). Assuming rationality on the part of the speaker allows the 
process of interpretation to gain a toehold. This is an effective move to make when 
interpreting the utterances of somebody in the actual world whom we believe to be rational. 
However, this principle does not apply so easily to interpretation of fiction. 
Throughout his description of the principle of charity, Davidson highlights agreement 
between the speaker and the interpreter as the most important presupposition of 
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interpretation. Under standard conditions, this agreement will be on matters of belief about 
the world. Fictive utterances do not, however, necessarily express beliefs about the world. 
Taken as communications, they do not necessarily express any beliefs at all.33  As Culler 
points out, a common method of normalisation is to assume that the fiction refers to the real 
world: when using such a method, the principle of charity is a reasonable approach to take. 
However, the principle of charity cannot be used to interpret all works of fiction. It would 
frequently lead us to inappropriate conclusions. Assuming that Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland or Labyrinth express only rational beliefs is clearly inappropriate, and an 
interpretation of these fictions which turned on this assumption would be correspondingly 
flawed. Davidson’s account alone cannot explain the interpretation of fiction, even if we treat 
fictions as communications. 
Davidson accepts that we may make maximum sense of a speaker even if we do 
not make absolute sense of their utterances (Davidson 1984b: 197). When interpreting 
actual communications, this is achieved through the principle of charity. The interpretation 
which a receiver settles on may not be identical to the speaker’s intended meaning; the 
important thing is that it is close enough the goal of the communication is achieved. In the 
case of interpreting fiction, alternative principles may maximise the sense a reader makes 
of the fiction. Fictions do not necessarily express rational beliefs, but this does not mean 
they are necessarily inconsistent, random or unpredictable. I claim that the reader can still 
interpret the fiction in a principled manner, but she cannot rely on the principle of charity to 
do so. Instead, the reader must call upon different principles in order to interpret the fiction. 
Finding the principle which most suits the fiction is what allows us to make maximum sense 
of the fiction. Readers are able to interpret fictions in multiple ways, according to multiple 
principles, and can meaningfully debate which interpretation is most suitable. If the reader 
is able to radically interpret fiction using an appropriate principle in place of the principle of 
charity, she maximises her understanding of the fiction. 
What is needed to complete the account of normalisation is a set of reasonable, 
intuitive principles which can stand in for the principle of charity when radically interpreting 
 
33 I say not necessarily, since some fictions are likely to express the beliefs of their authors. Compare 
J.R.R. Tolkien’s ‘In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit (Tolkien 1991: 3)’ with Milan Kundera’s 
‘A person who longs to leave the place where he lives is an unhappy person (Kundera 1984: 26).’ It 
is likely, though not strictly necessary, that Kundera expresses a belief about the actual world, 
whereas Tolkien certainly does not. Furthermore, a reader may still consider truths about the actual 
world when they come to interpret impossible fictions. For example, principles of reality/minimal 
departure (such as those of Walton (1990) Friend (2017) and Ryan (1980)) may still influence 
interpretations. 
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fiction. These different principles are candidates to replace the principle of charity as a 
framework for the reader to use when interpreting the fiction. They may make it so that the 
fiction is coherent: forming a statement or set of statements which is broadly unified in tone, 
style and subject. They may make the fiction internally consistent: logically compatible and 
not self-contradictory, even if it contradicts the actual world. They may also make the fiction 
rational: certain fictional events entail others in sensible ways, rather than being arbitrary. 
These principles can serve as grounds needed for radical interpretation. Rather than it 
aligning with the reader’s beliefs, the reader can agree that the fiction is coherent, consistent 
and rational by an alternative principle.  
I identify six different principles of normalisation. Five are provided by Tamar Yacobi: 
the genetic, generic, existential, functional and perspectival principles. I supplement these 
principles with one proposed by Matravers: the reconciliation strategy. Readers use these 
principles to normalise challenging, deviant and unusual works of fiction, including 
impossible fiction. 
 
3.3.3  Normalisation: principles of normalisation 
 This section discusses the first four of Yacobi’s principles: the genetic, generic, existential 
and functional principles. I begin by establishing the need for definitive principles of 
normalisation. I describe how readers decide which principle to use, and I illustrate with 
examples how normalisation proceeds according to these principles. These illustrations 
include examples of how these principles can be used to normalise impossible fiction. 
The previous section established that, when it comes to interpreting a fiction, the 
typical analytic methods of interpretation cannot always apply in their original forms. This is 
because they tend to revolve around truth. Lewis’s account of language, Grice’s maxim of 
quality and Davidson’s radical interpretation all refer to rational reporting of truth as one of 
the important aspects of successful communication (Davidson 1984b: 138; Grice 1989: 26–
28; Lewis 1983a: 167). An author of fiction, however, is not bound to rationally report what 
she believes to be true. The nature of the actual world is not necessarily an accurate 
predictor of the author’s meaning. Given this, the reader must sometimes find a different 
system by which to calibrate their interpretation. Normalisation requires finding and 
implementing a suitable principle by which to interpret a fiction.  
The mere fact that a reader adopts a particular principle does not guarantee that 
she will successfully normalise the fiction, or that the impressions she forms as a result will 
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be appropriate. Principles can be misapplied. Some fictions are extremely resilient to 
normalisation (Steve McCaffery’s aforementioned Panopticon, for example, makes every 
attempt to resist the reader’s efforts to immerse herself in and understand the fiction 
(Bernstein 1987: 44–47). The reader’s ability to draw on principles to help interpret a text 
does not automatically render the text interpreted. Adopting a principle does allow the 
reader to begin normalising otherwise intransigent works of fiction. It is a crucial first step 
on the way to successful normalisation. 
Settling on a convention to use is not a matter of trial and error. Readers often have 
a clear idea of which convention best suits a given fiction. This may be determined by the 
purpose for which the reader interprets the text (for enjoyment, for academic deliberation, 
to understand a particular issue, etc.). Sometimes the reader needs no alternative principle, 
and her point of reference is the actual world. Such is the case with realist fictions, and this 
is why we may find factual mistakes jarring, even though we recognise that we are reading 
a work of fiction. At other times, we may use genre conventions, historical viewpoints (we 
do not quibble with the portrayal of Friday as a reformed cannibal in Robinson Crusoe 
despite the historical non-cannibalism of the Naso, because we know that in Defoe’s time 
the indigenous Carib people were painted as savages), or others. We may use multiple 
different frameworks at various points in the fiction—as Davidson states, we are able to 
quickly re-evaluate how we interpret words according to the most reasonable theory 
available to us (1984a: 196). Different readers may feel that different frameworks are more 
appropriate for the same fiction, and compare the consistency, coherence and rationality of 
the resulting interpretation as evidence for their chosen framework.  
The process of normalisation is complex and individualistic, but it is still expressible 
with only a slight modification of existing accounts of interpretation: the reader chooses the 
framework within which the fiction makes the most sense, rather than only using beliefs to 
guide her interpretation of the author’s utterances. This conception of normalisation owes 
something both to Davidson (the attitude to interpreting unfamiliar and strange 
communications) and to Culler (the notion that other principles might replace the principle 
of charity when it comes to interpreting fiction). As seen in the paragraph above, 
normalisation is used for general reading; a reader naturally interprets a fiction in a way 
which normalises its content and maximises consistency, coherence and rationality. This is 
not a difficult task in most cases, as works of fiction are often fairly consistent and rational 
to begin with. However, impossible fictions frequently require a more drastic process of 
normalisation than other works of fiction, as they tend to be less consistent, coherent and 
rational. This section explains and analyses several potential principles of normalisation 
which can be used to normalise impossible fiction. I explain the principles of normalisation 
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provided by narratologist Tamar Yacobi, illustrating how these principles help readers 
normalise impossible fictions. 
Yacobi is specifically interested in the interpretation of works of ‘deviant’ fiction: 
fictions with incongruous elements which violate the norms of our own world (Yacobi 1981). 
This makes her work relevant to impossible fiction, which is a clear case of deviant fiction. 
Particular parts of a fiction may also be deviant in the sense that they are not in keeping 
with the rest of the fiction. These are the parts of a fiction which lessen its coherency (in my 
sense of the term). Sudden shifts in theme or tone may lead to fictions which are deviant in 
this regard. Yacobi attempts to provide principles which capture how readers accommodate 
these deviant elements in their interpretation of a fiction. She offers five principles; five 
frameworks which can be used to replace the principle of charity in the process of 
interpretation. She names them the five principles of normalisation, framing her discussion 
in terms of ‘reconciling and integrating’ incongruent elements with the rest of the text (Yacobi 
1981: 113). In other words, her interest is explicitly in the principles by which readers 
interpret deviant elements of a text rather than about interpretation in general.  
The five principles which Yacobi describes can be split into two categories. One 
category normalises through exclusion: it seeks to eliminate deviant elements from the 
fiction. This normalises the fiction, as there are fewer deviant elements to interrupt reading. 
The other category normalises through justification. It seeks to justify the presence of 
deviant elements in the text so that readers do not view these elements as deviant in the 
first place. Each one is a possible way for the reader to normalise a fiction, but it is not the 
case that each one will be appropriate or applicable in every instance. Sometimes a 
particular principle will be more readily accessible than others. A particular principle may be 
inappropriate for a specific text. More than one principle may be deployed at once. They 
are methods that readers use to normalise rather than ironclad rules of interpretation. I 
outline and demonstrate the first four—genetic, generic, existential and functional—below. 
These are all principles based on justification of deviant elements. The final, fifth principle, 
the perspectival, is the only exclusionary principle. It is discussed in its own section following 
this one, as it relates to the work of Nolan, Hanley and Matravers discussed above.  
The first of Yacobi’s principles is the genetic principle. When interpreting according 
to the genetic principle, the reader pays particular attention to the causal history of the text 
and its author. This causal history includes the circumstances in which the text was 
authored—the political and social mores of that time and place, the author’s personal beliefs 
and practices, etc. The causal history also incorporates any editing or censorship which the 
text has undergone. It is, as Yacobi describes, the collection of ‘factors that produced the 
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text without coming to form part of it (1981: 114).’ To interpret according to the genetic 
principle is to lay emphasis on the psychological and environmental forces which influenced 
the production of the text itself. The genetic principle can be used to normalise morally 
deviant fiction from the Iliad to the Carry On franchise, normalising problematic elements 
through awareness of historical context.34 In some instances, readers will form a richer, 
more appropriate set of impressions by using the genetic principle when interpreting fiction. 
For example, a reader familiar only with the Homeric Odysseus must adopt the genetic 
principle when reading Virgil, where Ulysses is cruel and deceitful. If she does not, she risks 
fundamentally misunderstanding the position of the character in the Aeneid. Even if readers 
do not adopt, or even recognise the validity of these historic morals, she increases the 
coherence and consistency of the fiction by recognising their presence. The fiction no longer 
seems arbitrary as its morals, however reprehensible, are contextualised by historical 
thought. The genetic principle also normalises issues like scientific inaccuracies. The 
inaccurate portrayal of volcanoes in Verne’s Journey to the Centre of the Earth can be 
attributed to contemporary misunderstanding of volcanology, and contemporary readers 
normalise it as such. The notion that historical context normalises factual errors of this kind 
can be traced back as far as Hume, who warns that ‘the poet’s monument’ will collapse if 
we do not make allowances for changes in ‘manner and custom’ (Hume 1995: 236). 
The genetic principle can help normalise impossible fiction in much the same way 
as these examples. In some cases, absolute impossibilities are present in a work of fiction 
due to certain genetic conditions. ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is one example: Priest explicitly attempts 
to write an impossible fiction, and this attempt is part of the history of the fiction. A reader 
who is aware of Priest’s efforts will recognise that the impossible e lements of the story 
should form part of the reader’s impression. The impossible box can be recognised as a 
coherent aspect of the fiction because part of the history of the fiction is its attempt to give 
the reader an impression of the impossible box. In a similar way, depictions of absolute 
impossibilities abound in medieval miracle plays, but modern readers recognise their 
religious and historical context when reading these fictions. We are able to rationalise and 
accept the portrayal of miraculous events in these plays because we have normalised them 
using the genetic principle. 
 The second principle is the generic principle. Interpretations which favour the 
generic explanation look to the ways in which our expectations given by conventions of 
genre fiction differ from the expectations we have of reality. Deviations from reality are 
 
34 This should not be confused with the issue of imaginative resistance, which focusses on fictions 
which attempt to represent these deviant moral values as fictionally true (see Gendler 2000). 
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deemed acceptable if they are included in this difference. Genres involve, according to 
Yacobi, a slightly different set of rules than reality, and generally this set is more limited and 
simplified (1981: 115). These simplifications may include, for example, the outlandish 
coincidences which power the comedy genre. They also include the convention of the 
mystery genre where the culprit must be an individual known to the investigator. A popular 
example of how genre modifies our expectations is seen in Othello. In reality, a Moorish 
general speaking in beautiful iambic pentameter would be unusual. Within the genre of 
Shakespearean tragedy, however, it is unremarkable. In fact, it would interfere with the 
conventions of some genres if the text were to attempt to depict realistic, non-deviant 
events. 
Genre is perhaps the clearest case of how an alternate framework can give 
consistency, coherency and rationality to a text. When Westley is brought back from the 
dead in The Princess Bride, the reader’s interpretation and experience of the story is 
influenced by its fantasy setting. If the actual world was the only point of reference for 
interpreting The Princess Bride, this resurrection would be incoherent (Reiner 1987). 
However, given the fantasy conventions of magic and miracles, the resurrection is made 
consistent and coherent with the other events of the film. Genre conventions can also help 
the reader interpret which events of the text are to be taken as actually occurring in the 
story. Iris Murdoch’s The Sea, The Sea is not a fantasy novel—the world it depicts seems 
similar in many relevant ways to our own. It seems more like a work of realist fiction; one 
which emulates the real world in every way besides explicit departures from it. When 
protagonist Charles sees a great grey monster while sitting by the sea, the conventions of 
realist fiction are violated (Murdoch 1999: 20). This makes the reader disinclined to take this 
section of the story literally. Instead, she may interpret the sea monster as either Charles 
being fictionally mistaken about the identity of the creature, or as a figurative inclusion which 
illustrates the protagonist’s self-indulgence. In this way, she has been guided by genre 
conventions to an agreeable interpretation of the text. If The Princess Bride had resurrected 
Westley with advanced technology rather than magic, a reader may well normalise it in a 
similar way to Charles’s sea monster: it contradicts genre conventions, so the fiction is more 
coherent if the anomaly is interpreted non-literally. 
Like the genetic principle, the generic principle normalises a fiction in the sense of 
reassuring the reader that it is appropriate to interpret the fiction in a seemingly deviant way. 
This includes interpreting a fiction as absolutely impossible. H.P. Lovecraft’s cosmic horror 
is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis, but it is worth mentioning now. 
Lovecraft’s fiction illustrates how the reader’s knowledge of a genre changes the way she 
normalises works of fiction. Themes of madness and extradimensional monsters are 
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standard fare for members of the cosmic horror genre, and Lovecraft’s works regularly 
feature bizarre, geometrically impossible shapes and buildings. It is important for these 
elements of the stories to be recognised in an interpretation, since the cornerstone of the 
genre is fear of the unknown (Hull 2006: 10; Kneale 2006). The reader recognises the 
validity of these elements of the text if she recognises the role they play within the wider 
genre of cosmic horror. If she is not familiar with the tropes of cosmic horror, she may think 
that the characters’ descriptions of geometric impossibilities are a symptom of madness 
rather than (as would be appropriate for Lovecraft’s work) the cause. 
The third principle is Yacobi’s existential principle. This principle focusses on 
differences between the real world and the story world in order to reconcile deviant elements 
in the text with the rest of the story. This is done on a diegetic level (i.e., within the story)—
it involves the reader changing her understanding of the nature of the fictional world she is 
experiencing. Yacobi’s example is Kafka’s Metamorphosis: 
Neither actual reality nor any established stylization of it dictates (and accounts for) Gregor 
Samsa’s startling appearance as a giant insect. To say that Kafka’s “Metamorphosis” 
postulates a world accommodating the transformation of the human into the nonhuman is to 
devise an organizing principle that is both referential and predominantly intra-textual: it derives 
more from the peculiar structure of reality the reader attributes to the work than from any pre-
existent constraints or legitimations (Yacobi 1981: 116–117).  
In the example case of Metamorphosis, the reader cannot successfully normalise the text 
simply through appeal to the actual world. Instead, she must accept that the fictional reality 
of the text is such that human beings can turn into monstrous vermin. According to Yacobi, 
this is a significant break from the rules of our own world—it is not a simplification or 
stylisation of our reality, but an indication that Metamorphosis represents a different kind of 
world to ours.  
 Impossible fiction can be normalised using the existential principle. Dan Abnett’s 
science fiction series Ravenor is set in a universe where faster-than-light travel is possible 
thanks to an alternate dimension: the Warp. The Warp is a dangerous realm of absolute 
chaos and madness (Abnett 2019: 283). Its existence is built into the story of Ravenor—
spaceships transition to the Warp in order to travel vast distances, individuals draw magical 
power from it, and dangerous creatures which escape the Warp are a peril to the characters 
of the series. The existential principle is a natural way for readers to normalise Ravenor, 
since the world of the story is so different to the actual world. The reader can recognise that 
the world of Ravenor differs to our own in substantive ways, and that to attempt to 
understand it as something which could obtain in our own world would be misguided. The 
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world this fiction represents has a different set of rules to our own, which involve the 
existence of an absolutely impossible alternate dimension. Recognising that the world of 
Ravenor has these features is a way of normalising the fiction, as it justifies the existence 
of these otherwise-deviant elements. 
 The fourth and final of Yacobi’s justificatory principles is the functional principle. I 
return to this principle in future chapters when discussing several responses to impossible 
fiction. When normalising according to the functional principle, the reader keeps an eye on 
why it is that deviant elements are included in the text. Where the existential principle 
integrates deviant elements into the world of the story, the functional principle does not 
attempt this integration. Instead, it prioritises the formal properties of the fiction, and 
highlights how deviant elements contribute to these properties. Yacobi explains the 
difference: 
The existential operation more or less plausibly relates the experienced anomaly (e.g., 
inconsistent behavior) to some referential feature or law (e.g., psychological complexity) and 
thus turns it into an integral or even natural part of the fictive reality, whereas the aesthetic or 
formal operation explains the function of that anomaly within the structure of the text (e.g., 
satiric flexibility) without necessarily integrating it with the world of the text (1981: 117). 
This means that the generic principle is itself a functional principle—genre is one means by 
which to deduce the function of a deviant aspect of the text. Yacobi thinks it significant 
enough to warrant its own category despite this: the generic principle is set out by how 
widely recognised (‘institutionalised,’ in Yacobi’s own words) it is in literary theory and 
philosophy of literature (Yacobi 1981: 117). However, there are functional principles besides 
the generic. For example, readers can rationalise contrived coincidences in stories as plot-
essential. There would be no real story to Bram Stoker’s Dracula if not for the fact that Mina 
so happens to be in Whitby when Count Dracula arrives, or that a suitor to one of Dracula’s 
victims (Lucy, who happens to be a friend of Mina’s) is close friends with Van Helsing, an 
expert on vampires. Readers can accept these contrivances because the story is predicated 
on their existence.  
 The functional principle can be used to normalise cases of impossible fiction. In 
particular, the technique seems apt for normalising paradoxical time travel stories.  A viewer 
who does recognise the absolute impossibility in Looper described above—a man losing 
body parts in real time as his past self is mutilated—may well also recognise the role this 
scene plays in the film. The scene establishes the danger posed by the mob to the film’s 
characters. The scene sets up the film’s finale, where a character kills himself to prevent 
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his future self from killing a young boy. It is also an exciting and distinctive scene—there is 
an aesthetic function to the absolute impossibility. 
 These four principles—genetic, generic, existential and functional—are all ways in 
which Yacobi understands normalisation to be conducted. Each one is a framework which 
the reader adopts in order to justify the presence of incongruous elements in fictions. By 
interpreting the fiction according to each principle, reader impressions of incongruity are 
shown to be appropriate rather than mistaken. Each principle shifts the reader’s focus to a 
different extratextual element in order to explain the deviances. This, as Yacobi points out, 
does not necessarily make any of the text more credible or imaginable (1981: 114). What it 
does do is rationalise the presence of the deviant element, making the reader able to see 
why the deviant element was included. This promotes the coherency and rationality of the 
fiction by indicating why impressions of deviant elements are appropriate. However, none 
of these four principles promote consistency, since inconsistent parts of the text are not 
made consistent despite being normalised. It is Yacobi’s fifth principle which addresses 
consistency, and this principle is what I turn to now. 
 
3.3.4  Normalisation: the perspectival principle 
Yacobi’s fifth principle concerns unreliable narration. The previous four princip les were all 
justificatory, operating by justifying the presence of deviant elements in a fiction. This final 
principle, the perspectival principle, normalises by interpreting the text in such a way that 
some of its features are the product of a character or narrator’s perspective rather than 
features of the story itself. This section explains the perspectival principle. I highlight how it 
resembles the approach adopted by Nolan, Matravers and Hanley with regards to unreliable 
narration and impossible fiction. 
The perspectival principle is the mode of interpretation where the reader actively 
attempts to substitute incongruous (i.e., inconsistent, incoherent or irrational) elements of 
the text for congruous ones. She does so by attributing the presence of these incongruities 
to the perspective from which the story is told, rather than to the fictional world itself. The 
incongruities are not taken literally; rather they are seen as interfering with an accurate 
description of the fictional world. In other words, the reader posits unreliability. She 
interprets the fiction in such a way that her impression is not that an incongruous element 
is part of the story, but instead is misleadingly included in the telling of the story. From the 
premise that the story has been distorted by the influence of perspective, the reader may 
or may not attempt to decrypt the narration. Doing so requires analysing the reason why the 
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perspective has distorted events, and accounting for this distortion while interpreting the 
events of the story. She may instead accept that the perspective has distorted the fictional 
events beyond recognition: simply recognising that the narrative does not accurately reflect 
the fictional world is an important recalibration in itself (Yacobi 1981: 118–119). Either way, 
the reader uses the perspectival principle to explain the presence of incongruities in the 
fiction. They are present because they are the creation of an unreliable narrator. 
Absolute impossibilities, when recognised by the reader, frequently count as 
incongruous elements in the story. Their alienness comes from their lack of consistency, 
which often prompts normalisation. The interpretation of the story as unreliable is one way 
of normalising an impossible fiction—a method which, as seen above, is highlighted by 
Nolan and Hanley. Discussing normalisation has shown why this reaction occurs: the 
interpretive strategies described earlier in this chapter can be attributed to normalisation 
according to the perspectival principle. This renders the fiction consistent by showing how 
the seemingly inconsistent elements are not in fact to be taken as literal—they are not true 
to the story.  
Nolan and Hanley both suggest that the reading of unreliability is a technique which 
readers can and will deploy when reading impossible fiction. However, if Yacobi is correct 
then readers actually have an array of different techniques with which they normalise any 
incongruent fiction, including impossible fictions. Matravers is more sensitive to this than 
Nolan and Hanley, as he recognises that there are multiple responses readers can have to 
impossible fictions (Matravers 2014: 131). His ‘rejection strategy’ is very similar to the 
perspectival principle—it is the strategy by which a reader takes the narrator to be unreliable 
in order to engage with an impossible fiction. Matravers lists three other strategies for 
reading impossible fiction, which are explored in the following section. 
 
3.3.5  Normalisation: Matravers’s strategies 
This section introduces Matravers’s three remaining strategies for reading texts. I show how 
one of his three strategies, the ‘weird world’ strategy, is a restatement of one of Yacobi’s 
principles, much like his rejection strategy is of Yacobi’s perspectival principle. I describe 
also discuss his ‘disregarding’ strategy, but I defer discussion of the activity it describes until 
Chapter 5. I then consider Matravers’s ‘reconciliation’ strategy. I show how it differs from 
Yacobi’s five principles and deserves to join them as a reasonable principle for conducting 
normalisation. This completes the second major portion of this chapter, and I take the 
opportunity to summarise my arguments so far. 
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Two of Matravers’s strategies make no further contribution to the discussion of 
normalisation. Matravers’s ‘weird world’ strategy is markedly similar to the existential 
principle. Just like Yacobi’s existential principle, it involves discarding the reality principle as 
a guide for generating impressions of the fiction. Instead, the reader recognises that this 
fiction represents a world very different from our own. Since I have already explained the 
existential principle in detail, I continue using Yacobi’s principle rather than Matravers’s 
strategy. Matravers also suggests a ‘disregarding’ strategy, according to which the reader 
does not reinterpret but simply ignores impossible elements of a story. This is effectively 
the opposite of normalisation—it removes deviant elements from consideration rather than 
compensating for them. This strategy does not belong in an account of normalisation, but 
the notion of disregarding certain aspects of impossible fictions is investigated further in 
Chapter 5.  
Matravers’s fourth and final strategy is the ‘reconciliation’ strategy. When a reader 
adopts this strategy, she attempts to find a reason why the reported impossibility is actually 
possible. Matravers’s example is the undecayed face of eighteen-year dead Catherine in 
Wuthering Heights. The reader may reconcile this incongruity with the actual world by 
speculating that Catherine was buried in lime which slowed the decay of her skin (Matravers 
2014: 132–133). This is closely related to unreliability, following the same principle that 
accurate information about the ‘true’ events of the story has not been provided by the 
narration. It is worth distinguishing it from unreliability, however. The perspectival principle 
recasts the information provided by the text gives as unreliable. The reconciliation strategy, 
on the other hand, adds information to that already given by the text in order to rationalise 
incongruities. The reconciliation strategy is not helpful for taking impossible fiction at face 
value—any way of reconciling the fiction with the real world would necessitate the removal 
of the absolute impossibility—but it identifies a method of normalisation distinct from 
Yacobi’s five principles, and deserves to be considered alongside them as a viable way of 
normalising deviant fiction. 
This makes six methods of normalisation: Yacobi’s four justificatory principles, 
Matravers’s reconciliation strategy and the shared approach of perspective/rejection. All six 
are available to readers as replacements for the principle of charity when interpreting 
impossible fiction. The arguments from Hanley and Nolan, discussed earlier in the chapter, 
focus solely on the perspectival principle. As this section has shown, doing so oversimplifies 
the behaviour of readers. In fact, readers regularly draw on the other principles when 
normalising impossible fiction. In these cases, there is no reading of unreliability. 
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This completes the second major port of this chapter. The first identified a typical 
approach to impossible fiction among philosophers: to claim it can and perhaps should be 
identified as unreliably narrated. I challenged this approach with an example of an 
impossible fiction which resists this style of interpretation: Looper. This second portion has 
taken a closer look at the techniques readers use when faced with deviant and difficult 
fiction. I have established six principled ways in which readers normalise fiction. The final 
portion of this chapter will take the lessons learned in the second and apply them to the first. 
With the close understanding of interpretation given by my investigation into normalisation, 
I can now show why it is that some impossible fictions are amenable to interpretation as 
unreliable while others are not. 
 
3.4.1  Unreliability revisited: applying the perspectival principle 
This third major portion of the chapter ties together the previous two. I suggest that 
consistency, coherency and rationality guide readers to normalise works in particular ways. 
This explains why certain principles of normalisation are more appropriate than others for a 
given fiction. Earlier in this chapter, I used Looper as an example of an impossible fiction 
which resists a reading of unreliable narration. This section uses the lessons of 
normalisation to show exactly why it is that Looper, among other fictions, resists this 
reading. First, I use 1984 as a trial run of a deviant fiction which resists normalisation via 
the perspectival principle. Following this, I apply the same principles to Looper.  
As I have argued, a reader normalises a fiction in order to maximise its qualities of 
coherence, consistency and rationality. The reader may attempt to deploy any principle of 
normalisation when faced with an incongruous fiction. However, certain principles of 
normalisation are more or less appropriate than others for use with a given fiction. It is not 
appropriate to use a particular principle of normalisation if the use of that principle has too 
negative an impact on any of the three qualities. Principles are also inappropriate if they do 
not successfully normalise the fiction (for example, the generic principle has little to offer 
‘Sylvan’s Box’ as this story has no clear genre). Others are inappropriate because they 
undermine or distract from key themes of the fiction, and in doing so reduce its coherence. 
What exactly constitutes ‘too negative an effect’ is not fixed. It may frequently be a matter 
for debate. However, an example helps show that some applications of particular principles 
have overly negative effects on a fiction. 
Take a non-impossible fiction, George Orwell’s 1984. The novel opens with the 
clocks striking thirteen (Orwell 1987: 3). This is an unusual, incongruous element of the 
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fiction when considered in terms of Davidson’s principle of charity. It therefore suggests to 
the reader that a fresh principle is required for successful interpretation of the text. 
Appropriate principles might include the existential (e.g., the world of 1984 is one which is 
different to ours with respect to time measurement, using units of thirteen or more rather 
than twelve), the generic (e.g., the fact that major upheavals in society, including in 
measurement of time, are a common trope in dystopian fiction) or the functional (e.g., the 
unusual time hints at the differences between the society of 1984 and the reader’s own, 
while the unlucky number thirteen sets a tone of dread). These normalisations increase the 
coherence, consistency and rationality of 1984. They explain why it is that an incongruous 
element is present in the fiction: its presence is justified either by reference to differences 
between our world and the world of 1984, or in terms of setting a scene and tone for the 
fiction. It would be inappropriate to normalise the clocks of 1984 according to the 
reconciliation strategy (e.g., supposing that time in 1984 is measured in the same way as 
our own world, but these clocks are broken and chime an extra time each hour), or the 
perspectival principle (e.g., imagining that protagonist Winston has miscounted the numbers 
on the clock). Each of these normalisations reduces the coherency of 1984 by dispelling the 
sense of unease which the reader develops at this sinister introduction, and by eliminating 
the uncanny difference between our world and the world of 1984. Using these would result 
in the reader forming inappropriate impressions of Orwell’s novel. 
Earlier in this chapter, I suggest that it is inappropriate to normalise Looper 
according to the perspectival principle. Comparing Looper directly with ‘Sylvan’s Box’ helps 
to show why this is the case. ‘Sylvan’s Box’ can be appropriately normalised by the 
perspectival principle. Doing so increases the consistency and rationality of the fiction 
without necessarily sacrificing coherency. An unreliable reading of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ is a 
coherent fiction, but it is about two men who believe that they have found an impossible box 
rather than actually about an impossible box. An existential normalisation, which would 
validate the reading of the box as absolutely impossible, is also possible. However, it is not 
any more compelling than the perspectival reading: both are appropriate ways to interpret 
‘Sylvan’s Box’. The perspectival reading does no significant damage to the fiction’s overall 
coherency. 
Looper, on the other hand, would be impoverished by this relatively arbitrary reading 
of unreliability. There is no motivation to avoid calling ‘Sylvan’s Box’ unreliable, since it is 
short and simple enough a fiction that the reading of unreliability based on a single, 
impossible feature does not interfere with other aspects of the text. Richer works, such as 
Looper, seem less liable to these revisionist interpretations. This is because the absolutely 
impossible features are accompanied by many other features which are not so supportive 
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of a judgement of unreliable narration. Better interpretations of Looper can be found by 
using other principles. I have already discussed how using the functional principle can 
normalise Looper earlier in this chapter (pp. 91–92), but I now show that the generic and 
existential principles can do just as convincing and appropriate a job of normalising the 
fiction.  
 
3.4.2  Unreliability revisited: normalising Looper 
To show even more conclusively that Looper should not be normalised according to the 
perspectival principle, I look at which modes of normalisation better suit Looper. This shows 
that, in some cases, an appropriate impression of an impossible fiction is one where that 
fiction is not unreliably narrated. This is a convincing reason to deny Hanley’s assertion that 
readers should interpret impossible fictions as unreliable. 
Looper benefits from normalisation according to the generic principle. It is a soft 
science fiction/action film, and as a member of this genre it is likely to contain suspenseful 
scenes which showcase futuristic technology. Seth’s mutilation is exactly this sort of scene: 
the gruesome application of time travel technology fits well into the genre. A viewer who 
recognises the absolute impossibility which occurs during the scene may well accept that 
this deviant aspect can be explained as one of the genre’s conventions. Rather than seeking 
to understand or eliminate the impossible element of the film, she may recognise that 
paradoxical happenings like this are standard fare for Hollywood depictions of time travel. 
While Seth’s mutilation is incongruous with the real world, it is not at all out of place in the 
genre to which Looper belongs. This reader has normalised Looper according to the generic 
principle.  
Alternatively, the existential principle interprets the world depicted in Looper as 
operating according to different laws to our own. The fiction supports this kind of 
normalisation: antagonist Old Joe tells his younger self that he doesn’t want to ‘talk about 
time travel shit, because we’ll start talking about it and then we’ll be here all day making 
diagrams with straws. It doesn’t matter (Johnson 2012).’ There is a simple account of how 
this happens: readers are able to entertain the idea that the world of a story is importantly 
different to our own in terms of people and places, and by the same capacity can imagine 
that the word of the story is different to our own in terms of what is possible. Stock’s 
approach to propositionally imagining absolute impossibilities, described in the previous 
chapter, may offer a more detailed account of how readers imagine this. According to Stock, 
the reader is able to imagine that the world of Looper is different to our own, provided that 
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she imagines there is an explanation of how this difference can obtain (Stock 2017: 141). 
The reader imagines that, in the world of Looper, there is some explanation of why it is that 
Seth is mutilated synchronously with his past self. As Old Joe and Stock both recommend, 
there is no need for her to imagine this explanation in detail; she only needs to imagine that 
it is available (Stock 2017: 141). In much the same way that I accept there is an explanation 
for why it is that octopuses can change colour without knowing what it is, the reader 
imagines there is an explanation for the absolute impossibility in Looper. This justifies the 
presence of the impossibility, normalising Looper by the existential principle. 
Not only are the existential and generic principles more effective when normalising 
Looper, using the perspectival principle would likely damage the aesthetic pleasure gained 
from the film. It would confuse the plot: the mobsters carve an address into Past Seth’s arm, 
which appears as scars on Seth and allows him to find the mobsters. How did he discover 
the address, if not by this mutilation? It would also confuse the film’s themes: the film deals 
with short-sightedness, changing what seems to be an inevitable future, and decisions 
made in the past catching up to oneself. Thinking of Seth as unreliable reduces the 
resonance of this scene with these themes, making the interpretation seem contrived. 
Finally, as mentioned in the discussion of the functional principle, it would remove the set-
up this scene provides for the film’s finale, where the protagonist kills himself in order to kill 
his future self. Thinking of Seth as an unreliable narrator lessens the coherence of Looper, 
even though it increases its consistency. Reducing the coherence of a text can diminish its 
aesthetic effect, and aesthetic considerations carry weight when it comes to normalising 
impossible fictions. If a perspectival reading would harm the aesthetic effect of the fiction, it 
is less appealing for this reason. This is not to support the notion that the correct 
interpretation of a work of art is whichever interpretation maximises its aesthetic value (such 
as Davies 2007: 15–17). Rather, it is reasonable to suppose that readers tend to avoid 
interpreting works of fiction in ways which actively diminish their aesthetic value.  
Any appropriate impression of Looper includes the belief that Seth was mutilated in 
real time as a result of the same injuries being inflicted on his past self. This impression is 
absolutely impossible, but it is still appropriate. Believing that this mutilation occurred in 
some other way, and that the event as depicted in the film is fallible or untrustworthy, is not 
an appropriate impression of Looper. In fact, I contend that it is pre-theoretically obvious to 
viewers that Looper is not a case of unreliable narration. Friends I interrogated generally 
rejected the idea that the film is unreliably narrated at any point, even when they (commonly) 
claimed to have recognised the inconsistencies in the film. This evidence is anecdotal, but 
I suspect it is reasonably representative of the film’s wider audience. 
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If normalising according to the perspectival principle makes for a less satisfying 
aesthetic experience than alternate methods, then there is no motivation to normalise in 
that fashion. Hanley might protest at this: his motivation for claiming that impossible fictions 
are unreliable is that they otherwise cannot be accommodated under a Lewisian account of 
fiction. However, as I have emphasised, differentiating between reader impressions and 
fictional truths removes the need for Hanley to consider any impossible fiction unreliable. 
The reader’s impression does not need to correspond exactly with the fictional truth of the 
matter, as Bourne and Caddick Bourne show.  Naturally, my preferred solution for Hanley 
is to agree that chunking is the better solution for ‘Sylvan’s Box’. Hanley has already 
condoned the chunking approach to impossible fiction, meaning that there is little motivation 
for him to perspectivally normalise impossible fictions rather than chunk them. I cannot see 
what damage it would do to Hanley’s work to accept the use of chunking in this case. In 
fact, it would make Hanley’s approach to impossible fiction all the more consistent—adopt 
chunking wherever possible.35 Hanley’s attitude of considering a story unreliable insofar as 
it is inconsistent is insensitive to the literary technique of narrative unreliability, and it 
undermines the efficacy of chunking in the first place. Ultimately, my point is that writing off 
all readings of impossible fictions which do not posit unreliability is excessive. It lacks 
sensitivity to the nuances of interpreting fiction. It does not reflect the way in which people 
read, think of and interpret fiction. This becomes increasingly apparent as a fiction grows in 
complexity—while short and simple impossible fictions seem amenable to the perspectival 
principle, longer and richer impossible fictions are more resistant. It is better for a Lewisian 
like Hanley to follow Bourne and Caddick Bourne in differentiating between fictional truth 
and truth to the story. This allows the Lewisian to accept the effective interpretations of 
Looper I have proposed. 
 
3.4.3  Unreliability revisited: summary 
It is a popular notion in analytic philosophy that unreliable narration accounts for the 
presence of absolute impossibilities in some fictions. This has been used in order to 
preserve Lewisian theories of fiction by claiming that impossible fictional truths are illusory—
 
35 Other cases, such as Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds, may be less susceptible to chunking. 
Hanley discusses several in the paper (2004: 122–125). These cases are rare enough to be 
exceptions to a general rule. Even so, Bourne and Caddick Bourne offer some extremely 
sophisticated accounts of chunking which accommodate complex impossible fictions like Groundhog 
Day and Haneke’s Funny Games, so perhaps there is still hope for a chunking account of At Swim-
Two-Birds (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016). 
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the narrator of these impossible fictions is unreliable, and this is why she misreports these 
fictional truths as impossible. I agree that some cases of impossible fiction are best 
interpreted as the product of an unreliable narrator. However, I disagree with the idea that 
this interpretation is universally applicable to impossible fictions, or that it is always the 
preferable interpretation. I also disagree with the idea that these unreliable readings are 
necessary in order to maintain a Lewisian account of fiction. Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s 
distinction between fictional truth and truth to a story augments chunking the Lewisian’s 
account to the point where heavy-handed treatments of impossible fiction as unreliable are 
unnecessary. 
 Work on normalisation in literary theory sheds light on how readers react to deviant 
and unusual fictions, including impossible fictions. The idea that readers draw on 
supplementary principles and strategies in order to make sense of impossible fictions is 
corroborated by work in the philosophy of language and in the philosophy of fiction. While 
normalisation is not a rigorous approach—it is highly subjective, and different readers may 
find different methods more effective for engaging with the same text—it is not arbitrary, 
and certain applications of the principles of normalisation can be rejected. I claim that 
Hanley’s blanket approach of applying the perspectival principle to impossible fictions 
frequently results in such misplaced applications. 
 Yacobi’s five principles of normalisation, along with Matravers’s four strategies for 
reading impossible fiction, offer some insight into how readers engage with and respond to 
impossible fictions. Between Yacobi and Matravers, there are six unique principles under 
which reader responses to impossible fictions can be broadly grouped. They include the 
four justificatory principles: genetic, generic, existential and functional, as well as the two 
interpretive principles: perspectival and reconciliatory. This shows that readers respond to 
impossible fictions both in terms of the impressions they form (the interpretive principles) 
and the attitudes they hold to these impressions (the justificatory principles).36  
 
36 While they are the only accounts I focus on in this thesis, Yacobi and Matravers do not between 
them exhaust the variety of principles readers might use to normalise fiction. There is extensive work 
on the idea of normalisation in structuralist and literary theory, varyingly under the name 
‘normalisation’, ‘naturalisation’, ‘recuperation’, ‘conventionalisation’ and many others besides (Culler 
1975: 137; Alber 2016: 47–57). Of particular note is the notion of vraisemblance developed by 
Tsvetan Todorov, which has heavily influenced the notion of interpreting fiction according to certain 
specific frames of reference (Culler 1975: 162; McHale 2005: 627). I have limited my investigation to 
Yacobi and Matravers for several reasons. First, they capture between them several key ways of 
normalising fiction—enough to compose a solid account of normalisation. Second, both deal explicitly 
with impossible and unnatural fiction rather than standard works of fiction, which reflects the goals 
and interests of this thesis. Third, both are far more accessible than other accounts. Todorov in 
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 Which principle the reader uses to normalise a given impossible fiction depends on 
what that principle offers the coherence, consistency and rationality of the fiction in question. 
Of these three features, I argue that coherence is the most dominant. Readers are willing 
to engage with an inconsistent and irrational text provided that it is coherent in theme and 
tone. This is why not all impossible fictions are normalised by using the perspectival 
principle to interpret away impossible elements. In some cases, like Looper, absolute 
impossibilities contribute substantially to the overall coherence of the fiction. Appropriate 
interpretations must therefore preserve these impossibilities. 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced an account of how readers respond to absolute impossibilities 
in fiction. I have done so by expanding on arguments by Matravers, Nolan and Hanley to 
show how and why readers posit unreliable narration. I have also shown alternative 
responses to impossible fiction, developed through an investigation of normalisation. The 
work of Yacobi, supplemented with Matravers, offers insight into the principles by which 
readers normalise fiction. These principles show why it is that certain works of impossible 
fiction resist being interpreted as unreliably narrated. 
The next step is to investigate how versatile this concept of normalisation is. There 
are some works of fiction which seem extremely resistant to normalisation. The following 
chapter shows how even these more complex cases can be interpreted by average, non-
specialist readers. Just as Basil says placidly in the heading quote from The Club of Queer 
Trades: fiction is always congenial to the human mind. I show just how flexible the human 
mind can be when it interprets impossible fiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
particular is difficult to marry with the style and language of analytic philosophy, while the work of 
Yacobi and Matravers is easy to incorporate into my argument. 
102 
 
4. Complex Normalisation 
 
Whatever is useful and necessary to man, lies level to his abilities, and is easily acquired; but 
whatever exceeds the common size, is always great, and always amazing.  
- Longinus, On the sublime 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Alain Robbe-Grillet’s 1965 La Maison de Rendez-vous (henceforth Maison) is a complex 
impossible fiction. Its narrative contains twisting contradictions and confusing repetitions. A 
reader must normalise the fiction (to interpret it in a way which the reader can understand, 
and which accounts for seemingly deviant elements of the text) in order to engage with it in 
any meaningful sense. As a postmodernist novel, there are compelling normalisations to be 
made of Maison using the generic or genetic principles (emphasising the genre conventions 
and historical circumstances which contribute to the unusual narrative). However, doing so 
requires specific expertise. An average reader cannot be expected to show understanding 
of and sensitivity to the conventions of French Postmodernism. Readers lacking this sort of 
expertise will not be able to normalise the fiction by these otherwise compelling methods. 
In fact, it is not clear at all how an average, non-expert reader can normalise fictions like 
Maison. Given that the previous chapter established normalisation as the primary way in 
which readers access, understand and enjoy impossible fiction, this poses a problem. Is a 
non-expert reader, one who has insufficient knowledge to draw on the generic and genetic 
principles, doomed to find Maison and impossible fictions like it completely inaccessible? 
This chapter answers that question: no. Maison can be normalised by a non-expert 
reader. This reader may have an ill-informed understanding of Robbe-Grillet and the work 
of fiction itself, but this does not mean that her normalisation and ultimately her impressions 
of Maison must only be partial. The way in which this normalisation can proceed is not 
obvious. To help show how it can be done, I draw heavily on work by semiotician Umberto 
Eco. Eco suggests that there are two levels at which such fictions are appreciated: a first-
level reading, which is confusing and frustrated; and a second-level reading, which critically 
reflects on how the first-level reading is brought about. In other words, Eco’s argument is 
that readers can take a naive or a reflective approach when reading fictions like Maison. 
This, Eco claims, allows the reader to enjoy her ‘logical and perceptual defeat’, and to 
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appreciate the self-disclosing nature of the fiction (Eco 1994: 77). This chapter analyses 
Eco’s argument, and suggests several ways of interpreting these cryptic claims. 
I begin by giving a more detailed explanation of Maison, explaining its impossible 
elements. I observe that, despite its unintuitive structure and content, it is frequently well-
received and garners positive reviews. In order to find an explanation for this, I introduce 
Eco’s work on impossible fiction. I outline Eco’s argument, including the key concept of the 
Model Reader. This argument shows that Eco considers impossible fictional worlds to be 
outside the realm of conceivability. Instead of conceiving of the fictional world as she would 
in standard cases of fiction, Eco thinks the reader has a two-level experience: one naive 
reading where the reader tries and fails to comprehend the impossible fiction, and another, 
critical reading where she reflects on the techniques and conventions which the impossible 
fiction draws upon and subverts. I register several disagreements with Eco, but decide that 
his second-level reading is, effectively, a method for normalising the fiction according to the 
functional principle. 
Moving on to Eco’s suggestion that a reader undergoes a logical and perceptual 
defeat, I suggest that the defeat in question is the reader’s inability to intuitively understand 
the story of Maison. Regarding Eco’s claim that this defeat is the source of pleasure, I draw 
an analogy between interpreting impossible fiction and solving puzzles. In both cases, the 
kind of pleasure available is a cathartic pleasure: the enjoyment of finally feeling able to 
rationalise that which was previously beyond understanding. When the reader recognises 
the source of her frustrated attempts to conceive of the fiction, she gains cathartic pleasure. 
I suggest that this image is plausible but unlikely to occur regularly. However, there are 
other reasons why logical and perceptual defeat may be pleasurable.  
In the final section, I discuss two of these other reasons. One is the heightened 
attention to detail which a challenging fiction can force the reader to deploy. The other is 
the fact that some works play on a reader’s ability to recognise when she cannot, and indeed 
is not supposed to fully engage with a fiction. These show why even unintuitive and 
normalisation-resistant fictions like Maison can be enjoyed by readers.37 
 
37 This chapter makes frequent use of non-definite language: ‘can’, ‘may’, ‘might’, etc. This is not 
intended to weaken the argument: I argue that the behaviour I describe in this chapter really does 
take place. I refrain from definite language because readers are frequently idiosyncratic and difficult 
to generalise. One reader may think Ulysses is utterly inaccessible but beautifully written, another 
may think it is easily followed but sloppily communicated, a third might give up after two pages. It is 
not feasible to definitively capture the experience of all three readers in a single account, but it is 
possible to describe how a reader might reasonably behave.  
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4.2  Example: La Maison de Rendez-vous 
Throughout this chapter, I return to a particular example of impossible fiction: Robbe-
Grillet’s La Maison de Rendez-vous. This section gives an overview of Maison’s plot and 
impossible elements. These are, respectively, convoluted and myriad. The novella regularly 
contradicts itself, shifts between scenes and moves from the main story to a story-within-a-
story without any warning. I highlight the difficulty that a typical reader has in intuitively 
understanding and in normalising Maison. I also point out that this difficulty does not 
necessarily prevent a typical reader from enjoying the novella. In fact, the typical reader’s 
inability to intuitively grasp the fiction can play a significant role in her enjoyment of the 
fiction.  
Maison is about a murder which occurs during a Hong Kong aristocrat’s party. The 
novella is written so that events make sense at the point they occur, but they are rendered 
impossible by things which happen earlier or later in the novel. For example, a dog is at 
once stuffed and still alive in the following: 
[A mannequin bends her elbow] in order to control a big black dog with shiny fur walking in 
front of her.  
The animal has been mounted with great skill. And were it not for its total immobility, its slightly 
overemphasised stiffness… one would think it was about to complete its interrupted 
movement… Strolling in front of the shop-window, the girl in the black sheath… continues 
walking with the same even gait past the buildings, holding on its taut leash the big dog with 
the shiny fur whose half-open mouth drools a little, then closes with a dry snap (Robbe-Grillet 
1987: 133–135). 
Each time the dog is mentioned, its features make sense. In the first instance, it is incredibly 
lifelike, but inanimate. In the second, it is alive enough to drool and close its mouth. 
However, when juxtaposed these two descriptions are inconsistent. Robbe-Grillet’s use of 
the definite description ‘the’ heavily implies that the living dog and the stuffed dog are the 
same animal. This means that this dog is both alive and dead—an absolute impossibility. 
This is far from the only contradiction in the novel. William Ashline identifies another: 
Edouard Mannaret, the victim of the novel’s murder plot, is killed but manages to speak to 
one character on the telephone and another in person after his death (Ashline 1995: 2). 
Just like the dog, Mannaret is alive in some scenes and dead in others, with no regard for 
continuity. Robbe-Grillet specialist Bruce Morrissette describes the process: 
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Johnson is pursued by the police because he has killed Mannaret, the money-lender; when 
he manages to evade the officers, Johnson… proceeds to the scene of the crime, but there 
“actually” kills Mannaret, and in the fashion already described by the police. This time there is 
no… solution, and, in fact, Mannaret (or his double, or triple) will die several times, and at 
various hands (Morrissette 1966: 822). 
The story of Maison is full of temporal shifts. Johnson’s pursuit isn’t merely presented as 
occurring before he murders Mannaret; the murder actually does occur after the pursuit. 
These inconsistencies make Maison an impossible fiction. As the previous chapter claims, 
this means that readers will, under typical circumstances, attempt to normalise the fiction. 
Maison is interesting, however, because normalising it poses a challenge. 
 Some readers are well-equipped to normalise Maison according to the generic or 
genetic principles discussed in the last chapter (pp. 87-90). These well-informed readers 
are aware of Robbe-Grillet’s techniques, his preoccupation with the experimental nouveau 
roman, and of the stylisations of postmodern French literature. The frequent non-sequiturs 
and deviations contained in Maison can be correctly attributed to these genre quirks, or to 
Robbe-Grillet’s idiosyncratic approach of reinventing his style and subject with each work 
of fiction. Normalising Maison does not pose a significant challenge to these readers. 
However, while such readers represent a proportion of Maison’s readership, they do not 
exhaust it.  
Not every reader is aware of the relevant genre conventions or biographical history, 
and consequently is unable to use them to normalise Maison. Not only this, but the 
convoluted impossibilities of the story are so extensive that the reader may have difficulty 
using alternative principles of normalisation. In particular, the perspectival principle seems 
poorly placed to help normalise the fiction: the aforementioned fluctuations in time make it 
difficult to see how the narrator could mislead the reader in any minor way. Instead, adopting 
the perspectival principle would involve rejecting almost all of the narrative, and claiming 
that most of the narration bears almost no resemblance to what should be taken as 
occurring in the story.  
 As a result of this inconsistency and irrationality, Maison undermines the standard 
methods readers use to engage with impossible fictions.  Under typical circumstances, a 
reader has an easy, natural understanding of a fiction. This allows the reader to make 
complex inferences and predictions while forming her impressions. This includes low-level 
information, such as causation (Anna Karenina’s failed relationship with Vronsky was the 
reason for her suicide) and simple counterfactuals (if no train had been approaching, Anna 
would not have died when she threw herself on the tracks). In some cases, this also includes 
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more sophisticated processes. Such processes might include positing narrative unreliability, 
complex counterfactuals (If Anna and Vronsky had made any friends in Italy, their 
relationship would have been successful) and the ability to imagine the events of the fiction 
in close detail. These abilities are present in many impossible fictions as well.38 In the case 
of Maison, however, these abilities are absent. The repeated contradictions and temporal 
inconsistencies make it difficult to follow the plot or understand the characters’ motivations. 
The reader’s impressions are constantly undermined by the unannounced changes in the 
narrative.  
 As a shorthand for this ability to intuitively comprehend a fiction, I follow Stephen 
Yablo in using the term ‘grokking’ (Yablo 2002: 485). To grok a concept is to understand it 
comfortably, intuitively and profoundly. The act of is what makes a difficult fiction grokkable 
to a reader. This is why very little normalisation is required for standard, possible fictions, 
but a great deal of normalisation is required for certain impossible fictions. While the 
competent reader of Anna Karenina is able to grok what she reads with little effort, the 
reader of Maison is not. Due to its inconsistencies and contradictions, the reader of Maison 
cannot, for example, make predictions or detailed inferences about the story. The 
information on which she bases her inferences is subject to revision and erasure by the 
shifting narrative. Inability to grok a fiction does not indicate a total lack of understanding; 
the reader is still able to form some kind of impression of the fiction. However, this 
impression will be sparse and uncertain. This means that the kind of imaginative 
engagement the reader has with Maison is qualitatively different to her easy, natural 
engagement with a fiction like Anna Karenina.  
The inability to grok Maison can prevent the reader from enjoying the experience of 
reading the fiction in much the same way that it is difficult to enjoy a play performed in an 
unfamiliar language, or which one has only joined halfway through. However, it may also 
offer a unique kind of experience. Disliking Maison is not the only reasonable or even likely 
response to this challenging fiction. The novella has many positive reviews. Critical reviews 
describe Maison as ‘poetic, amusing, captivating’ (‘La Maison de Rendez-vous & Djinn', 
n.d.). User reviews on Goodreads are widely positive (‘La Maison de Rendez-vous’, n.d.). 
These people all report enjoying Maison. I claim that this enjoyment is not in spite of the 
contradictions in the text. Instead, I argue that these contradictions are themselves a source 
 
38 Priest assumes this in his brief questionnaire in ‘Sylvan’s Box: A Short Story and Ten Morals’, 
arguing that readers will not infer that the box was shot into space at the end of the fiction (1997: 
579). 
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of enjoyment. The reader’s inability to grok Maison can itself be a source of aesthetic 
pleasure.  
To make this argument, I draw on work concerning the appreciation of fictions which 
challenge readers in this way. My primary source is Umberto Eco, who writes on the 
pleasures of impossible fiction in his 1990 The Limits of Interpretation. Eco claims that 
impossible fictions ‘self-disclose’—highlight their own fictional nature (1994: 77). According 
to Eco, this self-disclosure means that there are two general experiences of the impossible 
fiction: one naive reading, where the reader is confused and disarmed by the fiction’s 
impossible elements, and a higher-level reading where the reader appreciates the narrative 
techniques which brought about the naive reading. The following section provides the 
groundwork needed to properly understand Eco’s claim. 
 
4.3  Overview of Eco 
This section provides a summary of Eco’s comments on impossible fiction and the 
theoretical assumptions which drive them. As with Culler and Yacobi in the previous 
chapter, Eco draws on methodology and terminology from outside analytic aesthetics. My 
analysis therefore takes care to be sensitive to Eco while still indicating how his comments 
are relevant to an analytic account. I indicate which aspects of Eco’s argument I see as 
informative contributions to my analysis of impossible fiction, and which I see as misguided 
or irrelevant. Eco’s overall point is that the pleasure to be gained from impossible fiction is 
found either in recognising our own inability to conceive of the fiction, or from recognising 
the fiction’s inability to describe impossible things. I disagree with this. I do, however, agree 
that both of these are potential sources of aesthetic pleasure for readers of impossible 
fiction, and understanding Eco’s argument helps understand why this is the case. 
In The Limits of Interpretation, Eco proposes an account of reader responses to 
impossible fictions. Eco establishes the existence of fictions which represent ‘impossible 
possible worlds’ (1994: 76). These worlds are ‘self-voiding’—they establish a certain 
proposition as part of the fiction, but then contradict themselves and so void the original 
proposition (Eco 1994: 76). His account of how readers might enjoy these fictions is not 
clearly stated, as Eco’s primary interest is not aesthetic pleasure but rather a study of 
fictional worlds more generally. However, I claim that it is possible to extract from Eco an 
argument which runs as follows:  
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E: the reader can gain pleasure from reading impossible fictions because her inability to 
conceive of the content of the text encourages a higher-level, critical reading.  
Eco’s account suggests how readers may respond to impossible fictions when many 
methods of normalisation are unavailable or undesirable. My goal is to reconstruct Eco’s 
argument, expressing it in analytic terms, and confirm my interpretation of it. This requires 
close reading and analysis of Eco. However, it first requires clarification of a concept Eco 
develops in earlier work on semiotics: the ‘Model Reader’.  
To Eco, fiction-making is communicative. It is a process whereby information is 
encoded by an author, to be decoded by a reader. The Model Reader is the reader who can 
interpret the text in the way intended by the author (Eco 1984: 7).39 The Model Reader has 
the ability to decode the expressions of the text in such a way that she finds the information 
which the author originally encoded. Different texts have different Model Readers—Eco 
suggests that linguistic codes (language and dialect), literary styles and particular 
‘specialization-indices’ (jargon and other domain-specific language) featured in a text are 
factors which determine that text’s Model Reader (Eco 1984: 7). This means that Model 
Readers only exist in relation to a particular text—there is no universal Model Reader. The 
Model Reader of Cervantes’s original Don Quixote is Spanish-speaking and familiar with 
the tropes of chivalric romance. The Model Reader of The Mote in God’s Eye is English-
speaking, has read other works from the CoDominium series, and has some basic 
grounding in physics. There can also be multiple Model Readers for a single text, provided 
that the text has multiple equally appropriate interpretations (Eco 1994: 77).The concept 
has been entertained outside of semiotics—Eco’s Model Reader is similar to Jerrold 
Levinson’s notion of an ideally comprehending reader (Levinson 2006).40 The significance 
of the Model Reader to Eco is that she is the only reader who can decode the author’s 
expressions with total accuracy. This does not entail that she has complete knowledge of 
the text. The Model Reader of a devious mystery novel may not be able to solve the case 
of the murder (Eco 1994: 77). Rather, the mark of the Model Reader is that she will not 
interpret any expressions in a way which the author did not intend.  
With the meaning of the term clarified, I can explain the significance of the Model 
Reader to Eco’s work on impossible fiction. The relevant aspect of Eco’s Model Reader is 
 
39 It is not clear exactly what kind of interpretation Eco is referring to. Going by the evidence provided 
in the rest of this paragraph, the most likely kind of interpretation at stake is the understanding of 
communicative utterances, just as the previous chapter discussed in the context of Culler. 
40 See DeMaria Jr. (1978) for a historical overview of the ideal reader. 
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the response she has when reading impossible fictions, as opposed to her response to 
standard, possible fictions. Eco claims that, typically, the Model Reader of a fiction is led to 
conceive of a world as part of reading the text (1994: 75).41 This does not pose a challenge 
in the case of standard, possible fictions. However, he argues that even a Model Reader is 
incapable of conceiving of the kind of world which an impossible fiction represents (Eco 
1994: 76). She is therefore ‘requested to display exaggeratedly generous flexibility’ in her 
interpretation of impossible fiction (Eco 1994: 76). In other words, she must take certain 
elements of the story for granted rather than conceiving of them as she normally would. The 
fact that the Model Reader must alter her mode of engagement in this way shows that Eco 
thinks the interpretation of impossible fiction is fundamentally different to the interpretation 
of standard, possible fiction. The intended, ideal reader of a possible fiction conceives of 
the world which that fiction represents. The intended, ideal reader of an impossible fiction, 
however, does not conceive of the world which that impossible fiction represents. The notion 
that readers cannot conceive of the content of impossible fiction is interesting in its own 
right—it is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. However, the asymmetry found 
between the reader’s engagement with possible fiction and with impossible fiction alone has 
a significant implication for the reader’s experience. 
 The implication is that this reader’s experience is impoverished. The reader of 
impossible fiction has a different experience than the ideal experience of standard fiction. 
The difference is that this reader has a reduced kind of engagement with the fiction. It does 
not involve conceiving of the fictional world, whereas engagement with standard fiction 
does. It is reasonable to suspect that the reduced engagement that the reader has with the 
fiction correspondingly reduces the pleasure which the reader gains from the experience. If 
it did not, then this reduced form of engagement would be appropriate for standard fiction 
as well. This implication can be illustrated by Maison. If even the Model Reader of Maison 
is unable to conceive of the bizarre world the novella represents, then a typical reader is 
unlikely to fare any better at conceiving of this world. Instead of engaging closely with the 
fiction by conceiving of its content, Eco thinks readers must take for granted that Mannaret 
is dead despite talking to other characters, or that the animate dog is in fact a statue.42 If 
 
41 Since I have avoided discussion of the metaphysics of fiction, the idea of a fictional world has not 
featured heavily in this thesis. The closest analogue which features in this thesis is the idea of a story 
(as opposed to a fiction), and I interpret ‘conceiving of a fictional world’ along the lines of ‘conceiving 
of a story’. 
42 Compare this with learning new facts about the world. Learning that a cube is three metres wide 
is not a difficult fact to conceive of. However, learning that a cube is spherical is much more difficult 
to understand. Arguably, we have no meaningful conception of what it is like for a cube to be 
spherical. However, if given by a suitably reliable source, a person has no difficulty in taking 
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this less imaginatively rich way of reading a work of fiction is not ideal for standard cases, 
then it is reasonable to suppose it is, overall, a less desirable kind of engagement. 
Eco, however, thinks readers of impossible fictions like Maison can still have an 
experience which is net positive. The experience of reading impossible fiction, he argues, 
has two distinct layers. The first is the ‘illusion of a coherent world and the feeling of some 
inexplicable impossibility (Eco 1994: 77)’. This first-level reading is the experience a naive 
reader has when an impossible fiction partially conceals its own impossibility. The second 
layer is a critical experience which analyses ‘the brilliant narrative strategy by which the 
first-level naive reader has been designed (Eco 1994: 77)’. This exercise grants the reader 
‘the pleasure of [her] logical and perceptual defeat (Eco 1994: 77)’, and it grants this 
pleasure because she is unable to conceive of the world of the fiction. These quotations are 
not self-explanatory, and reading Eco leaves us with several questions. Why we should 
think that a first-level reader is under the illusion that an impossible fiction is consistent? In 
what sense is the reader logically and perceptually defeated? Why does the reader’s logical 
and perceptual defeat grant pleasure? These quotations therefore require unpacking, and 
that is the task of the following sections.  
 
4.4  First-level reading of impossible fiction 
This section explains Eco’s account of first-level reading of impossible fiction. This, 
according to Eco, is the reading which gives the reader the ‘illusion of a coherent world and 
the feeling of some inexplicable impossibility (1994: 77)’. I cover Eco’s general description 
of how impossible fiction is read at this level, which includes a comparison to viewing 
impossible images. I identify exactly what Eco means by the ‘illusion of a coherent world’, 
as well as the sense of ‘inexplicable impossibility’. However, I have several criticisms of 
Eco’s account, all around the same theme: while it may describe the Model Reader’s 
experience, it does not reflect the general experience of reading impossible fiction. 
 Eco’s notion of first-level reading should not be confused with first-time reading. 
Rather, it refers to a naive approach to reading fiction. However, in order to understand the 
first-level reading impossible fiction, we must first understand how Eco thinks the reader 
 
unintuitive information for granted, even if she has no conception of how that information could be 
actualised. One can take for granted that birds see more colours than humans, even if one has no 
concept of what seeing more colours would be like. Similarly, a reader can take for granted that, in 
Maison, Mannaret is both alive and dead without having any clear concept of a living dead person.  
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responds to impossible fiction. Eco compares reading an impossible fiction to studying a 
picture which depicts a geometrically impossible object, such as the work of Penrose or 
Escher. He labels these ‘visual instances’ of impossible possible worlds (1994: 77). These 
are pictures which might appear superficially possible, but with closer scrutiny demonstrate 
an impossibility. Take the Penrose triangle (illus. 3). Comparing each of the three corners 
of the triangle, it is apparent that the triangle is impossible. It bends back on itself in a way 
which is not permitted by geometry. Each angle is individually possible but taken together 
as one shape they result in an impossible whole. It is easy to notice this, since we can view 
the entire shape at once. This point is important when comparing visual impossibilities with 
what Eco calls ‘verbal’ impossibilities.  
 
  
To Eco, a verbal text is a fiction communicated using words, rather than a single 
image. This category includes most forms of narrative fiction.43 Verbal texts can represent 
impossibilities, but in a different way to visual texts. This difference is due to the extended 
nature of verbal texts. While the reader can view the entirety of a visual text in one instant, 
a verbal text is viewed in sequence. This means that, while the impossible elements of a 
visual text can be immediately identified, a Model Reader identifies a verbal text as 
impossible over time. The reader must use her long- and short-term memory to detect 
contradictions in the text (Eco 1994: 78), as she cannot immediately compare two aspects 
 
43 Eco does not make it clear whether he considers moving image to be a verbal or visual text. Given 
his comments, discussed shortly, about the extension of verbal texts through time, I am inclined to 
think that moving image counts as a verbal text. 
Illus. 3: Penrose triangle 
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of the text to check for consistency. The verbal text might maintain the facade of consistency 
for a long time before its inconsistency is noticed, if the inconsistency is ever noticed at all. 
This is what Eco means when he writes that an impossible fiction gives an illusion of 
coherency (1994: 77). The impossible elements of verbal texts require the use of memory 
to identify, and until the impossible element is recognised, the fiction appears, illusorily, to 
be consistent. This answers the first of the questions listed at the end of the previous 
section. The reader is under the illusion that the fiction is possible for at least part of the 
time that she reads it, because the impossible elements of the fiction only become apparent 
over time.  
I do not find this picture of first-level reading convincing. As a counterexample to 
Eco’s argument, a reader can already be aware that a fiction is impossible before she begins 
to read it. Such a reader is never under the illusion that the fiction is possible. This reader 
is not a Model Reader—her experience is based on information gained from outside the 
text itself, not from her ability to appropriately interpret the text. Perhaps Eco is content to 
ignore this reader’s experience and focus on how readers engage with impossible fiction in 
ideal circumstances. However, this non-Model Reader shows that Eco’s portrait does not 
represent the actual experience of many readers. His description of the first-level 
experience of reading impossible fiction is, consequently, not particularly enlightening when 
analysing what readers actually tend to experience. 
 I also disagree with Eco’s distinction between visual and verbal texts—that 
impossible elements of visual texts are immediately apparent, whereas impossible elements 
of verbal texts require the reader’s faculty of memory. The case of Sylvan’s Box shows that 
some verbal texts require almost no memory at all. Instead, these texts are upfront about 
their own inconsistencies, and will often draw attention to them. Some visual impossibilities, 
on the other hand, may be so intricate or so large-scale that a keen memory is required to 
notice their inconsistencies. Imagine, instead of a Penrose triangle, a Penrose chiliagon. It 
would take careful inspection, as well as the faculties of memory and imagination, to notice 
that the one thousand-sided shape is impossible. However, in general I take Eco’s point—
verbal texts have a tendency to draw upon these faculties to a greater degree than visual 
texts. They are more likely to give a reader the illusion that they are possible. 
One realistic, representative sense in which readers may be under the illusion that 
an impossible fiction is possible is in the event that the reader does not notice the impossible 
elements of a verbal text. Eco argues that some texts seem possible despite being 
fundamentally impossible. His example is Back to the Future, which avoids drawing 
attention to its temporal paradoxes by focussing its narrative on the immediate experiences 
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of Marty McFly (Eco 1994: 79). Another example can be found in Charlie and the Great 
Glass Elevator, where Grandma Georgina is accidentally de-aged to minus two years old. 
The absolute impossibility of Grandma Georgina being de-aged to minus numbers is not 
the focus of the narrative—instead, it is the dangerous expedition to rescue her from 
‘Minusland’ which demands the reader’s attention. In the cases of Back to the Future and 
Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator, it would hardly be surprising if the average reader 
never noticed any impossibilities at all. 
In such a case, it is unlikely that the reader would have a sense of an ‘inexplicable 
impossibility’ as Eco claims. If she has not noticed any impossibilities at all, then she will 
simply assume that she is reading a standard fiction. It is only in a specific case that the 
reader can have such a sense: one where she recognises that the fiction is impossible but 
does not understand which aspect of the fiction makes it impossible.44 I consider the case 
where the reader notices no impossibilities at all more likely state of affairs than the case of 
inexplicable impossibility Eco describes. For a reader to possess the sense of inexplicable 
impossibility that Eco describes, she must be able to recognise that a fiction is not possible 
without necessarily understanding which element of the fiction is impossible. 
Charitably speaking, Maison could be considered an example of this sort of fiction. 
While ‘Sylvan’s Box’ draws attention to the exact nature of its impossible elements, Maison 
does not. It represents events which clearly contradict one another, but it is difficult to 
escape a sense of ambiguity in the content of the fiction. Lubomír Doležel observes that the 
world of Maison is ‘tentative, unfinished, crumbling into a sequence of frustrated events 
(Doležel 1998: 165).’ Maison’s narrative is not definitive; it could be several conflicting 
narratives or a single impossible narrative. It is difficult for the reader to get a firm grasp on 
what actually occurs in Maison because she cannot easily tell whether some elements of 
the story should be interpreted non-literally. This means that, despite the reader’s strong 
sense that something impossible is taking place in Maison, it is difficult for her to pin down 
a precise reason why the fiction is impossible. This is how, as Eco claims, a reader can 
have a sense of inexplicable impossibility during a first-level reading. 
 
44 Failure to fully understand a fiction could also occur in some situations where impossibilities are 
not involved. There are some circumstances of which a reader could not conceive due to ignorance. 
A fictional depiction of synaesthesia, for example, might be so alien to a reader as to be 
inconceivable. If so, it might be the case that the pleasure Eco describes is a feature of reading 
impossible fictions, but not uniquely so. 
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While Maison bears out some of Eco’s claims, I am sceptical about the idea that Eco 
accurately portrays the experience of real readers.45 The contrast between Maison and 
‘Sylvan’s Box’ shows this: while the former may produce some sense of inexplicable 
impossibility, the latter makes it extremely clear to the reader precisely which aspect of the 
fiction is impossible. Many impossible fictions take the same approach as ‘Sylvan’s Box’. 
They are upfront about their own impossibility, and deliberately call the reader’s attention to 
their impossible elements. Other impossible fictions, like Back to the Future and Charlie and 
the Great Glass Elevator, are impossible in a way which a typical reader does not notice or 
is not sufficiently informed to realise is impossible. In these cases, the reader has no sense 
of impossibility at all. Both of these scenarios go against Eco’s claim that first-level readers 
of impossible fictions have a sense of imperceptible impossibility. Accordingly, I do not find 
Eco’s comments on first-level readers convincing.  
Generally, I do not think that Eco’s description of the first-level reader fairly 
represents the naive experience of impossible fiction. On the other hand, Eco’s arguments 
about second-level readers of impossible fiction are interesting, and I do not think that the 
problems with his picture of first-level readers interfere with these arguments. I explain why 
this is the case in the following section. 
 
4.5  Second-level reading of impossible fiction 
This section explains Eco’s second-level reading of impossible fiction. I also explain why, 
although the second-level reading is not exclusive to impossible fiction, Eco sees impossible 
fiction as particularly conducive to second-level reading. I introduce Lubomír Doležel’s 
analysis of Maison and show how it relates to Eco’s arguments. I show that both Doležel 
and Eco’s positions on second-level reading are kinds of normalisation. This normalisation 
proceeds according to the functional principle, as outlined in the previous chapter. I explain 
why it is that the functional principle works so well for Maison, and why Eco’s model of 
second-level reading is not so well supported by other kinds of impossible fiction. 
Eco characterises the second-level reading of impossible fiction as the reader’s 
ability to critically analyse a text, and in doing so ‘enjoy… the brilliant narrative strategy by 
which the first-level, naive reader was designed (1994: 55).’ This reader appreciates the 
construction of the text itself rather than the narrative which that text contains. Note that this 
type of reading can be performed with all kinds of different fictions, not only with impossible 
 
45 Although, in fairness to Eco, this is not his primary objective. 
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fictions. Take most mystery novels: the first-level reader falls for red herrings and suspects 
the innocent character; the second-level reader appreciates how the author brings that first-
level reader to do so (Eco 1994: 55). Regardless of what the first-level reader’s experience 
actually was, the second-level reader critically reflects on how the fiction managed to bring 
about this experience. 
Like the first-level reading, second-level reading should not be confused with 
‘reading for the second time’. Second-level reading of impossible fiction involves an 
appreciation of the devices used to bring about the experience of the first-level reader. The 
second-level reading is a critical interpretation rather than a semantic interpretation: the 
second-level reader is interested in the effect the fiction has on her rather than the meaning 
of the fiction itself (Eco 1994: 77). This sort of reading can be performed during a first-time 
reading of a fiction, and readers are capable of switching between first- and second-level 
reading on the fly.  
There are two observations to make of this second-level reading. The first is that 
this second-level reading can apply to impossible fictions which do not give the reader a 
sense of incomprehensible impossibility, the first-level reading experience which Eco 
describes. This means that the previous section’s criticisms of Eco’s account of the first-
level reading of impossible fiction do not directly affect the second-level experience. My 
second observation is that this second-level experience is, ultimately, a principled way of 
approaching normalisation. More specifically, I claim that second-level reading falls within 
the domain of normalisation by the functional principle (more on this later). I argue this 
shows that general readers are equipped to normalise even complex impossible fictions like 
Maison. 
In the previous section, I argued that Eco’s portrayal of the first-level experience of 
impossible fiction—a sense of inexplicable impossibility—is unconvincing. However, the 
sense of inexplicable impossibility is not the only viable target of the second-level reader’s 
critical analysis. The second-level reader may also appreciate how the impossible element 
confuses the first-level reader, or how the impossible elements were revealed to the reader. 
The second-level reader may admire the language used to communicate the impossible 
elements of the fiction, or the way in which the fiction remains engrossing despite its bizarre 
inconsistencies. There is no reason to suppose that only the sense of incomprehensible 
impossibility is a valid target of the second-level reader’s appreciation. The second-level 
reader may find many other things to admire about the effect the fiction has on the first-level 
reader. 
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Eco considers impossible fiction to be particularly conducive to second-level 
appreciation, and in this regard is supported by Doležel (Doležel 1998: 164–166; Eco 1994: 
77). This is because both Eco and Doležel see impossible fiction as a member of a wider 
class of ‘self-disclosing’ fictions. These are fictions which call attention to their own fictional 
nature. This is fiction ‘flaunting its hidden foundations’, to use Doležel’s phrase (1998: 162). 
By doing so, the fiction invites a critical analysis rather than a naive analysis. It encourages 
a reading which focusses on the fiction’s use of conventions rather than on the story which 
arises from that usage. The same thing happens upon viewing a Penrose triangle. Rather 
than appreciating the shape primarily as an artistic object, the viewer tends to appreciate it 
primarily as a clever depiction of an object which cannot really exist. The reader of 
impossible fiction who recognises the impossibilities represented is likely to appreciate it as 
a fiction which attempts to represent impossibilia rather than one which actually represents 
the impossible. So claims Doležel of Maison, arguing that the aesthetic achievement of 
Robbe-Grillet’s novel is that it ‘reconfirms the ultimate impossibility of constructing a 
fictionally authentic impossible world (1988: 493).’  
In light of my previous chapter, Doležel’s comments here are highly reminiscent of 
Yacobi’s functional principle. This is the principle by which readers justify the presence of 
deviant elements in the text by considering their function. If they play a role in the text’s 
formal or aesthetic properties, then the reader can proceed with certainty that the deviant 
elements are justified (see p. 91 for further discussion). Doležel’s functional normalisation 
of Maison works by considering the function of the impossible elements of the novella. In 
the case of Maison, the function of the impossible elements is to encourage the reader to 
perform a second-level analysis of the fiction. Eco offers a similar approach of functional 
normalisation for impossible fiction, explaining that the reader can gain pleasure from a text 
which ‘speaks of its own inability to describe impossibilia (1994: 77)’. Given that the text 
‘speaks’ of its inability by inviting the reader to perform a second-level reading, Eco’s 
analysis here is extremely similar to Doležel’s. For both Eco and Doležel, a reader can enjoy 
impossible fiction by performing a second-level reading. I claim that this reading falls within 
the domain of the functional principle of normalisation. 
I do not disagree with Eco and Doležel that this is a way in which readers might 
enjoy an impossible fiction. However, I have a similar disagreement with Doležel’s 
characterisation of reading impossible fiction as I have with Hanley’s (see pp. 67–69). Like 
Hanley, Doležel effectively claims that fictions cannot represent absolute impossibilities. 
Rather than interpreting absolute impossibilities as part of the narrative, both Hanley and 
Doležel claim that readers must draw on a different principle to correctly interpret the text. 
By focussing the discussion on the nature of fictional worlds rather than stories, Doležel 
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unnecessarily limits the ways in which a reader might interpret Maison. Where Hanley 
focusses excessively on the perspectival principle of normalisation, I argue that Do ležel 
focusses excessively on the functional principle. It is worth noting that Doležel is not as 
prescriptive about his normalisation of impossible fiction as Hanley, as he does not argue 
that there is only one viable interpretation of an impossible fiction. However, I see Doležel’s 
functional normalisation as particularly applicable to Maison and less applicable to other 
cases of impossible fiction. 
This sort of functional reading is less effective when applied to fictions which are 
impossible in a less systematic way. Returning to the example of Ravenor from last chapter 
helps show this (see p. 90–91). The impossible element of Ravenor, the alternate warp 
dimension, is a major part of the fiction’s setting, but a very minor part of the fiction’s plot. 
Performing a second-level reading of Ravenor may be enjoyable and enlightening, but the 
novel itself does not question the foundations of fiction-making in the same way that Maison 
attempts. Interpreting the impossible warp dimension as a tool to encourage a second-level 
reading would be misguided. As established in the previous chapter, I consider the better 
normalisation of Ravenor to be an existential normalisation (or, to Matravers, a ‘weird world’ 
strategy): the reader normalises the impossible elements of the fiction by recognising how 
they differentiate the world of Ravenor from her own world. This shows that Doležel and 
Eco are overzealous—a fiction can contain impossible elements without necessarily making 
a comment on the nature of fiction-making or the hidden conventions of fiction. It is not the 
case that second-level reading is always an appropriate way of engaging with impossible 
fiction. 
As is also established by the previous chapter, the fact that second-level reading 
gives the reader a way of normalising impossible fiction does not guarantee that the reader 
will successfully normalise the fiction, or that she will enjoy the fiction as a result. Attempts 
to conduct a second-level reading may fail. Conducting a second-level reading may only 
reveal that there is not much to be gained from critical approach to the fiction. Whether or 
not a second-level reading does normalise the fiction, there is no guarantee that aesthetic 
pleasure will be part of the outcome. Some impossible fictions are simply bad works of 
fiction, aesthetically speaking. Some readers are simply aesthetically insensitive readers. A 
fiction must be of suitable quality to aesthetically reward a second-level reading, and a 
reader must be capable of appreciating this quality in order to benefit from the reading. If 
both of these factors are in place, then conducting a second-level reading can increase the 
enjoyment the reader gains from the fiction. 
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I argue that Eco’s second-level reading of impossible fiction is an example of 
functionally normalising a fiction. This is a particularly appropriate way of normalising 
Maison, as it does not require the specialist knowledge mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter. This is a significant contribution by Eco to my investigation of how readers access 
and enjoy impossible fiction, but it does not exhaust Eco’s contribution. The last aspect o f 
his work on impossible fiction to investigate is the notion that readers can gain pleasure 
from the fact that they are logically and perceptually defeated by a work of impossible fiction. 
What precisely this means is the topic of the next section. 
  
4.6  Logical and perceptual defeat 
This section investigates Eco’s claim that readers gain pleasure from their logical and 
perceptual defeat. I begin by clarifying exactly what Eco means by this defeat—the reader’s 
inability to conceive of an impossible fictional world. I am in favour of the idea that readers 
can, to some extent, conceive of absolute impossibilities, so I offer a different suggestion. I 
argue that, instead of being unable to conceive of impossible fictional worlds at all, readers 
are unable to conceive of impossible fictional worlds with the same intuitive ease as they 
can possible fictional worlds. Readers cannot grok impossible fictions, and this changes the 
nature of their engagement with them. This is still a defeat, but in a weaker sense than Eco’s 
original claim.  
Eco writes that the reader is logically and perceptually defeated. Which endeavour 
has the reader been defeated in? Given Eco’s comments, the most reasonable answer is 
that the reader fails to conceive of an impossible world (Eco 1994: 76). According to Eco, 
readers endeavour to conceive of the world represented by a fiction. However, Eco claims 
that in the case of impossible fiction this effort is interrupted. The Model Reader is not 
capable of conceiving of the world represented by an impossible fiction, and so is defeated 
in the effort to do so (Eco 1994: 76). This does not imply that the reader cannot access or 
enjoy the fiction at all. The notion of defeat is with regards to the attempt to conceive of the 
fiction. A reader who is defeated in the attempt to conceive of a fiction may still develop an 
appropriate impression, and she may find the experience stimulating or pleasurable. In this 
context, then, the terms ‘defeat’ and ‘failure’ are not pejorative or dismissive. Instead they 
refer exclusively to this inability to conceive of the fictional world.  
It is not clear whether Eco is correct to claim that a reader cannot conceive of what 
is represented by an impossible fiction. While the received wisdom in analytic philosophy is 
that the absolutely impossible is inconceivable, Gendler and Stock both argue that readers 
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can, to a degree, conceive of impossible fictional worlds (Gendler 2000; Stock 2017). This 
question is developed further in the next chapter. However, I argue that even if readers do 
conceive of impossible fictional worlds while reading impossible fiction, they do so differently 
to how readers conceive of possible fictional worlds. I return to the notion of grokking a 
fiction: while readers can grok a possible fiction (and perhaps impossible fictions which 
conceal their impossibilities), they cannot grok recognisably impossible fictions. I take it that 
conceiving of a grokkable concept is phenomenally different to conceiving of a non-
grokkable concept. A reader may be able to conceive of a box which is empty and has 
something in it, but she cannot do so with the same intuitive ease as she can conceive of 
an empty box. This means there are two claims to be made about the reader of impossible 
fictions: a stronger claim and a weaker claim. Eco’s strong claim is that readers are unable 
to conceive of impossible fictional worlds, and so are defeated in their attempts to do so. 
My weaker claim is that readers are unable to grok fictions which they recognise to be 
impossible, and so they are defeated in their attempts to conceive of impossible fictions as 
they would possible fictions.  
Maison vindicates my weak claim, but Eco’s arguments are important for showing 
why this is the case. In particular, Eco’s claim that memory plays a key role in identifying 
impossible fiction is borne out. This is because the reader of Maison is required to keep 
track of the statements made about various characters, places and events if she is to 
recognise the contradictions thrown up by the fiction. Maison is difficult to follow—the 
narrative moves fluidly from scene to scene, without exposition or explanation. Doležel 
describes it as ‘a sequence of drafts, with recurring cuts, new beginnings, corrections, 
deletions, additions etc. (1988: 493, Doležel’s italics).’ If she does not maintain focus, the 
reader is likely to be confused by these shuffled, unfinished or corrected lines of narrative. 
Only the attentive reader (which includes but is not limited to Eco’s Model Reader), one who 
keeps track of the events of the novel, will recognise exactly which elements contradict 
other parts of the story. However, it is this attentive reader who is best positioned to 
recognise that she cannot grok the fiction. The inferences which a reader is usually able to 
draw from fictions are not so easily drawn from Maison, as the novel does not follow the 
logical laws which these inferences are built upon. A typical inference such as ‘Mannaret is 
talking to the police, therefore Mannaret is alive’, taken for granted in other works of fiction, 
cannot be made of Maison. If inferences such as this are part of the conception readers 
usually form of fictions (which I think they are), then Maison cannot be conceived of in the 
same way as works of possible fiction. 
 Whether Eco is correct or not about the reader’s ability to conceive of an impossible 
fictional world, the reader has been defeated. She recognises that her original goal, 
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engaging with Maison as she would a standard fiction, cannot be attained. In the following 
chapter, I partially retract the claim that readers cannot engage with impossible fictions as 
they do possible fictions (§5.5). I discuss cases where readers are able to do just that. 
However, for the purposes of this section, it is sufficient to say that Maison is not one of 
these cases. It is labyrinthine enough that the reader is very likely to be defeated in her 
attempt to conceive of Maison as she would a standard fiction. This defeat may occur 
quickly, or she may spend a considerable amount of time attempting to grok the fiction. 
However, the notion of defeat is important, as it is only when she stops trying to interpret 
the impossible fiction as she would a possible fiction that the reader is able to begin 
normalisation.  
 
4.7  Frustration and catharsis 
I have characterised the reader’s defeat. What remains to be seen is why Eco claims this 
defeat can be pleasurable. I draw an analogy between Eco’s portrait of reading impossible 
fiction and solving a puzzle. In both cases, the reader builds up frustration as she struggles 
to find a solution. For the puzzle, this solution is the answer to the puzzle. For Eco’s account 
of impossible fiction, the solution is the realisation of why the fiction eludes intuitive 
understanding. In puzzles, the discovery of a solution brings a sense of cathartic pleasure. 
Perhaps a similar cathartic pleasure is available for Eco’s reader. I characterise this 
cathartic pleasure, but argue that, like Eco’s first-level reading of impossible fiction, it is not 
widely experienced by real readers. 
The process of reading impossible fiction which Eco describes is extremely similar 
to existing accounts of puzzle-solving. When discussing impossible fiction, Eco describes a 
‘linear and temporally ordered… scanning’ which is part of the process of making a ‘global 
analysis… that requires an interplay of long- and short-term memory (1994: 78).’ This 
description of the reader’s actions is similar to the description of the actions of puzzle-
solvers. In their psychological description of problem solving, David Hambrick & Randall 
Engle describe the Tower of Hanoi, a classic example of a puzzle. They claim that:  
Discovery of a solution [to the Tower of Hanoi] may depend on the ability to activate information 
from multiple, unsuccessful solution attempts, and to maintain that activation until the 
information is integrated… working memory is a fundamental determinant of proficiency in a 
wide range of tasks (Hambrick and Engle 2003: 179–180). 
121 
 
To solve the Tower of Hanoi the solver must use her memory to synthesise information 
gained from failed attempts to solve the puzzle. This information guides her future attempts 
by helping her avoid making the mistakes which led to failure. 
As Eco describes impossible fictions, they also have a ‘solution’—the identification 
of which aspect makes them absolutely impossible. For the Penrose triangle, this is the 
combination of angles in the corners of the triangle. For Back to the Future and Looper, it 
is the paradoxes included in the story. In both Eco’s account of impossible fiction and 
Hambrick & Engle’s account of puzzles, solutions are discovered through the faculty of 
memory. If both the puzzler and the reader are drawing on the same faculty when engaging 
with their respective media, investigating the experience of the puzzler may shed some light 
on the experience of the reader. This is why the comparison to the process of solving 
puzzles is helpful for the discussion of impossible fiction.  
Both attempting to solve a puzzle and attempting to normalise an impossible fiction 
can be frustrating. Marcel Danesi describes a build-up of suspense in the process of solving 
a puzzle (2002: 226–227). The same goes for the reader, who must draw on her memory 
and interpretive skills to try and make sense of the fiction she is reading. Just as a puzzle-
solver does not embark on a puzzle which she knows has no solution, a reader does not try 
to make sense of a fiction unless she thinks there is a sensible interpretation available. 
Correspondingly, just as the puzzler’s frustration is based on the thought that she could 
solve the puzzle but has failed to do so, the reader’s frustration is born of an expectation 
that the text can be successfully interpreted which is not met. 
Eco agrees with this overall picture of the reader’s defeat. He claims that the reader’s 
objective is to find the meaning of the text (Eco 1994: 77). To Eco, this is a process of 
interpreting the text in such a way that the reader can understand it. To other theorists, this 
may be seen as a different process, such as recovering the intentions of the author. In either 
case, the goal is a specific interpretation of the text—usually one which is rational and 
consistent. The obstacle to this process is the fact that the text is impossible: there is no 
easy way of interpreting the impossible elements. This prevents the reader from interpreting 
the text in the way she normally would. 
The reader therefore develops a feeling of suspense and frustration. Typically, 
frustration is replaced by pleasure when the source of frustration is finally overcome. This 
is the pleasure associated with puzzles. Danesi describes how puzzles cause a feeling of 
suspense and anxiety in their audience (2002: 2). This feeling of suspense grows as the 
reader attempts to solve the puzzle. It is only when the puzzle is solved that the reader 
achieves a ‘mental catharsis’, and with it relief from the suspense (Danesi 2002: 2). To 
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Danesi, this suspense is a key part of a puzzle’s appeal (2002: 226–227). A good puzzle is 
one which builds up anxiety and, presumably, though Danesi does not specify this, releases 
this anxiety when the reader finds a solution. A puzzle is too easy if we manage to solve it 
before any frustration builds up. A puzzle is too hard if we are unable to find a solution which 
allows the frustration to be released.  
A reader who successfully normalises an impossible fiction feels a similar moment 
of catharsis to the puzzle-solver: a moment where the information they have been collating 
finally makes sense. This catharsis is the result of the reader feeling that she finally 
understands the fiction. In the case of Maison, the reader who draws on a functional 
normalisation like those of Eco and Doležel may feel as though she has finally put her finger 
on why exactly the unusual elements of the fiction are present. This achieves her goal—
making sense of the fiction—in a manner which cathartically dispels her frustration with the 
confusing narrative of Maison. I argue that this catharsis can be an enjoyable aspect of 
successfully normalising an impossible fiction, just as it is for solving a puzzle. This catharsis 
is a result of the building frustration which accompanies the efforts to engage with an 
impossible fiction like Maison. It is not an Aristotelian catharsis—the exorcism of pity and 
fear. It is a less technical sense of the term: the purgation of negative emotions in general.  
 This corresponds with Eco’s notion of the pleasure of logical and perceptual defeat. 
When the reader accepts that she cannot conceive of the fiction in the standard way, she 
admits defeat in her original objective. Accepting our defeat in the effort to grok the fiction 
and instead adopting a principle of normalisation can be cathartically pleasurable. Danesi 
claims that a pleasurable, cathartic release is created by the discovery of a solution to a 
puzzle. I argue that this release is analogous to the discovery of a method for reading the 
impossible fiction which makes that fiction seem coherent. This model also shows why 
failing to normalise fiction can result in a frustrating reading experience. A reader who 
cannot normalise Maison is doomed to simply fail in her effort to grok the fiction. There is 
no moment of cathartic release, and so this reader’s experience is likely to be strongly 
negative.  
I argue that the logical and perceptual defeat to which Eco refers is best understood 
as the reader’s inability to conceive of the fiction as she would normally. This can be 
pleasurable, as the cathartic sense of release from frustration has been earned by the hard 
work of repeatedly failing to grok the text. Eco takes a stronger position and claims that the 
reader cannot conceive of the world of Maison at all, but this is still compatible with the 
model of catharsis which I have described in this section.  
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 This sense of cathartic release is not available to every reader of impossible fiction. 
It is only available to those who recognise or strongly suspect that a fiction is impossible but 
cannot place the exact reason for this impossibility. As I previously explained in my criticism 
of Eco, I do not think that many readers have this experience. Readers are often aware 
prior to or early on in reading a fiction that it is impossible. Consequently, while I agree that 
some readers may gain this sense of catharsis, a great many will not. This does not mean 
that these other readers are doomed to a negative experience. In the following section I 
argue that there are other reasons why a reader can find her logical and perceptual defeat 
pleasurable. 
 
 
4.8  The pleasure and frustration of defeat 
In the previous section, I argue that there is a sense of catharsis available to readers who 
are frustrated and ultimately defeated by impossible fictions. However, I do not think that 
catharsis is the only reason why defeat can enrich the reader’s experience of a fiction. 
Maison and fictions like it are frustrating because they challenge the reader’s typical ways 
of engaging with fiction. One tactic for identifying the pleasurable elements of frustration is 
therefore to seek other instances where typical reader behaviour is challenged, and to note 
which features of these sponsor aesthetic enjoyment. In this section, I propose two other 
reasons why being defeated may enhance the reader’s experience. The first is the fact that 
readers, when challenged by a fiction, may respond by taking greater care in their reading. 
I show how this proceeds in cases of non-impossible fiction, and I argue that impossible 
fictions fulfil the same conditions. I also show how certain fictions require their reader to 
recognise her inability to fully access their content, and why this can enhance that reader’s 
enjoyment of the fiction. 
  One way in which fiction commonly challenges typical reader behaviour is when it 
does not contain a definitive answer to a major question raised by the plot. This expectation 
is played with in fictions which contain pivotal indeterminacies. While every fiction contains 
indeterminacies to some extent (every statement which is not confirmed or denied by the 
fiction can be considered indeterminate), some works of fiction contain indeterminacies 
which are central to the plot. Take, for example, Akira Kurosawa’s 1950 Rashomon. In this 
film, the murder of a samurai is recounted by four different witnesses in four different ways. 
None of the four stories are given weight over another, and each witness is motivated to tell 
the story in such a way that their own part in the murder is diminished. As a result, the 
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reader is unable to definitively state what the fictional truth of the story is. The reader must 
accept that there is no knowable answer. Yet despite this, readers of indeterminate fiction 
can derive enjoyment. I claim that this enjoyment can stem from a consequence of the 
fictional indeterminacy: close attention to the fiction.  
 Works of fiction which contain indeterminacies are often best when read closely. As 
readers, we expect answers—if they are not forthcoming, we search for them. Readers who 
are confused by impossible fictions like Maison search for a cure for their unease, just as 
readers of indeterminate fiction search for clues as to which of the potential interpretations 
is most appropriate. Searching for answers is, in both cases, performed by closely analysing 
the text. The reader looks for clues which may have otherwise passed her by, taking 
increased time and using increased concentration when reading the text. She may make 
more of an effort to vividly imagine the contents of the text, or she may deploy her critical 
faculties in a more directed manner—testing out whether a particular interpretation is 
consistent with the rest of the text, for example. This investigation has a side effect: the 
reader develops a closer engagement with the text. She dedicates her attention to it, giving 
her a deeper, richer experience. Provided that the text itself is high-quality enough to 
withstand this level of analysis, the reader may find that she enjoys it more by virtue of 
having paid it such close attention. She may notice turns of phrase, beautiful imagery or a 
pattern of themes which would otherwise have gone unnoticed. She therefore gains more 
pleasure as a result of the close engagement which the indeterminacy or impossibility 
forced her to undergo. This is one way in which frustration with a text may transform into 
enjoyment—a prolonged, more intense exposure to the text may result in a more nuanced, 
and hence more pleasurable experience.46 
Another reason why the reader may enjoy her defeat is found in work on epistemic 
inaccessibility. Guy Sircello, in his analysis of the sublime, discusses the notion of epistemic 
transcendence (1993: 542–543).  This refers to the reader’s realisation that she is unable 
to access the true nature of what is depicted, despite her drive to do so. In the case of the 
sublime, the reader has no epistemic access to the overwhelming power or majesty of the 
sublime phenomenon. Perhaps something similar could be said for absolute impossibilities: 
we are struck by their sheer oddity and our inability to comprehend their true nature. 
However, there is a more intuitive reason why the epistemic inaccessibility of impossible 
fiction can be aesthetically pleasing. Impossible fictions can toy not only with the fact that 
 
46 To be absolutely clear, this kind of enjoyment is only possible if the text itself is worth engaging 
with closely in the first place. Artistically poor works of fiction will not offer such a pleasant experience 
during close engagement. 
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the reader cannot epistemically access the content of the fiction, but also with the possibility 
that the reader recognises this inability. 
One effect that this can achieve is easily demonstrated: humour. Take Charles 
Addams’s cartoon ‘The Skier’ (illus. 4). The tracks left by the disappearing skier suggest a 
route passing straight through the tree, but the reader recognises that this cannot be what 
has happened. The cartoon is funny because the reader recognises that, no matter how 
she reasons, she will never be able to come up with a satisfying explanation of how the 
skier’s tracks skirt the tree. Arthur Danto agrees. In his analysis of the cartoon, he observes 
that the reader’s recognition of the cartoon’s impossibility is an essential aspect of her 
enjoyment of the cartoon (Danto 1989: 334).47 The cartoon is not funny if she does not 
realise that there is no explanation available to her. Instead, it is mystifying.  
 
Illus. 4: The Skier (Addams 1940) 
 
Frustration is compounded if the reader does not realise the futility of trying to access 
the fiction. A real-world example of this is also found in cartoons. Gary Larson’s The Far 
Side cartoon ‘Cow Tools’ generated perplexed fan mail when readers attempted to decipher 
 
47 While Danto thinks that Addams’s cartoon is impossible, he appears to mean the term in a weaker 
sense than I use in this thesis. A variety of circumstances would render the cartoon possible—that 
the tree or skier is a hologram, or that the skier is playing a trick on the other man. I do not consider 
Addams’s cartoon an impossible fiction, but rather a useful example of the kind of pleasure to which 
I refer. 
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its meaning. Larson had intended the cartoon as simply ridiculous—a cow proudly 
displaying a collection of random tools—but readers were convinced that they were missing 
the punchline (Larson 1992: 156–157). They were defeated in their attempts to grok ‘Cow 
Tools’, but they were not able to gain any pleasure from this defeat. This is because, unlike 
readers of ‘The Skier’, readers of ‘Cow Tools’ did not recognise that the cartoon was 
deliberately inaccessible. 
 This section has suggested two further ways in which the inability to grok a fiction 
may contribute to a pleasurable aesthetic experience rather than detracting from it. These 
suggestions are not exhaustive, and there are likely many reasons why impossible fictions 
are enjoyable despite their inaccessibility. However, these two are sufficient to demonstrate 
my original point: despite the technical knowledge needed to normalise Maison and fictions 
like it by the genetic and generic principles, there are still ways in which a typical reader can 
normalise the fiction. Recognising the functional role of impossible elements is perhaps the 
most significant way of doing so. Even if this is not done, the fiction’s inaccessibility can 
prompt the reader to read more carefully and thoroughly. In this case, though the reader 
does not normalise the impossible fiction, it is still possible for her to enjoy the craft of the 
author. 
 
4.9  Conclusion 
Maison can provide an aesthetically pleasurable experience, and part of what gives it this 
quality is its frequent use of impossibility. It uses impossibility to challenge the reader, 
demanding that she abandon traditional methods of interpretation in favour of embracing its 
unnatural ordering. It uses impossibility to mystify the reader, escaping the bounds of the 
murder mystery genre by forsaking the limitations of logical possibility. I have described in 
this section how the reader responds to the impossibilities that Maison includes. The list of 
positive influences that impossibility can have on aesthetic enjoyment that I present here 
may not be exhaustive. Individual readers may take pleasure from unexpected or unusual 
aspects of the impossible narrative. What I do claim to have definitively shown is that Eco’s 
notion of pleasure stemming from logical and perceptual defeat is feasible. Despite the 
potential to become frustrated, our inability to understand impossible fictions can be a 
source of pleasure rather than an obstacle to it.  
Eco’s writing on impossible fiction contains important arguments about aesthetic 
pleasure, though these require careful interpretation. The way in which I have interpreted 
Eco shows what happens when we are incapable of normalising a text. Unpacking Eco’s 
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argument gives us the following: if the reader recognises the strangeness of the text (which 
requires attention and sensitivity to inconsistencies), she is frustrated. This frustration lasts 
until she realises that she must engage with the text in a critical way rather than a naive 
way. This realisation alone can be cathartically pleasurable, but it also allows the reader to 
conduct a more suitable second-level reading of the fiction. I have also built upon Eco’s 
arguments by showing how the inaccessibility of impossible fiction may positively affect the 
reader’s experience in other ways: focussing their appreciation of the fiction’s craft, and 
humorously playing on the expectation that fiction should be accessible. 
This chapter has explained and demonstrated several reader responses to feeling 
unable to normalise an impossible fiction. It transpires that, even when it seems difficult to 
normalise a fiction, there may be a principle available with which to do so. Even if that 
principle is not followed, the inability to normalise a fiction does not imply that the experience 
of reading the fiction is unpleasant. The following chapter is concerned with another feasible 
response to challenging cases of impossible fiction—that of imaginatively alienating oneself 
from the text and ceasing to play the game of fiction-reading entirely. 
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5. Imaginative Engagement  
 
When I read a book, I put in all the imagination I can, so that it’s almost like writing the book 
as well as reading it—or rather, it is like living it. It makes reading so much more exciting, but 
I don’t suppose many people try to do it. 
- Dodie Smith, I Capture the Castle 
 
5.1  Introduction 
I have shown in Chapter 3 how readers can interpret impossible fictions as unreliable. I 
have shown in Chapter 4 how readers of impossible fiction obtain pleasure from reflecting 
on their own experience of impossible fiction. It still remains to be discussed how readers 
directly engage with impossible fiction. In this final chapter, I investigate how readers 
imagine and are imaginatively alienated from impossible fiction. In the process, I outline and 
weigh in on the debate over whether or not readers can imagine the content of impossible 
fiction. This debate causes a particular tension: proper engagement with fictions is usually 
seen as imaginative, but impossibilities are widely regarded as unimaginable. Given this, it 
is unclear how readers can successfully engage with impossible fiction. I resolve this 
tension by addressing each aspect. 
First, I show that impossible fiction is imaginable, which dissolves the tension by 
eliminating one of its premises. This requires a convincing case of imaginable impossible 
fiction. I investigate Gendler’s proposed case, ‘The Tower of Goldbach’, which she claims 
illustrates a logical impossibility which is nevertheless imaginable (Gendler 2000). While I 
am sceptical about Gendler’s arguments, I also discuss Stock’s recent claims about the 
imaginability of impossible fiction. I agree with Stock that there is a non-imagistic sense in 
which impossibilities can be imagined. 
Second, I show that even if impossibilities are unimaginable, readers can frequently 
engage with impossible fiction normally. This attacks the second premise of the tension-
causing argument. This requires explanation of why readers are able to engage with the 
fiction despite not imagining its content. I argue that impossibilities can be treated as 
hyperbolic modifiers to the rest of the fiction. This is backed up by Stock in her 2003 
discussion of Gendler and impossible fiction, and by Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s 
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suggestions as to how readers treat impossible propositions in fiction (Bourne and Caddick 
Bourne 2016; Stock 2003). 
The final step is to show that readers can engage with some impossible fictions in 
the same way that they engage with standard fictions. This dissolves the tension by showing 
how engagement with fiction is more flexible than philosophers often give it credit for. This 
requires systematic analysis of how the experience of engaging with impossible fiction can 
differ from that of engaging with possible fiction. I provide this by investigating the practice 
of indeterminate imagining. I show that certain impossible fictions—those which describe 
impossibilities in vague terms—can be and are indeterminately imagined in the same way 
as standard, possible fictions. 
These three points show there is no problem concerning imaginative engagement 
with impossible fiction. I agree with Gendler and Stock that notions of imaginative 
engagement are unnecessarily restrictive, and that we can imagine impossible fiction in 
some sense. I also agree that readers often successfully engage with impossible fiction as 
if it were possible, since readers frequently do not notice impossible elements in the fictions 
they read. It is empirically obvious that readers can engage with impossible fictions, but 
over the course of this chapter I show exactly how this can occur. 
 
5.2  Imaginability, possibility and fiction 
This section describes the tension in imaginative engagement with impossible fiction. I 
establish the wide philosophical consensus that proper engagement with fiction requires the 
reader to use her imagination. I also show that there is a popular notion that absolute 
impossibilities cannot be imagined. Given these two notions, there is a problem for 
impossible fiction: its impossible content prevents the reader from imagining it, and hence 
prevents her from properly engaging with it. First, however, I take a moment to explain 
exactly what I mean by the phrase ‘imaginative engagement’. 
 Imaginative engagement with fiction is closely related to the idea of narrative 
engagement. Narrative engagement, Shen-yi Liao helpfully articulates, is ‘the mental project 
we undertake when we recruit imagination for the sake of gaining aesthetic pleasure from 
imaginative prompts such as fictional narrative (2016: 465).’ The imagining we do during 
this project, Liao clarifies, has a normative component which is provided by the fictional 
narrative itself (2016: 466). He summarises: ‘during narrative engagement, one aims one’s 
imaginings at fictionality (Liao 2016: 466, Liao's italics).’ Imaginative engagement may be 
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thought of in similar terms. I see it the use of one’s imagination to explore the content of a 
fictional narrative. The normative standards for these imaginings are set by that content.  
Generally, philosophers see this kind of imaginative activity as essential to the 
minimally appropriate reading of fiction (and indeed for a proposition to count as fictional to 
begin with).48 When reading an excerpt from a fiction in the form of a proposition p, the 
appropriate response is usually considered to be imagining p, and doing so is typically 
regarded as necessary for successful narrative engagement (Stock 2013: 887). How exactly 
imagining p constitutes narrative engagement is less widely agreed upon. It may be due to 
a Gricean relation where an author intends for a reader to imagine the propositions 
contained in the fiction, as is notably the case for Currie (Currie 1990). It may be that 
imagining as prompted is by itself sufficient for narrative engagement, as Liao argues, 
provided that this is done in order to derive enjoyment (2016: 462). It may instead be the 
case that appropriate engagement with fiction takes the form of a game of make-believe, 
as is Walton’s approach (Walton,1990). Even in the most prominent case of a philosopher 
challenging the link between fiction and imagination, in Matravers’s Fiction and Narrative, 
the imagination is still an essential component in engaging with fictional narratives (it is 
simply not the defining component) (2014: 57). There is a consensus in philosophy of fiction 
that the imagination is a major or even constitutive factor in how we successfully engage 
with narratives. 
There is also a tradition, if not a consensus, in Western philosophy which states that 
the conceivable is possible (and, by implication, that one cannot conceive of something 
absolutely impossible). This has been used to draw conclusions about the separability of, 
for example, cause and effect, mind and body, and knowledge and true belief (Chalmers 
2002). If the impossible is not conceivable, it may also be the case that it is not imaginable. 
While conceiving of p and imagining p are different activities, it is not a stretch to claim that 
the two are related. Yablo and Chalmers define the act of conceiving in terms of the 
imagination, and Yablo suggests a strong link between imaginability and possibility 
(Chalmers 2002; Yablo 1993). Gendler & Hawthorne distinguish between the two as 
sensory and/or imagistic (in the case of imagining) and non-imagistic (in the case of 
conceiving), but they are agnostic about whether this difference means that one can 
imagine something absolutely impossible (2002: 9). These discussions have a major 
ramification for impossible fiction: if the absolutely impossible cannot be imagined, then 
 
48 See, among many others, Feagin (1988), Currie (1990) and Stock (2013; 2017). Matravers offers 
a helpful overview of the links drawn between fiction and imagination (as well as challenging the 
explanatory power of this link) in the second chapter of his Fiction and Narrative (2014).  
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readers cannot imagine the content of impossible fiction. If readers cannot imagine the 
content of impossible fiction, then they cannot engage with impossible fictions in the way 
readers normally engage with fiction. 
Given this issue, it is worth investigating the argument that the impossible is 
unimaginable more thoroughly. The position is best shown by Yablo, who claims that to 
imagine p is to entertain the appearance that p could obtain. To conceive of p is to imagine 
a world where p is verified, and it is by doing so that Yablo thinks the possibility of p is made 
apparent to us (1993: 30). This means that absolute impossibilities are not imaginable, as 
there is no world to be imagined where they are verified. Yablo writes that: 
Tigers with round-square striping are not imaginable; neither can we imagine tigers that lick 
all and only tigers that do not lick themselves, or tigers with more salt in their stomachs than 
sodium chloride, or indeed any tigers that do not strike us as capable of existing (1993: 30). 
By claiming these logically impossible objects are not imaginable, Yablo inadvertently lays 
down a major challenge to impossible fiction. His position creates a tension between the 
unimaginability of impossible fictional content and the requirement that the reader imagine 
that content as part of standard narrative engagement. If impossible fictions cannot be 
imagined, then readers cannot engage with them appropriately. 
Even if Yablo is not correct, his claims show that I cannot simply assume that 
impossible fiction is imaginable. There is a live possibility of tension between the 
unimaginability of impossible fiction and the fact that imagining the content of fiction is a 
major aspect of engaging with that fiction. I offer three responses in order to dissolve this 
tension. These are as follows: first, reject Yablo’s claim and argue that absolute 
impossibilities can be imagined; second, reject the claim that imagination is an essential 
aspect of standard narrative engagement; third, give an example of how readers engage 
with impossible fiction in the same way as they do a standard fiction. Each section remaining 
in this chapter addresses one of these responses. I address the first in the following section. 
 
5.3  Imagining absolute impossibilities 
This section investigates objections to the idea that readers cannot imagine fictional 
impossibilities. First, I look to the work of Gendler on imagining conceptually impossible 
fictions. I am unsatisfied with Gendler’s argument. Instead, I return to Stock’s notion of F-
imagining, first mentioned in Chapter 2, to show that the notion ‘the impossible is 
unimaginable’ is poorly formed. The act of imagining has more permutations than Yablo 
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gives it credit for, and there are several different ways in which the imagination can be 
employed. One of these ways, propositional imagining, is a convincing way of imagining 
impossible fiction. 
Gendler discusses impossibilities in fiction, and ultimately claims that these 
impossibilities are imaginable (explained further in Appendix A, pp. 155–156). She uses an 
example to show that this is the case. This is a short story which contains a logical 
impossibility: ‘The Tower of Goldbach’. It describes an unusual punishment from God after 
a conclave of mathematicians prove Goldbach’s Conjecture: the number twelve ceases to 
be the sum of two primes. God promises that he will lift this punishment if the 
mathematicians can find twelve righteous souls. However, the conclave can only find five 
and seven rational souls—two prime numbers which no longer total twelve. Solomon must 
decide how to proceed after God comes close to relenting. Solomon’s ultimate verdict is 
logically impossible: 
So with great fanfare, the celebrated judge announced his resolution of the dispute: From that 
day on, twelve both was and was not the sum of five and seven. And the heavens were glad, 
and the mountains rang with joy. And the voices of five and seven righteous souls rose towards 
heaven, a chorus twelve and not-twelve, singing in harmonious unity the praises of the Lord. 
The end (Gendler 2000: 67).  
This is a contradiction just as clear as the titular box of ‘Sylvan’s Box’. Twelve both is and 
is not the sum of five and seven, making this a logically impossible story. According to Yablo, 
one cannot imagine the proposition q: ‘twelve is and is not the sum of five and seven.’ 
However, according to Gendler, one can. She argues that it is imaginable because the story 
has directed our attention towards particular aspects of q at different times (Gendler 2000: 
67). We are prompted to consider twelve as ‘the number of righteous souls needed’. By 
imagining this property of the number twelve, we pay less attention to its property ‘is the 
sum of five and seven’. As a result, we are able to imagine that the conclave has not found 
the right number of righteous souls even though we also imagine that they have found 
twelve souls. Accordingly, Gendler thinks that the logical impossibility in ‘The Tower of 
Goldbach’ does not prevent us from imagining the story. She generalises this point: readers 
can imagine impossible fictions, provided that the impossibilities they contain are sufficiently 
disguised (2000: 69). Impossibilities can be disguised by deft narrative which keeps the 
reader’s attention on specific aspects of the impossible content, preventing them from 
attempting to imagine it in full. 
 I agree with Gendler that certain fictions do disguise their impossible elements. 
Fictions which feature inconsistent depictions of time travel regularly disguise their 
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impossible elements, whether by design or by accident. Ray Bradbury’s ‘A Sound of 
Thunder’ is one such fiction. A botched time-travelling hunting trip results in several major 
changes to the characters’ present—a temporal paradox which the short story sweeps 
under the rug (Bradbury 2005). By focusing on the consequences of changing the past, 
rather than the fact that human history has shifted without the time travellers undergoing 
any changes, Bradbury’s story enables readers to imagine a logically impossible scenario. 
The same goes for Back to the Future, Timecop 2 and a host of other fictions which depict 
paradoxical time travel. The fact that flashy consequences are emphasised over 
paradoxical implications prevents readers from being distracted by the logical impossibilities 
they are presented with.  
 My problem with Gendler’s approach is that it does not seem to demonstrate a 
reader imagining an absolute impossibility. Rather, it demonstrates a reader imagining part 
of an absolute impossibility. On its own, this part may not be impossible—the two sides of 
an inconsistent conjunction are, individually, unproblematic. It is only their conjunction which 
makes them inconsistent. In the case of ‘The Tower of Goldbach’, I am suspicious that, on 
Gendler’s assessment, the reader is not really imagining the conceptual impossibility which 
lies at the heart of the story. The reader is merely imagining one unproblematic 
circumstance (that the conclave has found five and seven righteous souls), and then later 
imagining a different unproblematic circumstance (that twelve is the sum of five and seven). 
I am not convinced that this equates to imagining a single impossible circumstance. It would 
be similar to reading ‘Sylvan’s Box’ and imagining first an empty box, and then a box with 
something in it. I think Gendler is right that different aspects of a fictional situation can be 
accentuated, pushing other aspects into the background. However, I do not see why the 
end result of this accentuation is the reader imagining an impossible proposition. Under 
Gendler’s account the reader only ever imagines part of an impossible proposition, and 
never a full impossible proposition.49 
 I am not the only person who is unconvinced by Gendler’s analysis. Stock provides 
an in-depth analysis of the imaginability of impossible fiction. Stock argues for two slightly 
different positions on two different occasions. The first, laid out in Stock’s 2003 ‘The tower 
of Goldbach and other impossible tales’, claims that impossible fictions are not imaginable 
in the way Gendler describes. The second, provided in Stock’s 2017 book Only Imagine, 
argues that there is a sense in which impossible fictions can be imagined. To avoid 
 
49 As I discuss in §5.5 of this chapter, I still consider Gendler to have described a reader imaginatively 
engaging with an impossible fiction. However, this is not the same thing as imagining an absolute 
impossibility. 
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confusion between these two positions, I refer to the earlier and later Stock respectively. 
The relevant argument with respect to Gendler is from the earlier Stock.  
The earlier Stock’s argument is in response to Gendler’s claim that focused attention 
allows us to imagine conceptual impossibilities. Stock has several broad issues with 
Gendler’s account of imagining, arguing that it is incompatible with most accepted theories 
of concepts and therefore an unrealistic depiction of how people imagine (Stock 2003: 109–
113). However, Stock further claims that we are worse judges of our own imagination than 
we might think. When a reader considers herself to be imagining an absolute impossibility 
(such as that twelve both is and is not the sum of five and seven), she may in fact be 
imagining something consistent with a different, possible state of affairs (Stock 2003: 119–
120). When imagining ‘The Tower of Goldbach’, Stock suggests that a reader may in fact 
be imagining that Solomon has declared twelve to be both the sum and not the sum of five 
and seven, or that the majority of people believe it to be the case that twelve both is and is 
not the sum of five and seven (2003: 119). These alternate imaginings serve as defeaters 
for the notion that we are imagining something absolutely impossible when reading 
impossible fiction. There is not sufficient reason to believe that the reader imagines the 
absolute impossibility rather than the consistent defeater. 
I consider Stock’s arguments a major problem for Gendler. In particular, I agree with 
Stock’s assertion that it is incredibly difficult to imagine something in a way which 
deliberately excludes certain features (Stock 2003: 109). Doing so would be like imagining 
an elephant, but deliberately avoiding imagining the elephant’s ears. We cannot simply 
choose to create an injunction against imagining certain aspects of something. This does 
not prohibit the idea that a reader can imagine ‘The Tower of Goldbach’ in the way Gendler 
describes, only the idea that the reader can do so deliberately. Therefore, even if it a reader 
is able to imagine something logically impossible in the style that Gendler describes, doing 
so consciously will be extremely difficult.  
This difficulty would not be such an issue if absolute impossibilities frequently flew 
beneath the reader’s radar, but Stock does not consider this to be the case. She claims that 
readers are ‘unlikely to remain ignorant’ of anything which ‘counts to [the reader] as a 
conceptual impossibility’ in a fiction (Stock 2003: 108). If readers are usually alert to 
contradictory propositions when they occur, and were disposed to selectively imagine these 
impossible events as Gendler describes, then reading impossible fiction would be extremely 
laborious. This is further reason for Stock to reject Gendler’s claim that readers can imagine 
the content of impossible fiction. 
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In practice, I consider Stock wrong to claim the norm is that the reader notices 
contradictions when they arise. The examples above, ‘A Sound of Thunder’ and Back to the 
Future, are representative impossible fictions where the typical reader is unaware of any 
contradictions. Unless the impossible elements are explicit or otherwise obvious, most 
escape the reader’s notice. Stock may, however, consider her ‘counts to me as’ clause to 
account for these cases. If the reader does not recognise the absolute impossibilities in 
these fictions, then they do not count to the reader as impossibilities to begin with. For 
something to count to the reader as an absolute impossibility, that reader must recognise 
the impossibility in the first place. If this is the case, then Stock has provided an account of 
why impossible fictions cannot be imagined if recognised, and why they seem to be 
imaginable if the reader does not notice any impossibilities. 
 As a result of this debate, I am unconvinced by Gendler’s claim that the impossible 
is imaginable. Not only am I sceptical that what Gendler describes can be considered 
imagining an impossibility, the early Stock’s counterarguments are convincing. If there is a 
way of dissolving the tension between the unimaginability of impossible fiction and the role 
of imagination in standard engagement, I have not found it by analysing Gendler’s 
arguments. However, there is another approach to demonstrating that absolute 
impossibilities are imaginable. This is the approach adopted by the later Stock: F-imagining. 
 F-imagining, discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 52–53) is Stock’s term for the manner in 
which readers imaginatively respond to works of fiction. F-imagining is the minimal level of 
imagination required for successful engagement, and it is built heavily into Stock’s 
intentionalist account of fictional truth (Stock 2017: 20). I will not address the relationship 
between F-imagining and fictional truth here. However, F-imagining is relevant to the 
discussion of imagining impossible fictions, as the later Stock argues that readers can F-
imagine absolute impossibilities. I finish this section by re-establishing what F-imagining is, 
and why it leads Stock to partially recant her earlier position against the imaginability of 
absolute impossibilities. 
 F-imagining takes only propositions as its content (Stock 2017: 21). Stock contrasts 
this with objectual imagining—the having of mental images or sensory imaginings. She also 
contrasts F-imagining with counterfactual imagining: imagining how situations would 
proceed if they were true (2017: 124). To F-imagine a proposition p, it is necessary to think 
that p, where ‘think that’ is not synonymous with belief or desire. This is not to say that any 
non-belief and non-desire thought is an F-imagining—Stock distinguishes F-imagining from 
other mental activities such as accepting that p and considering that p (2017: 22). ‘Thinking 
that p’ is a broad church of different mental activities; one of them is F-imagining that p. 
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 Given the minimal requirements for F-imagining, the later Stock goes back on the 
comments made by the earlier Stock concerning the imaginability of impossible fiction. The 
later Stock argues that there is an important respect in which impossible fictions can be 
imagined: they can be F-imagined. In order to F-imagine an impossibility q, Stock claims, a 
reader propositionally imagines q and, additionally, propositionally imagines that there is 
some good explanation for why it is that q obtains (2017: 141). This explanation does not 
need to be detailed or convincing; the reader need only imagine that a good explanation is 
available. If these conditions are in place, Stock argues, then we can consider the reader 
to have F-imagined an impossibility. 
Stock suggests that ‘even when we are fairly certain of a fact, we can imagine that 
circumstances obtain such that we might also be wrong about it (2017: 141). This is why it 
is important to F-imagine that there is some good explanation of why q obtains in addition 
to F-imagining that q. Just as we can imagine discovering something which forced us to 
revise our beliefs about the world, we can imagine some fact obtaining which explains why 
it is that an absolute impossibility occurs. I am completely convinced that the sky is blue, 
but I can imagine that some fact could exist which causes me to change this belief. When I 
F-imagine that Sylvan’s box is both empty and full, a situation which I am convinced cannot 
occur, I also F-imagine that there is some explanation for why the box is like this. This is 
how readers can F-imagine the absolutely impossible despite having intuitive convictions 
that absolutely impossible things cannot exist.   
This is not the only reason that F-imagining an explanation for absolute 
impossibilities is helpful. By including this feature of F-imagining the impossible, Stock pre-
empts criticism like that of Amy Kind. Kind, in her review of Only Imagine, suggests that 
more is required than merely ‘processing a sentence’ in order to consider that sentence to 
have been imagined (2019: 607). By establishing that F-imagining an impossibility requires 
F-imagining that some explanation for that impossibility is available, Stock offers a richer 
account of F-imagining the impossible than mere language-processing. This fits with Stock’s 
response to Kind, which highlights how ‘reading and processing’ does not exhaust the 
nature of F-imagination (Stock 2019: 224). 
The important aspect of Stock’s argument for this chapter is the claim that we can, 
to an extent, imagine absolute impossibilities. The standard rejections of this ability are, 
Stock suggests, based in misunderstandings concerning the imaginative project which the 
reader should undertake (2017: 143). The reader may attempt, fruitlessly, to 
counterfactually or objectually imagine q. With no set of circumstances available which 
corresponds to q, this kind of imagining cannot be performed. However, the reader can still 
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F-imagine q, and F-imagining q is the minimal level of appropriate imaginative engagement 
with the impossible fiction. In other words, readers can imagine impossible fiction to the 
same minimal standard as possible fiction. It is only when readers attempt to objectually or 
counterfactually imagine impossible fiction (and this attempt is supererogatory to 
appropriate imaginative engagement) that they find themselves unable to do so. Given that 
readers often do attempt to objectually or counterfactually imagine the fictions they read, it 
is unsurprising that the popular opinion of impossible fiction is that it is unimaginable. 
Settling the question of whether the impossible is imaginable is a weighty topic in its 
own right, and I do not attempt a definitive answer here. However, what I take Stock to 
successfully show is that there is some sense in which one can imagine an absolute 
impossibility: F-imagining. This sense may be too weak for Yablo and others like him, but it 
is a toe in the door for impossible fiction. I am also inclined to agree with Stock that F-
imagining satisfies minimal imaginative engagement with fiction. Imaginative responses to 
fiction are often sparse; requiring a phenomenally rich imaginative experience for every 
reader of every fiction is unrealistically demanding. Stock admits that readers frequently do 
see fictions as something to be phenomenally imagined (else there would be no 
misunderstanding about the way readers are supposed to imagine impossible fictions) 
(2017: 143). However, this indicates that the experience of reading impossible fiction may 
be jarring and unsettling, not completely devoid of imaginative engagement. 
With this in mind, I am satisfied that the tension between the apparent 
unimaginability of impossible fiction and the imaginative nature of narrative engagement is 
partially dissolved. Imagining impossible fiction may differ from typical imaginative 
engagement with fiction, but not from minimal imaginative engagement. With this 
established, the next section addresses the second aspect of the tension—whether 
imagining the impossible content of a fiction is required for successful narrative 
engagement. 
 
5.4  Engaging without imagining 
This section argues that readers can narratively engage with impossible fictions even if they 
do not imagine impossible fictional content. This is because the impossible content of some 
fictions is accepted as part of the story, but not seen as something which it is necessary to 
imagine. The earlier Stock hints at this in her discussion of impossible fiction (2003). A more 
explicit analysis is offered by Bourne and Caddick Bourne (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 
2016). I relate these approaches to Yacobi’s functional principle from Chapter 3. I claim that 
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imaginative engagement with fiction is not an all-or-nothing game, and these approaches 
demonstrate that readers can successfully engage with impossible fiction even if they do 
not imagine its every feature. 
 A fresh example is needed in order to illustrate these points. It is easiest to do so 
with a fiction which clearly and unambiguously states an absolute impossibility. Very few 
fictions plainly state something impossible. Most impossible fictions are more subtle in their 
delivery of absolute impossibilities. Some rare fictions do, however, commit directly to 
establishing absolute impossibilities as something to be imagined as part of the story. The 
following extract is from H.P. Lovecraft’s short story ‘The Call of Cthulhu’: 
The Thing cannot be described—there is no language for such abysms of shrieking and 
immemorial lunacy, such eldritch contradictions of all matter, force and cosmic order. A 
mountain walked or stumbled. God! What wonder that across the earth a great architect went 
mad, and poor Wilcox raved with fever in that telepathic instant?.. Parker slipped… and 
Johansen swears he was swallowed up by an angle of masonry which shouldn’t have been 
there; an angle which was acute, but behaved as if it were obtuse. So only Briden and 
Johansen reached the boat… Slowly, amidst the distorted horrors of that indescribable scene, 
she began to churn the lethal waters; whilst on the masonry of that charnel shore that was not 
of earth the titan Thing from the stars slavered and gibbered like Polypheme cursing the fleeing 
ship of Odysseus (Lovecraft 2019: 46). 
There are at least two absolute impossibilities described in this scene—one definite, one 
suggested. The description of ‘eldritch contradictions of all matter, force and cosmic order’ 
is a definite impossibility. This is a vague description, but if it is taken at all seriously then it 
inarguably represents an absolute impossibility. The line ‘Johansen swears he [Parker] was 
swallowed up by an angle of masonry which shouldn’t have been there; an angle which was 
acute, but behaved as if it were obtuse’ is the second, suggested impossibility. This fictional 
object, the masonry, has a contradictory property: it is acute, but acts obtuse. This is a 
fictional report, and hence particularly susceptible to normalisation via the perspectival 
principle (i.e., the impression that an impossibility has been reported, but has not fictionally 
occurred). However, given the typical content and themes of Lovecraft’s work, considering 
this line to represent an impossibility is also a valid interpretation. While both lines are fairly 
blatantly impossible, the former is less ambiguous. It makes a better example with which to 
investigate the responses to impossible fictions which Stock and Bourne and Caddick 
Bourne describe. 
The earlier Stock argues that, unlike typical propositions in fictions, unambiguous 
impossibilities are not invitations to imagine something. Instead she writes that, typically, ‘in 
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this sort of case the author is playfully drawing the reader’s attention to the unimaginability 
of such propositions, rather than seriously asking her to entertain them (2003: 121).’ There 
is no serious pressure on the reader to imagine something logically impossible, according 
to the earlier Stock. Rather, the intention is that the reader will recognise the unimaginability 
of the proposition.  
 Bourne and Caddick Bourne make a similar claim about the value of an impossible 
proposition in a work of fiction. While the earlier Stock is agnostic about whether logical 
impossibilities can be fictionally true, Bourne and Caddick Bourne are absolutely certain 
that they cannot (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016: 107; Stock 2003: 89–90).50 However, 
Bourne and Caddick Bourne do think that impossible features can play an important role in 
the reader’s appreciation of the story, and use Dahl’s Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator 
to demonstrate this: 
On our view, [Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator] is funny not because it does represent an 
impossible world, but because we recognize that it does not represent any one possible world. 
We say that it is the attempt to do something impossible—namely, represent a fictional world 
using that description—which is amusing… Part of the amusement is in considering how 
somebody could fall into the trap of attempting to represent a world in which Charlie’s 
grandmother becomes minus two years old… part of what is amusing... is that it arises through 
a misapplication of perfectly sensible reasoning (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016: 90). 
This approach is similar to Stock’s: Bourne and Caddick Bourne claim that the reader does 
not attempt to imagine the impossible proposition. However, the reader recognises the 
impossibility of the proposition, and its impossibility makes a contribution to the aesthetic 
properties of the fiction. In this case, Bourne and Caddick Bourne claim that it is funny. The 
appropriate response to the straight-faced ridiculousness of Dahl’s assertion that Grandma 
Georgina is aged minus two is laughter. The effect of the hyperbole in Charlie and the Great 
Glass Elevator is a sense of absurdity.  
Unlike Stock, Bourne and Caddick Bourne do not clarify whether readers can or are 
supposed to imagine this impossibility. Their account of truth to a story is that certain 
impossible propositions should form part of the reader’s impressions even if they are not 
fictionally true (see p. 46-47). This seems to indicate that the reader should be attempting 
to imagine that Georgina is minus two, since this is the impression we gain from the fiction 
(Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016: 196). This also suggests that Bourne and Caddick 
 
50 The later Stock is in favour of impossible fictional truths, since authors can reasonably intend 
readers to propositionally image absolute impossibilities (2017: 142–143). 
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Bourne consider it true to the story that Grandma Georgina is minus two, even if Dahl has 
not made this fictionally true. Bourne and Caddick Bourne focus on the attempt to make an 
absolute impossibility fictionally true rather than on the reader’s attempt to imagine this 
impossibility. Whether or not the minus-two-year-old Grandma Georgina is imaginable, she 
contributes to the comedy of Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator. She does so because 
readers recognise that the situation is too extreme to ever take place—the description is an 
over-exaggeration rather than an attempt to make something fictionally true. Despite the 
theoretical differences between Stock and Bourne and Caddick Bourne, then, it neither 
consider these blatant impossibilities to be something the reader actually imagines.  
This is why I refer to this aesthetic effect as hyperbole. The proposition is too 
outlandish to be imagined, and instead should be interpreted as emphasising something 
else. In the case of Lovecraft, the hyperbolic reading of the impossible proposition is 
intended to communicate the eldritch horror of Cthulhu (the monstrous Thing which 
Lovecraft describes) rather than provide any serious grist to the reader’s imagination. 
Rather than attempting to imagine eldritch contradictions of matter, the reader recognises 
the unimaginability of the proposition and does not attempt to imagine it as part of the fiction. 
 The use of impossible propositions as hyperbole is found in many other fictions. 
Douglas Adams’s Hitchhiker series uses it for comedic effect, perhaps most notably in The 
Restaurant at the End of the Universe, where a bubble keeps a restaurant permanently 
suspended at the end of time. ‘If you’ve done six impossible things this morning,’ the 
restaurant’s slogan runs, ‘why not round it off with breakfast at Milliways (Adams 2017: 
196)?’ Danielewski’s House of Leaves, on the other hand, builds a creeping sense of 
uncanny horror with its descriptions of a geometrically impossible house. In Robert A. 
Heinlein’s “‘—And He Built a Crooked House—”’, four-dimensional geometry is impossibly 
rendered in three dimensions when an architect accidentally builds a house in the shape of 
a tesseract. As a result, Carl Sagan labelled the short story ‘for many readers, the first 
introduction to four-dimensional geometry that held any promise of comprehensibility 
(Sagan 1978).’  In all of these cases, impossibilities accentuate the story. A particular theme, 
emotion or lesson is highlighted with the use of an obvious impossibility. In this way, 
impossible fiction can prioritise emphasis of a theme over imaginability of the story.  
 Hyperbole must be differentiated from a similar technique whereby impossible 
elements of a story are not imagined. This is the technique by which non-sequiturs are not 
considered to actually occur as part of the story. I have already mentioned how contra-
genre moments in fiction can prompt this reaction using Murdoch’s The Sea, The Sea (p. 
89). The instance of Charles spotting a sea monster is so out of tune with the rest of the 
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novel that it is naturally read as allegorical rather than a literal sighting (Murdoch 1999: 20). 
Even in introspective, psychological works like Herman Hesse’s Steppenwolf, readers tend 
to naturally categorise particular parts of the story as allegorical rather than literal 
occurrences. In Steppenwolf’s dreamlike denouement, Mozart enters the room to chastise 
protagonist Harry for behaving too seriously (Hesse 2011: 245). I doubt many readers form 
the impression that Mozart is really present in the story; they are able to naturally interpret 
his inclusion as symbolic rather than literal. This is the key difference between these 
allegorical non-sequiturs and true hyperbole. When a reader interprets part of a fiction as 
an allegorical non-sequitur, she forms the impression that the events do not really occur in 
the fiction. The reader of hyperbole, on the other hand, does form the impression that the 
event occurs. However, rather than attempting to imaginatively engage with this event, she 
reads it as a hyper-exaggeration of the fiction’s themes, emotions or lessons.  
 This approach is, in the terms I describe in Chapter 3, an adoption of the functional 
principle of normalisation. The functional principle demands that, in order that they are made 
to seem in tune with the rest of the fiction, the reader interprets deviant elements as in some 
way crucial to the tone, theme or realisation of the fiction. This is precisely what happens 
when impossibilities are treated as hyperbole. The exaggeratedly outlandish description of 
the Thing in ‘The Call of Cthulhu’ plays the function of establishing the otherworldliness of 
the monster. The portrayal of Grandma Georgina as minus two plays the function of adding 
to the humour of Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator. These impossibilities can fulfil their 
functions even if the reader does not imagine them. By drawing on the functional principle, 
then, readers can engage with an impossible fiction without imagining its impossible 
elements.  
 This further dissolves the tension I have been discussing. It challenges the idea that 
failure to imagine elements of a fiction entails failure to appropriately engage with that fiction. 
Even if absolute impossibilities cannot be imagined at all, readers can still engage with 
impossible fictions. The functional principle cannot necessarily be deployed in every 
instance, but nevertheless shows that readers are not prevented from engaging with a 
fiction simply because they do not imagine its impossible elements. This further shows that 
narrative engagement is more flexible than it may have originally appeared. 
 
5.5  Indeterminate imagining 
The previous section showed how readers can selectively avoid imagining the impossible 
elements of fiction without any adverse effect on their level of engagement. This section 
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discusses how and in what sense readers do imagine these impossible elements. In this 
section, I discuss what Stock calls ‘objectual’ imagining: the forming of mental images and 
other sensory imaginings. I argue that certain impossible fictions are imagined in the same 
way as possible fictions, whether or not absolute impossibilities themselves are taken to be 
imaginable. This claim is based on the notion that, typically, readers imagine the content of 
fiction in an indeterminate way. That is to say, readers imagine that there are determinate 
features of a fiction without necessarily imagining what these features are like. I investigate 
work on indeterminate imagining in order to show this. I argue that indeterminate imagining 
operates within certain parameters which are set by the fiction. In some cases of impossible 
fiction, readers can use this method to avoid having to imagine absolute impossibilities in 
detail. In other cases, ones where the nature of the impossibility is made explicit, readers 
recognise that no determinate feature fits within these parameters. Due to this, readers can 
imagine some impossible fictions in the same way they imagine possible fictions, while other 
impossible fictions resist this approach.  
 One characteristic of fictions is their logical incompleteness. There is no fiction for 
which we can definitively say for any proposition that, within the fiction, it is true or false. 
Lewis establishes in his ‘Truth in Fiction’ that there are many incomplete aspects to any 
fiction, be it unestablished personal details about the characters (is Carmela Soprano a 
good rugby player?) or features of the surrounding world (how many sisters, cousins and 
aunts surround Sir Joseph Porter in H.M.S. Pinafore?) (1983c: 261–262). However, readers 
imagine that there is an answer to these questions even if they believe there is not. They 
imagine that Carmela Soprano either is or is not good at rugby. They also imagine that 
some number of family members surrounds Sir Joseph, even if nobody can definitively say 
how many. Perhaps a similar approach can be taken with Lovecraft’s impossible monster, 
or Grandma Georgina’s impossible age. We know that the monster is indescribable, but 
that does not put pressure on the reader to imagine exactly how it looks or how it behaves. 
We know that Grandma Georgina is minus two, but we need not imagine what this means 
or how it comes about too closely. When engaging with a story, readers may imagine these 
things in a similar way to Sir Joseph’s relatives: imagining that there is a specific answer 
without actually imagining what that answer is.  
 The notion of indeterminate imagining is well-discussed in the philosophy of mind. 
In order to show that sometimes we imagine objects in an indeterminate manner, Daniel 
Dennett uses the image of a striped tiger while Colin McGinn uses a speckled hen (Dennett 
1969: 136-137; McGinn 2006: 25). I consider the issue best summarised by Yablo. His 
discussion is applied to the general principle of imagining, rather than specifically to 
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imagining fiction. Yablo establishes that we are capable of imagining objects and situations 
without being particularly precise and exact. He describes imagining a tiger: 
When I imagine a tiger I imagine it as possessed of some determinate striping—what else?—
but there need be no determinate striping such that I imagine my tiger as striped like that; the 
content of my imagining is satisfied by variously striped tigers, but not by tigers of no 
determinate striping (Yablo 1993: 27). 
Yablo’s point is that we imagine something which is determinate, but we do not 
determinately imagine something. We imagine a tiger with an indeterminate number of 
stripes, but we imagine that the tiger has a determinate number of stripes. Just the same 
goes for Sir Joseph’s family members. We imagine that there is a determinate number of 
them surrounding him, but we do not need to imagine a particular number. This is 
indeterminate imagining. 
This type of imagining has limits and parameters, even if it is indeterminate. We may 
decide that the tiger’s stripes are definitely black. This adds a determinate detail to our 
indeterminate imagining. We may think that eight family members is certainly too few, but 
eighty is too many. The way we imagine the chorus of relatives is indeterminate within these 
fixed parameters. These parameters are set by the available information about the object 
of indeterminate imagination. There is a chorus of relatives surrounding Sir Joseph, and 
somewhere between eight and eighty members is an appropriate size for a chorus. The 
tiger must be striped, and presumably striped in a way fairly typical for tigers. These details 
establish general parameters within which we indeterminately imagine. In this way, readers 
can imagine the content of fiction as determinate without actually determinately imagining 
every specific detail. Instead, she determinately imagines certain details and 
indeterminately imagines others. 
 What a reader determinately imagines is set, in part, by her impressions of the fiction 
she reads. If the fiction gives her the impression of a tiger, she will determinately imagine 
that there is a tiger present and indeterminately imagine several details about that tiger 
(e.g., the number, size and shape of its stripes, how long the tiger’s whiskers are, how old 
the tiger is, and so on). Predominantly, this determinate information is provided by the fiction 
itself. However, there may be other determinate features of our imaginings that are not 
based on the explicit word of the fiction. Our imaginings may have determinate details based 
on our own whims.  For example, it would be unusual to imagine Sir Joseph with any other 
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number of ears than two, despite the script of H.M.S. Pinafore omitting this detail.51 A reader 
may imaginatively embellish on the fiction, and can choose to imagine that Holmes has a 
chipped tooth, or that Heathcliff resembles a friend, or that a background house is owned 
by a baker. Provided that these additional pieces of information do not disrupt the narrative 
(i.e., that all the appropriate determinate features are imagined as the fiction demands), 
readers are free to imaginatively embellish scenes to their own satisfaction. My list of 
determinate imaginings about Nancy Drew may include her age and the details of her 
current case (as set by the fiction itself) but also her favourite food and her eye colour (as 
added according to my own whim).52 The list of indeterminate imaginings I have about 
Nancy Drew include the length of her hair, whether or not she enjoys the Andrews Sisters, 
and many other details. In this way, readers can determinately imagine specific details, 
while other details are imagined to be determinate but are indeterminately imagined. 
 The fact that readers can objectually imagine fictions without including determinate 
detail gives some hope to the notion that we can objectually imagine impossible fictions.53 
If we need not imagine a scene in exact detail, perhaps we can omit the precise details of 
the impossible elements. This approach works in some cases, but not in others. It works in 
cases where the description is vague enough that the reader can imagine the impossible 
element while including very little determinate detail. Take the extract from Lovecraft above 
(p. 138), specifically the line ‘the distorted horrors of that indescribable scene.’ The reader 
is given a lot of leeway for imagining this, as very few details are specified either in this 
sentence or in preceding sentences of the scene. The parameters within which the reader 
indeterminately imagines the scene are extremely wide. The reader is therefore able to 
imagine that the scene is indescribable without committing to a particular vision of how the 
scene unfolds. The reader may still imagine some details determinately—perhaps a rocky 
island, an enormous portal, or even the popular depiction of Cthulhu as a tentacled, 
humanoid dragon. What is important is that the reader can imagine that the scene is 
impossible without imagining in full detail precisely how that impossibility manifests. 
 
51 Perhaps this is accounted for by something similar to Walton’s Reality Principle (Walton 1990). 
Readers tend to imagine what they would see if the fiction were actualised.  
52 I think that readers can distinguish between what they imagine and what is true to the story. I 
cannot help but imagine Horza from Iain M. Banks’s Consider Phlebas as Nish Kumar, but do not for 
a moment think that it is true to the story (or indeed fictionally true) in Consider Phlebas that Horza 
resembles Kumar. My impression here is inappropriate, but not in a way which damages my 
understanding of Consider Phlebas. 
53 This is not to suggest that indeterminate detail in fiction is linked to absolute impossibilities. All 
fictions are logically incomplete, and therefore contain indeterminate details to some extent. 
Furthermore, it is not obvious that there are no actual indeterminacies (see Parsons 2000).  
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Similarly, the causal story we are given of Grandma Georgina’s negative age (that she 
overdoses on de-aging drug Wonkavite) need not be imagined in any greater detail than we 
imagine how genius Shuri builds gadgets in Black Panther. Readers tend to imaginatively 
gloss over detailed explanations and tedious or confusing details. If this behaviour is 
permissible for possible fiction, it should be permissible for impossible fiction as well. 
This implies that we can imagine impossible fictions like ‘The Call of Cthulhu’ without 
adopting any imaginative practice which we do not already do as a matter of course while 
reading fiction. Given that all fictions are incomplete, it is standard practice to imagine 
fictions indeterminately. It is a viable and appropriate response to ‘The Call of Cthulhu’ to 
imagine that the monster is impossible without considering exactly how, just as one can 
imagine that a tiger is striped without imagining precisely how it is striped. The difference 
between the two cases is that one image (the tiger) can be closely finessed while the other 
(the impossible monster) cannot. I suspect that this difference does not come into play 
during standard cases of imaginative engagement. Readers are never required to imagine 
fictions in any close and determinate detail. There is therefore no significant difference 
therefore between how a reader typically engages with Black Panther, and how that same 
reader typically engages with ‘The Call of Cthulhu’ or Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator.  
The difference (and difficulty) returns, however, when we consider fictions with much 
more specific impossibilities. ‘The Call of Cthulhu’ is vague, allowing the reader to 
indeterminately imagine the monster without ignoring any specific aspect of its description. 
‘Sylvan’s Box’, on the other hand, specifies that the titular box is empty and also has 
something in it. This level of detail leaves very little room for the reader to indeterminately 
imagine the box. The parameters set by the fiction are extremely narrow. Compare the box 
with the chorus from H.M.S. Pinafore. In the case of the chorus, there is some number 
between eight and eighty which describes how large the chorus is. The reader is not 
required to commit to one number, but she does realise that the chorus should be 
determinately large. In the case of ‘Sylvan’s Box’, the reader is not able to leave the status 
of the box indeterminate. The box is explicitly stated to be both empty and containing 
something. Imagining the box as empty falls outside the parameters, as does imagining the 
box to be containing something. These narrow parameters force the reader to confront the 
logical impossibility depicted in the narrative. While many impossible fictions, including ‘The 
Call of Cthulhu’, feature impossibilities which the reader can indeterminately imagine, 
certain others do not offer the reader this luxury. These others are all fictions which explicitly 
describe the manner in which their impossible content is impossible, such as ‘Sylvan’s Box’ 
and ‘The Tower of Goldbach’—fictions with clearly defined impossibilities. These fictions do 
not leave enough scope for the reader to imagine their impossibilities indeterminately. 
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Most fictions set wide imaginative parameters within which fall a range of different 
scenarios which would satisfy the description given in the fiction. With explicit, specific 
impossible fictions, suitably engaged readers should recognise that there are no scenarios 
which could satisfy the parameters set. The following demonstration of explicit impossibility 
is from an example used in Chapter 1: Gaiman’s The Ocean at the End of the Lane. Some 
kind of magical parasite is being drawn from the protagonist’s foot: 
I watched, amazed, as something that glistened—it seemed black, at first, then translucent, 
then reflective like mercury—was pulled out from the sole of my foot, on the end of the 
needle… I watched Old Mrs Hempstock reel the thing in, and I was still unable, somehow, to 
entirely make sense of what I was seeing. It was a hole with nothing around it, over two feet 
long, thinner than an earthworm, like the shed skin of a translucent snake (2013: 136). 
Gaiman’s description of the strange creature moves through several stages. Each one 
sequentially limits the parameters of how the reader can indeterminately imagine the object. 
At first, this is only restricted to its colour, which is apparently shifting (‘it seemed black, at 
first, then translucent, then reflective’), and its size (it must be pulled with a needle from a 
hole in the protagonist’s foot, which gives some parameters for its size). At this point the 
reader has fairly broad parameters—there are all sorts of things which would fit within the 
parameters, so she may easily imagine the creature indeterminately. This is the standard 
mode of narrative engagement. The difference comes when Gaiman describes what I take 
to be an absolute impossibility: the creature is ‘a hole with nothing around it.’ This 
immediately and significantly alters the parameters within which the reader can 
indeterminately imagine. This sudden change is not itself unusual; if Gaiman had described 
the creature as ‘rat-like’ then there would have been a similarly significant collapse in 
parameters. The unusual feature of this change is that there is now no object which fits into 
the parameters. A reader who understands the significance of ‘a hole with nothing around 
it’ will realise this. The reader can no longer indeterminately imagine the creature, since 
there is no range of appropriate, indeterminate imaginings available within the parameters. 
This means that the imaginative engagement the reader has with The Ocean at the End of 
the Lane is different to the imaginative engagement she has with a standard, possible 
fiction.54  
 
54 The description above only applies to engaged and attentive readers. Engaged readers will 
recognise the difference in how they can imagine standard, possible fictions as opposed to how they 
can imagine explicit impossible fictions. However, inattentive readers will not recognise this 
difference. This is not remarkable, since these readers are already failing to engage with the fiction 
in the appropriate manner. Their experience is not relevant to my portrayal of indeterminate 
imagining, as they are not imagining in the way the fiction prescribes in the first place. 
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The reader’s inability to objectually imagine the absolutely impossible does not 
mean that she imagines nothing. Exactly what she does imagine while reading The Ocean 
at the End of the Lane, though, is heavily dependent on the reader herself. I myself 
selectively ignore the impossible features, and imagine something long, thin, and roughly 
like a snakeskin—the features which Gaiman describes the parasite as having. However, 
the reader might attempt to imagine the impossible aspect of the creature as far as possible, 
perhaps by imagining one part of its impossible description (that it is a hole, or that it has 
nothing around it). She may give up and leave that part of her mental image hazy and ill-
defined. Similarly, the reader of ‘Sylvan’s Box’ may imagine an empty box, a full box, 
alternatingly imagine an empty and a full box, or imagine a box with vague contents. I am 
reluctant to limit exactly how the reader could imaginatively respond to the instruction to 
imagine an absolute impossibility, as readers will respond to these impossible descriptions 
in varied and idiosyncratic ways.55 Besides, the argument I make here is that there are some 
kinds of impossible fiction which are imagined in the same way as standard, possible fiction, 
and some kinds of impossible fiction which are not. The former kind of vague impossibilities, 
the latter kind are explicit, direct impossibilities. 
 Readers might engage imaginatively with explicitly impossible elements in other 
ways, as discussed in §5.3 of this chapter. I certainly do not think that the reader’s 
imaginative project ends once she realises that she does not have suitable parameters 
within which she may indeterminately imagine. Fictional entities, even impossible ones, are 
imagined in a mixture of determinate and indeterminate ways, and Gaiman gives several 
non-impossible details about the parasitic creature in The Ocean at the End of the Lane. 
Just as one can indeterminately or determinately imagine how many stripes are on a tiger 
without imagining the entire animal, there are details about the parasite which the reader is 
able to imagine even if she cannot imagine the entire thing.  
So much for what the reader does imagine. A question which philosophers are better 
posed to answer is what is appropriate for her to imagine. I argue that her imagining is 
appropriate if it does not stray too far from the description which is given by the fiction. This 
leaves a substantial amount of leeway, but this is as it should be.  Readers regularly fail to 
imagine certain details of fictions correctly (or at all) without suffering accusations of failure 
to appropriately engage. How many readers imagine that Mr Hyde is taller than Dr Jekyll? 
How many avid Harry Potter film fans imagine Emma Watson instead of bushy-haired, buck-
 
55 They are not necessarily instructed to objectually imagine an absolute impossibility to begin with. 
However, as Stock points out, the descriptions provided by works of fiction are often taken to 
prescribe forming mental images (2017: 143). 
148 
 
toothed Hermione when they read Rowling’s novels? We might not consider these readers 
to have optimally appropriate imaginings, but I doubt we would accuse them of failing to 
imaginatively engage with the fiction. If we are lenient on these readers, we should be 
lenient on the reader of The Ocean at the End of the Lane. A reader can engage 
appropriately with impossible fiction even if she does not imagine its impossible elements 
in detail, and even if her imaginings do not correspond exactly with the description in the 
text. 
This section has shown two things. First, it has shown that impossible fictions are 
frequently objectually imagined to the same standards as possible fiction. This goes some 
way to explaining why there is no tension between the unimaginability of absolute 
impossibilities and successful engagement with fiction. Second, it has identified the kind of 
impossible fiction which cannot be objectually imagined to the same standard as possible 
fiction.56 I have already shown in this chapter that the inability to objectually imagine an 
absolute impossibility is not a substantial threat to successful imaginative engagement with 
impossible fictions. However, this section has shown that there is no reason to think that 
readers find it difficult to engage with many works of impossible fiction even if objectual 
imagination is considered important for successful imaginative engagement. 
 
5.6  Conclusion 
I began this chapter by describing a particular tension: that absolute impossibilities cannot 
be imagined, that fictions require imaginative engagement, and that readers are therefore 
unable to properly engage with impossible fictions. I have dissolved each of these notions. 
The first was dissolved through appeal to Stock’s notion of F-imagining. By dividing the 
notion of imagining into its propositional and objectual senses, Stock shows that there is a 
sense in which even absolute impossibilities can be imagined. The second is dissolved with 
reference to Bourne and Caddick Bourne and to Stock. Readers frequently engage 
appropriately with fictions even if they do not imagine impossible elements. This is because 
the functional principle of normalisation allows readers to treat impossible elements as 
hyperbolic emphasis of a particular theme or tone of the fiction. Finally, analysis of 
indeterminate imagining shows that readers imagine many impossible fictions in just the 
same way they do possible fictions. I conclude that there is no tension between impossible 
 
56 This sort of explicitly impossible fiction is the most likely to cause the sense of defeat discussed in 
§4.6. 
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fictions and standard accounts of imaginative engagement with fiction. While there is always 
a risk that readers will fail to narratively and imaginatively engage with a text (they might be 
distracted or ill-disciplined), absolute impossibilities do not in and of themselves increase 
this risk.  
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Conclusion 
 
The central goal of this thesis has been to articulate how reading impossible fiction is 
different from reading standard, possible fiction. This has required a focus on the aesthetic 
elements of impossible fiction, rather than its more regularly discussed metaphysical and 
ontological features. I have drawn on available work in the aesthetics of impossible fiction, 
and I have supplemented this with relevant work in narratology and literary studies. Doing 
so has shown that reading impossible fiction draws on interesting and important reader 
abilities.  
 First among these abilities is normalisation. The capacity to normalise is one reason 
why readers are capable of incredible flexibility when interpreting fiction. When readers 
normalise, they adopt principles which allow them to engage with impossible fictions despite 
the diversely deviant phenomena these fictions contain. I claim that my account of 
normalisation, informed by Culler and Yacobi, captures and formalises intuitions from 
philosophers like Nolan, Hanley and Matravers about how readers approach impossible 
fictions. 
Another reader ability exposed by my investigation is the capacity readers have to 
modify the kind of imaginative engagement they have with a fiction. Readers are naturally 
able to engage with fiction in a variety of ways, with more or less imaginative activity. We 
are able to recognise where impossible features are no more than hyperbole, and where 
they are a key part of the story. We are able to withdraw and imaginatively alienate 
ourselves from certain parts of a fiction and engage fully with others. This is done even 
when we have very little working knowledge of the author and her goals. 
 I emphasise the fact that, despite the range of effects they engender, impossible 
fictions do not have any effects on readers which are unique to impossible fictions. There 
are so many kinds of fiction, so many different levels of abstraction and unnaturalness that 
it would be surprising if we were able to carve responses to fictions finely at the joints. As 
Walton observes, ‘writers of fiction are a clever and cantankerous lot who usually manage 
to do whatever anyone suggests can’t be done, and philosophers are quick with 
counterexamples (1994: 38).’ Attempting to find an aesthetic effect unique to impossible 
fiction is an unappealing endeavour, since if there is not already a non-impossible fiction 
which engenders that effect, one might be written any minute. What is worse, readers are 
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just as difficult to pigeonhole as authors. No aesthetic effect will be felt consistently across 
all readers of a particular text or genre. This goes for impossible fiction as well. 
 This is not to say that the study of impossible fictions is aimless or unhelpful. In fact, 
the study I have undertaken in this thesis reveals interesting information about reading all 
kinds of fiction. Impossible fiction serves as an extreme stress test for ideas about how 
readers engage with fiction: these ideas may operate under ideal conditions, but they fail to 
capture real reader experiences when exposed to the avant-garde, the postmodern and the 
experimental fictions available. This is why many major accounts of the nature of fiction deal 
with impossible fictions in the course of establishing their theory. By paying specific attention 
to impossible fiction, I have brought several under-analysed reader techniques to the 
forefront, and in doing so shown how flexible and adaptable readers truly are. By combining 
the lessons of literary theory and narratology with the rigour of philosophy, I have shown 
not only how readers engage with impossible fictions but also set out a robust blueprint for 
how readers engage with challenging fictions of all kinds.  
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Appendix A: Existing notions of impossible fiction  
 
A.1  Introduction 
This appendix continues Chapter 1 by discussing existing philosophical work on impossible 
fiction. I consider how my revised definition (impossible fiction is fiction which represents at 
least one absolute impossibility which is not an empty reference) compliments, contradicts 
or resembles how previous philosophers have defined impossible fiction. I show how, 
generally, discussion has focussed on how fiction depicts absolutely impossible 
circumstances. Philosophers frequently assume that this involves strictly logical necessity. 
However, some philosophers have claimed that other kinds of necessity are absolute, 
including metaphysical, conceptual and analytic necessity. I make brief reports on the 
accounts of David Lewis, Kendall Walton, Derek Matravers, Daniel Nolan, Tamar Gendler 
and Kathleen Stock in order to show the history and variety of philosophical interest in 
impossible fiction. I make an aside about the debate on conceptual impossibility which 
arises between the accounts of Gendler, Stock and Matravers. Finally, I argue that only 
Matravers’s definition is incompatible with my revised definition, and even then, there are 
reasons to believe this can be resolved. 
 
A.2  David Lewis 
One early contributor to the field of impossible fiction is Lewis. Lewis directly addresses the 
topic, giving an unambiguous definition: a fiction is impossible if there is no possible world 
where the story is told as known fact (1983b: 274). This means that an impossible fiction is 
one of two kinds of fiction. The first is a fiction which depicts things which could not occur in 
any possible world. The second is a fiction which could not have been told as fact (such as 
a story where nobody could have known that the events occurred). This latter type, Lewis 
establishes, is impossible because it is contradictory: stories must have tellers, and those 
tellers must be able to tell the story (Lewis 1983b: 274). It is impossible for a storyteller to 
know a fact F which states that F cannot be known.  
 In his postscript to ‘Truth in Fiction’, Lewis makes a slight shift in his treatment of 
impossible fictions (1983b). While he uses the term ‘impossible fiction’ as a section header, 
his discussion is entirely concerned with ‘inconsistent fiction’. His use of the term 
‘inconsistent’ implies that he deals with logically impossible fictions. The same subtle shift 
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is also made by Richard Hanley in his defence of Lewis’s work on fiction (Hanley 2004: 
113–114). This is a departure from Lewis’s original definition, which does not imply that 
impossible fictions must contain logical impossibilities. I interpret this shift in focus from 
impossible to inconsistent as Lewis marking out a subsection of impossible fiction. I interpret 
Lewis not as claiming that only inconsistent fictions are impossible, but rather than 
inconsistent fictions are the type of impossible fiction he focusses on in that paper. He 
focusses on this kind of impossible fiction in order to provide conditions for non-vacuous 
fictional truth in inconsistent fictions. Other types of impossible fiction still exist but, by 
implication, contain only vacuous fictional truths. Lewis’s definition of impossible fiction can 
therefore still accommodate absolute impossibilities of all kinds despite his later switch in 
focus to inconsistent fiction. 
 
A.3  Kendall Walton 
Unlike Lewis, Walton’s account of fiction does not deal with possible worlds. In fact, one 
reason he discusses impossible fiction (or, more specifically, impossible fictional worlds) is 
as a reason to deny that fictional worlds are possible worlds (1990: 64). Walton claims that 
possible worlds and fictional worlds are not the same things since fictions can contain 
propositions which, taken together, cannot all be true. In other words, impossible fictions 
exist, and should be taken seriously enough to influence which account of fiction we 
subscribe to. However, Walton is similar to Lewis in noting that the significant aspect of 
these fictions is that they are not counterfactually possible. There is no way that our world 
could have been like the worlds of impossible fiction. This makes his implicit definition of 
impossible fiction similar to that of Lewis. This definition can be extracted from the examples 
of impossible fictional worlds that Walton uses. These include inconsistent fictions such as 
William Hogarth’s False Perspective and H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine. If these 
inconsistent fictions are impossible fictions, then it stands to reason that Walton sees 
inconsistency as a marker of impossible fiction. 
To Walton, inconsistent fiction is not the only kind of impossible fiction. He identifies 
metaphysical impossibilities by name when discussing impossible fictions. His examples of 
metaphysically impossible fictions are Kafka’s Metamorphosis, and various fairy tales where 
people turn into animals or objects. These are also mentioned in Walton’s argument as to 
why fictional worlds cannot be possible worlds. It is clear that Walton thinks that 
metaphysical impossibilities of this kind cannot manifest in any possible world, otherwise 
they would not differentiate possible worlds from fictional worlds. Walton’s definition of an 
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impossible fiction can be extracted from this work. I interpret his claim that impossible 
fictions separate fictional worlds from possible worlds as implying that impossible fictions 
are those which could not represent possible worlds. This end definition is, effectively, the 
same as my own revised definition, and coextensive with that of Lewis.  
 
A.4  Daniel Nolan 
Nolan focusses exclusively on logical impossibilities in his early discussion of impossible 
fiction (Nolan 2007: 667). He later specifies that impossible fictions are those which 
‘represents something as true according to it which is metaphysically or logically impossible 
(2015: 57).’ What Nolan also offers the account of impossible fiction is a thorough 
investigation of metaphysical necessity in his 2011 ‘The Extent of Metaphysical Necessity’. 
This investigation hints at why metaphysical impossibilities are absent from Nolan’s work 
on impossible fiction: he sees metaphysical necessity as less restricted than logical 
necessity. According to Nolan there are some absolute metaphysical necessities: logical, 
conceptual and analytic necessities (2011: 325). The exact content of these necessities is 
not described, but this does indicate that Nolan sees absolute necessity as a wide category.  
 
A.5  Derek Matravers 
Matravers refers only to fictional narratives which describe logically impossible states of 
affairs in his discussion of impossible fiction (2014: 128). This exclusion of metaphysical 
impossibilities could be due to one of three things: omission for the sake of brevity, omission 
for the sake of theory, and omission for the reason of redundancy.  
First, and most likely, Matravers may have overlooked metaphysical impossibilities. 
This oversight could be made deliberately or inadvertently. His comments on impossible 
fiction are fairly brief, and do not represent an exhaustive definition of the kind I make. 
Logically impossible fictions are a more intuitive and easily demonstrated type of impossible 
fiction than metaphysically impossible fictions. Focussing on logically impossible fiction 
alone allows Matravers to relate impossible fiction to his overall thesis in a more concise 
way, making the omission of metaphysical impossibilities a benefit rather than a flaw.  
Second, Matravers may genuinely think that all and only logically impossible fictions 
are impossible fictions. Concluding this is presumptuous, since most other treatments of 
impossible fiction include metaphysically impossible fictions. I include it here for 
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completeness, and do not consider it a likely explanation for the absence of metaphysical 
impossibilities.  
Third, Matravers may think that metaphysical and logical necessity are co-extensive. 
He would not be alone in doing so. Phillip Bricker, for example, equates both kinds of 
necessity under the broader term ‘absolute necessity’ (2008: 8). This is also a substantial 
assumption to make of Matravers, however. Given the relative weight of each of these three 
options, the safest assumption is my first: that Matravers’s definition of impossible fiction 
neither affirms nor denies that fictional metaphysical impossibilities are sufficient for 
impossible fiction. 
 
A.6  Tamar Gendler 
Gendler does not offer a general description of impossible fiction which I can compare to 
my own. Instead, her discussion of impossible fiction is conducted as part of her wider 
arguments about imaginative resistance (Gendler 2000). This discussion focuses on how 
certain fictions depict conceptual impossibilities, and whether readers are able to imagine 
those fictions (Gendler 2000: 66–70). The concern which leads her to this subject is whether 
conceptual impossibility can answer certain questions about the imaginability of fictions 
which prompt imaginative resistance. 
Gendler does not explicitly state what she takes conceptual impossibilities to be, but 
she does offer examples. Her main example of a conceptually impossible story is ‘The 
Tower of Goldbach’, recounted in Chapter 5 (p. 132). A brief recap: after hubristic 
mathematicians prove Goldbach’s conjecture, God’s punishment means that the number 
twelve ceases to be the sum of five and seven. The story is clearly both logically and 
analytically impossible. In other examples of impossible fictions, Gendler argues that the 
concepts of rabbit, playing card and snowman are incompatible with the actions performed 
by Peter Rabbit, the knave of hearts (of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland) and Frosty the 
Snowman (2000: 70–71). This suggests that to Gendler, conceptually impossible fictions 
are those which ascribe actions and properties to a concept which that concept cannot hold. 
 Gendler can be illuminatingly contrasted with Matravers. Matravers calls on similar 
examples to Gendler but does not consider them to be conceptual impossibilities. His claim 
is stronger: these are logical impossibilities. He cites The Wind in the Willows and Through 
the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There (Matravers 2014: 130). The former example 
includes the notion that a toad drives a motorcar, and that a water rat carries a picnic 
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hamper with various cold meats inside. The latter describes a Bread-and-butter-fly: a fly 
made of bread, butter and sugar. Matravers thinks that both instances are logically 
impossible, and that ‘most’ philosophers would agree (2014: 130). The properties ascribed 
to these creatures by the fiction are incompatible with their classes. Toads do not drive cars. 
Flies cannot be made of bread. For the same reason, it seems likely that Matravers would 
group Peter Rabbit and Frosty the Snowman in with these purported logical impossibilities. 
Gendler does not establish whether she takes Peter Rabbit and Frosty to be logically 
impossible fictions, but Matravers’s arguments suggest that this would be a short leap to 
make. 
 
A.7  Kathleen Stock 
The debate on conceptually impossible fiction continues with Stock, who responds directly 
to Gendler’s arguments. Like Gendler, Stock offers an insight into conceptually impossible 
fiction rather than a hard definition of impossible fiction. She accepts the existence of 
conceptually impossible fiction, including Gendler’s ‘The Tower of Goldbach’ (Stock 2003: 
121). However, Stock is unconvinced by the claim that Frosty the Snowman represents a 
conceptual impossibility (2003: 121). She argues that a singing snowman is physically 
impossible but conceptually possible. Her test for conceptual possibility here is significant. 
She claims that there is no inconsistency between the propositions ‘Frosty sings’ and ‘Frosty 
is made of snow’. It is this consistency which guarantees the conceptual possibility of Frosty 
the Snowman.  
Stock’s talk of consistency implies that Matravers is right to think of these issues in 
terms of logical possibility. If ‘drives a motorcar’ is a property inconsistent with the 
classification ‘toad’, then it is logically impossible for a toad to drive a motorcar. This would 
make The Wind in the Willows a logically impossible fiction. However, Stock would deny the 
antecedent to this conditional. If Frosty the Snowman does not manifest any contradiction 
to Stock, it is unlikely that she would consider Toad to be any different. This point is 
developed in the following section. 
 
A.8  Conceptual and logical impossibility 
The debate remains open on whether Frosty the Snowman and The Wind in the Willows 
are impossible fictions. The answer to this question does not impact on my definition of 
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impossible fiction. However, the way in which an answer is given demonstrates how 
substantive disagreement about classification as impossible fiction can proceed under my 
revised definition. I am persuaded by Stock that Frosty the Snowman is not impossible, and 
I extend the same arguments to The Wind in the Willows. There are no absolute 
impossibilities to be found in this work of fiction. I demonstrate this by rejecting Matravers’s 
list of properties which are supposedly inconsistent with the classification ‘toad’: 
(1) Wears goggles, a cap, gaiters and an enormous overcoat. This is logically possible. 
In fact, it is something any one of us would be capable of bringing about given some 
custom-made clothes and a patient toad.  
(2)  Speaks English. This is not biologically or physically possible given the structure of 
the larynx in known toads. However, the discovery of a new species, toad-like in 
every respect except for the ability to mimic spoken language, is entirely possible. 
Plenty of animals are capable of mimicking language, and this has never interfered 
with their species classifications.57  
(3) Owns a stately home. The Jackson Oak in Athens, Georgia, is a tree which owns 
itself. Michael Jackson’s chimpanzee, Bubbles, inherited two million dollars upon 
Jackson’s death. The only thing preventing a toad from owning a stately home is the 
lack of willing donors.  
(4) Prone to passing fits of enthusiasm about vehicular transport. This issue is the most 
potent, as it requires the toad to have certain higher brain functions not typically 
associated with toads. It requires intention and emotion to be enthusiastic about 
vehicles. However, we may run the same test here which Stock applies to Frosty 
the Snowman: it is not clear that any property seen as necessary to the concept (in 
this case, ‘toad’) is inconsistent with the property in question (‘prone to passing fits 
of enthusiasm about vehicular transport’) (Stock 2003: 121). Toads are not defined 
by their lack of enthusiasm about vehicular transport. A toad which could express 
such enthusiasm would be seen as a particularly intelligent toad, rather than a 
different kind of creature altogether. The concept ‘toad’ and the concept ‘enthusiastic 
about vehicles’ can be entertained together. 
Matravers claims that ‘one does not have to be too essentialist’ to think that any of these 
properties are logically inconsistent with classifying something as a toad (2014: 130). I 
argue the exact opposite: one must be extremely essentialist about toads to think that the 
 
57 Mimicry is all that is required to explain Toad’s capacity for English. In the event that Matravers 
thinks the speaking of English involves an intentional activity which communicates meaning, the 
property is dealt with in property 4.  
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character Toad is logically impossible. It would require an extensive list of properties 
necessary to the classification of a toad. I therefore disagree that The Wind in the Willows 
is a work of impossible fiction. In doing so, I have demonstrated that there is still scope for 
meaningful disagreement about whether a work is an impossible fiction under my definition 
of the term.  
 
A.9  Conclusion 
The type of necessity under discussion in these accounts of impossible fiction is necessity 
in the widest sense—a necessity which holds in every possible world or set of 
circumstances. For this reason, many accounts of impossible fiction refer to logical 
impossibility as a sufficient criterion for an impossible fiction. It is for the same reason that 
conceptual, analytic and metaphysical impossibilities are frequently brought up in relation 
to impossible fiction. These types of necessity are also taken to be impossible under all 
circumstances and in all possible worlds. 
This means that most positive accounts of impossible fiction support the revised 
definition I have defended. Lewis, Walton and Nolan all explicitly agree with the notion that 
impossible fiction is fiction which could not have taken place in any possible world. Stock 
and Gendler’s arguments on conceptual necessity do not directly endorse my definition, but 
both are compatible with it. The only definition which outright contradicts my own is 
Matravers’s account, as it allows for logical impossibilities and nothing else. If this is indeed 
the correct interpretation of Matravers, then he and I are at odds. However, I have also 
shown why Matravers might not endorse this reading of his account, and why he might allow 
other types of necessity to feature in a definition of impossible fiction. In either case, I am 
satisfied that the counterfactual definition does not need revision in response to any of the 
accounts of impossible fiction I have discussed in this section.   
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Appendix B: Impressions and existing accounts of 
fiction 
 
B.1  Introduction 
This appendix follows up on my assertion in Chapter 2 that reader impressions are 
compatible with other accounts of fiction. I sketch out two major players in the debate on 
fictional truth: make-believe and intentionalism. I show that reader impressions are not only 
compatible with these accounts, but they even contribute to a reasonable analysis of certain 
works of fiction. I show how the varied reader interpretations of 2001: A Space Odyssey are 
explained by impressions under Walton’s make-believe account. I also show how reader 
impressions explain reader responses to fringe cases of intentionalism: queer readings of 
Batman and Harry Potter. Since reader impressions are not only compatible with these 
accounts, but actually offer some explanatory power for reader behaviour, I conclude that 
reader impressions are theory-neutral. 
 
B.2  Make-believe 
Impressions complement theories of truth in fiction which involve make-believe. The make-
believe account of fictional truth is best exemplified in Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe. 
To Walton, engaging with fiction is an attitude analogous to a child’s game of make-believe 
(1990: 11). To say something is fictionally true is to say that some prop (for example, a 
novel) has prescribed that it be imagined as part of playing the game of make-believe 
associated with that prop (Walton 1990: 61). This theory of fictional truth is compatible with 
the notion of impressions as I have described them. To a make-belief theorist, an impression 
is part of the way we translate from a text to a prescription for imagining something. The 
impression is what the reader considers herself to have been prescribed by the text to 
imagine. However, the make-belief theorist would draw a sharp distinction between 
impressions and fictional truth. To see why, I refer to Kubrick’s 1968 2001: A Space 
Odyssey and its notorious ending.58 
 
58 While a case might be made that 2001: A Space Odyssey is an impossible fiction, I use it here 
only as an example of indeterminate fictional truths.  
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The final ten minutes of Kubrick’s film features a psychedelic sequence filmed using 
the ‘slit scan’ technique, using long exposure to create vivid, patterned colours. This is 
followed by an old man, presumably the film’s protagonist now aged by several decades, 
waking up in bed in a clean, brightly lit room. The camera shows the monolith, the alien 
artefact which catalyses the film’s plot, in the room at the foot of the bed. When the shot 
returns to the bed, the protagonist has been replaced with a glowing fetus, suspended in an 
amniotic sac-like bubble. The scene cuts to a shot of Earth from space, and the fetus looms 
over it, eyes wide open. 
The ambiguity of this ending is noted by critics, and by Kubrick himself (Palmer 2006: 
22; Pezzotta 2013: 55). Given this, a Waltonian might have a difficult job of deciding exactly 
what is the fictional truth at stake in 2001: A Space Odyssey. Walton himself acknowledges 
that in particularly difficult cases, it may be the case that no definite answer is available 
(1990: 146). This is not problematic for accounts of fiction. Many fictions (arguably all 
fictions) contain elements of indeterminacy. All that Walton takes this to mean is that the 
fiction truth is either beyond the reach of ‘any ordinary examination of the work’, or in fact 
non-existent (1990: 146). Despite this, some viewers have clear ideas about what happens 
at the end of 2001: A Space Odyssey. These ideas are based on the impressions they form 
of the film. 
It is possible for viewers to form impressions of the film’s ending which are 
unambiguous (that the protagonist has been kidnapped by aliens; that he is hallucinating 
as he dies of oxygen deprivation). These impressions can develop in wildly different 
directions according to the individual reader, but this is to be expected of a piece of cinema 
which is, on the surface, so ambiguous. As shown earlier, the mere fact that readers can 
form different impressions does not suggest that only one reader has an appropriate 
impression. We have good reason to reserve judgement on what the fictional truth is in 
2001: A Space Odyssey, despite the fact that we do still form impressions. However, 
impressions account for the fact that readers form judgements about what fictionally 
happens despite the fact that the fictional truth itself is indeterminate under the make-
believe theory. 
 
B.3  Intentionalism 
Although I called upon Stock’s account of F-imagining earlier, I have not said much about 
her preferred account of fictional truth: intentionalism. It is informative to compare 
impressions of homosexuality in the Harry Potter and Batman franchises with intentionalist 
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accounts of fiction. Doing so shows how reader impressions are an important and impactful 
feature of how fiction is read and interpreted. I first outline accounts of intentionalism, then 
turn to my case studies in order to demonstrate the role impressions play in the reading and 
discussion of works of fiction alongside an intentionalist model of fictional truth. 
In general, intentionalism is the notion that the author’s intentions are relevant when 
it comes to judging what is fictionally true. The intentionalist agrees that this intention has 
some authority when it comes to determining fictional truth. One recent defender of 
intentionalism, Stock, takes this intention to be Gricean (Stock 2017: 9). Take 2001: A 
Space Odyssey again. A reasonable response to the ambiguous ending is to seek out 
Arthur C. Clarke’s intention—what he meant when he wrote the fiction. This is a Gricean 
intention in that Clarke intends the reader to recognise his intention that she imagine 
something, and that her imagining that thing is based on this recognition of intent. Different 
strands of intentionalism place different emphases on the source and the authority of these 
intentions. Moderate, or modest intentionalists suggest that author intention is informative, 
but it can be overridden by salient features of the text. Extreme intentionalists argue that 
fictional truth is determined by the author’s intention. Hypothetical intentionalists claim that 
it is the best available information about the author’s intentions which informs fictional truths 
rather than the author herself.  
An issue for intentionalist accounts is that the known intentions of the author are 
ignored in a large number of readers’ interpretations of some works of fiction. Differentiating 
between impressions and fictional truth can help the intentionalist account for these 
instances. To demonstrate this, it is helpful to consider two similar cases of specific 
impressions, one of which was ‘confirmed’ by the author, the other not. The cases I refer to 
are readings of homosexuality in the Harry Potter series and in various incarnations of 
Batman. First, Harry Potter.  
Before 2007, the sexuality of the character Albus Dumbledore had been the subject 
of reader speculation. A minority but respected interpretation was that, in the Harry Potter 
franchise, Dumbledore is gay. In terms of impressions, this implies that some readers 
formed the impression, based on the fiction, that Dumbledore is gay. That year, author J.K. 
Rowling announced during a book tour that this was intentional; she had intended for it to 
be fictionally true that Dumbledore is gay ('JK Rowling outs Dumbledore as gay' 2007). In 
this instance, the impressions of some readers coincided with the intention of the author. 
However, it is doubtful that these readers formed this impression on the basis that 
Dumbledore’s homosexuality was Rowling’s intention, or even the most likely interpretation 
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of Rowling’s intention.59 Rather, to these readers, this seemed the most natural 
interpretation of the character. By contrast, some readers found Rowling’s declaration 
controversial because they had not formed the same impression. In both cases, the 
impression (of Dumbledore being gay or straight) was formed prior to the confirmation of 
authorial intention, and in many cases lasted past the confirmation. Later readers may have 
formed the same impressions based on Rowling’s declaration rather than any features of 
the text itself, or even based on the reported impressions of other readers. Neither of these 
scenarios affect the take-home message of this point: reader impressions can be formed 
independently of author intentions, and they may or may not accurately reflect those 
intentions. 
This can be compared with queer readings of Batman, which have been popular 
since, at the latest, 1954, when psychologist Fredric Wertham declared his research had 
confirmed the franchise ‘psychologically homosexual (1955: 189).’ That various 
incarnations of Batman give the impression that the protagonist is gay is a fact exaggerated 
by the camp 1960s-era Batman television show. However, readers have formed the 
impression despite active attempts at dissuasion by authors and other creative directors at 
DC, owners of the intellectual property (Brooker 2000: 226). This demonstrates that author 
intention need not influence reader impressions, even though it may in some cases 
vindicate them. Indeed, many readers with the impression of Bruce Wayne’s homosexuality 
are likely aware that these impressions are in no way intended by the author. Despite 
awareness of the author’s lack of intention, readers can nevertheless form specific 
impressions.60 The key point is this: to the intentionalist, impressions are formed in a 
different way to fictional truths. Impressions explain why readers have particular beliefs, 
theories and headcanons (something they take to be the case in the story without expecting 
that others should) about what fictionally happens, despite full awareness that these beliefs 
do not coincide with the author’s intention. 
 
B.4  Conclusion 
Any theorist, no matter what their conception of fictional truth is, can accept that readers 
form impressions of fictions. The only difference between theorists is to what extent these 
 
59 Stock argues that it is an open question as to whether Rowling seriously intended this reading 
(2017: 88). This means that, to Stock, Dumbledore’s sexuality is indeterminate in the Harry Potter 
series. 
60 See Currie (1991: 103) for further discussion of lack of intention. 
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impressions should influence our idea of what is fictionally true. This can be seen even more 
clearly when we consider a philosopher who opposes the account of Bourne and Caddick 
Bourne: Graham Priest. Given an impossible fiction, Bourne and Caddick Bourne conclude 
that the Lewisian account is sufficiently strong that we should prioritise it—our impressions 
are mistaken, and do not point to fictional truth. Priest, on the other hand, draws the opposite 
conclusion. From the impression that something impossible happens in a story, he argues 
that we can draw the conclusion that fictional worlds are not consistent (1997: 580–581). 
There is nothing about impressions themselves which forces us to choose between Bourne 
and Caddick Bourne and Priest on fictional truth. 
An impression is an understanding of what is going on in a story, and one which 
does not necessarily take theories of fictional truth into account. Unlike fictional truths, 
impressions are not related to any attempt at pinpointing the nature of a fictional world. They 
are not based on any metaphysical claim about the nature of fictional truth. They are simply 
the beliefs and imaginings that a reader forms as she engages with a story. She does not 
need an account of fictional truth to do so, although possessing one may influence the 
impressions she forms (a dedicated narrow intentionalist may have quite different 
impressions while reading a historical text when compared to a layperson, for example). 
We form impressions every time we engage with fiction, and the process is largely 
automatic. In this way, it is akin to parsing language—we form impressions of fictions 
without conscious effort, and the only way to prevent even a rudimentary impression from 
being formed is to turn away.  
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